关系股东视角的大股东控制与上市公司投资效率关系研究

发布时间：2018-02-01 18:11

本文关键词： 大股东控制投资效率财务决策资本结构公司治理　出处：《兰州大学学报(社会科学版)》2017年05期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：选择2011-2015年我国上海和深圳证券交易所民营上市公司作为研究样本,从关系股东视角对大股东控制进行了实证分析,研究了大股东对投资效率的影响。同时,更进一步讨论了企业的财务决策结果对其关系的调节作用。研究发现,第一大股东单独无法对投资效率产生影响;而前五大、前十大股东的持股状况对投资效率有显著的影响。而从股权制衡角度来看,无论是用Z指数还是用S指数来衡量股权制衡,都会对投资效率产生显著的影响。而当企业存在关系股东且持股比例较高时,就越有可能使得投资效率产生损失。进一步地关于财务决策的研究发现,当企业负债程度越高时,大股东导致的投资效率损失就会越少,就越会使得企业的投资效率得到改善。这在很大程度上是由于负债具有显著的治理作用造成的。
[Abstract]:This paper selects the private listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock exchanges from 2011-2015 as the research sample, and makes an empirical analysis on the control of large shareholders from the perspective of relational shareholders. This paper studies the influence of large shareholders on investment efficiency. At the same time, it further discusses the adjusting effect of financial decision results on the relationship between the major shareholders and the investment efficiency. The study shows that the first largest shareholder alone can not have an impact on the investment efficiency; And the top five, the top ten shareholders have a significant impact on the investment efficiency. And from the equity balance point of view, whether the Z index or S index to measure equity checks and balances. All of them have a significant impact on investment efficiency. However, when there are related shareholders and the proportion of shares is high, it is more likely to cause loss of investment efficiency. Further research on financial decision-making found. When the degree of corporate debt is higher, the loss of investment efficiency caused by large shareholders will be less, and the investment efficiency of enterprises will be improved, which is largely due to the significant governance role of debt.
【作者单位】：兰州大学管理学院;
【基金】：兰州大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(11LZUJBWZY050)
【分类号】：F275;F832.51
【正文快照】： 上市公司大股东控制的现象一直是理论界和实务界研究与关注的问题。在上市主体中,大股东通过多种方式对上市公司实施控制,最常见的是通过一股独大、多层的股权控制链、关系股东等形式。例如,一股独大普遍存在于大多数国家的公司当中,而我国的第一大股东持股的均值也高达31.59%

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