股权结构与高管薪酬对我国上市公司投资的影响研究

发布时间：2018-02-04 04:32

本文关键词： 股权结构高管薪酬投资过度投资不足　出处：《湖南大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：本文以代理理论和信息不对称理论为基础，结合我国上市公司“一股独大”和薪酬管制的制度背景，将管理层与股东冲突、大股东与中小股东冲突纳入一个统一的框架中，就股权结构、高管薪酬对投资过度和投资不足的影响进行了理论分析，并以我国上市公司2007~2011年的数据为样本，，运用非平衡面板数据的回归方法，实证检验了股权结构、高管薪酬对上市公司投资决策的影响。研究发现，在我国上市公司中既存在投资过度的情形，也存在投资不足的问题。股权结构对于企业的投资过度和投资不足的影响不同。第一大股东持股比例对于企业投资过度的影响总体来讲并不显著，但在非国有控股的上市公司中，第一大股东持股对企业投资过度影响显著，并呈现“倒U”形的关系。就投资不足而言，第一大股东持股比例与投资不足之间存在着显著的负相关关系，即第一大股东持股比例越高，企业的投资不足问题越小。但在非国有控股的上市公司中，这一关系并不显著，这恰好与投资过度的回归结果相对应。此外，作为解决管理层与股东冲突的高管薪酬激励，对于企业投资过度和投资不足的影响也不同。首先，对于投资过度，总体而言，不当高管薪酬激励加剧了企业的投资过度。这在地方政府及一般国有企业控制上市公司、非国有控股的上市公司中表现显著，高管薪酬契约失效导致了企业投资决策的代理问题；而在中央及部委控制上市公司中，高管薪酬与企业投资过度关系并不显著。就投资不足而言，总体上，上市公司高管薪酬与企业投资不足存在着显著的负相关关系。高管薪酬的提升，有助于缓解企业投资不足的问题，有效的管理层薪酬激励可以解决企业投资决策上的代理问题。但对不同控股股东的上市公司影响存在着差异。对于中央及部委控制上市公司而言，高管薪酬与企业不足显著负相关，但地方政府及一般国有企业控制上市公司其高管薪酬与企业投资不足负相关但不显著，在非国有控股上市公司中，高管薪酬甚至与企业投资不足正相关但不显著。本文的研究对于理解上市公司薪酬激励制度的经济后果具有一定意义，同时也为如何优化上市公司股权结构、完善高管激励约束和公司治理提供了一个有益的视角。
[Abstract]:On the basis of agency theory and information asymmetry theory, combined with the institutional background of "one share dominance" and salary regulation of listed companies in China, this paper conflicts management with shareholders. The conflict between major shareholders and minority shareholders is brought into a unified framework. The influence of ownership structure and executive compensation on overinvestment and underinvestment is analyzed theoretically. Taking the data of Chinese listed companies from 2007 to 2011 as a sample and using the regression method of non-equilibrium panel data, this paper empirically tests the influence of equity structure and executive compensation on the investment decisions of listed companies. It is found that there is overinvestment in listed companies in China. There is also the problem of underinvestment. The impact of ownership structure on the overinvestment and underinvestment of enterprises is different. However, in the non-state-owned holding listed companies, the largest shareholder stock ownership has a significant impact on the investment of enterprises, and presents a "inverted U" relationship. As far as underinvestment is concerned. There is a significant negative correlation between the proportion of the largest shareholder holding and the underinvestment, that is, the higher the proportion of the first largest shareholder, the smaller the problem of underinvestment. But in the non-state-controlled listed companies. The relationship is not significant, which corresponds to the regression result of excessive investment. In addition, as a solution to the conflict between management and shareholders, executive compensation incentives have different effects on overinvestment and underinvestment. First, for over-investment, overall. Improper executive compensation incentives have exacerbated the overinvestment of enterprises. This is evident in local governments and general state-owned enterprises which control listed companies and non-state-controlled listed companies. The failure of executive compensation contract leads to the agency problem of enterprise investment decision. In the central and ministerial control of listed companies, the relationship between executive compensation and corporate investment is not significant. In terms of insufficient investment, overall. There is a significant negative correlation between executive compensation and underinvestment in listed companies. The promotion of executive compensation helps to alleviate the problem of underinvestment. Effective management compensation incentive can solve the agency problem in the investment decision of enterprises. However, there are differences in the impact on the listed companies of different controlling shareholders. For the central government and the ministries to control the listed companies. Executive compensation is negatively correlated with the lack of enterprise, but the local government and general state-owned enterprises control the listed companies their executive compensation is negative correlation with the lack of enterprise investment, but not significant, in non-state-owned holding listed companies. Executive compensation is even positively correlated but not significant with underinvestment. The research in this paper has certain significance for understanding the economic consequences of the salary incentive system of listed companies, but also for how to optimize the equity structure of listed companies. Improving executive incentive and restraint and corporate governance provides a useful perspective.
【学位授予单位】：湖南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F272.92;F275;F832.51

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