金融环境、债务治理效应与在职消费
发布时间:2018-02-11 03:28
本文关键词: 金融市场发展 银行借款规模 银行借款期限 在职消费 出处:《石河子大学》2014年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文
【摘要】:经理层在职消费行为是股权代理成本的典型表现之一,虽然在高管激励框架中有一定的存在价值,但在我国特殊的制度背景下,经理层的过度在职消费问题变得尤为突出,引发了高昂的代理成本,对公司的绩效和市场价值产生了负面影响。在职消费是第一类代理成本的表现之一,但在代理问题的研究中,对在职消费的关注还较少。作为公司治理机制的重要组成部分,债务发挥着重要的治理效应。但是我国债券市场尚不发达,上市公司主要融资渠道为银行借款。作为我国企业最主要的融资渠道的银行贷款,对企业行为具有较强的监督作用,因而在治理效应的发挥上,有其特有的优势。此外,金融环境的改善可以进一步提升债务的治理功能,因此本文结合金融环境从银行债务融资这一视角研究对管理层在职消费的治理。 本文选择我国沪市和深市A股上市公司2007—2011年数据为研究样本,结果显示:银行债务规模总体上对经理层在职消费行为发挥了显著治理效应,长期借款比短期借款的治理作用更强,这是因为短期借款的期限较短,风险较小,银行的监管动力有所减弱,而与之相反的是,长期借款期限相对较长,,银行面临的不确定因素较多,从而风险也较大,银行对贷款企业的监管动机也较大;考虑产权性质,相对于国有企业,银行债务对非国有企业的治理作用更显著,这是普遍存在的预算软约束问题所导致的;就目前我国宏观经济环境来看,我国处于经济转轨时期,金融环境的优劣必然会对微观企业行为产生相应的影响,于是本文以金融环境为宏观背景分析银行借款对在职消费行为的治理作用,从金融发展的视角研究金融环境改善对银行债务治理作用的影响。研究表明:金融发展程度越高的地区,银行借款对高管在职消费的治理作用越强,并且这一作用在非国有企业中更为明显。 本文的贡献在于:为在职消费的治理提供新的视角,促进了公司治理理论中的第一类代理成本理论的完善发展,同时也丰富和完善了企业融资理论、公司治理理论,另外考虑了宏观金融环境的影响,丰富和发展了宏观经济政策与微观企业行为之间的研究。
[Abstract]:The in-service consumption behavior of managers is one of the typical manifestations of equity agency cost. Although there is some value in the framework of executive incentive, under the special system background of our country, the problem of excessive on-the-job consumption of managers becomes more and more prominent. It leads to high agency cost, which has a negative impact on the company's performance and market value. On-the-job consumption is one of the performance of the first kind of agency cost, but in the study of agency problem, As an important part of the corporate governance mechanism, debt plays an important governance effect. However, the bond market in China is not yet developed. The main financing channel of listed company is bank loan. As the most important financing channel of Chinese enterprises, bank loan has a strong supervisory function on enterprise behavior, so it has its own advantages in the exertion of governance effect. The improvement of financial environment can further enhance the governance function of debt, so this paper studies the governance of management's in-service consumption from the perspective of bank debt financing combined with financial environment. In this paper, the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2007 to 2011 are selected as the research samples. The results show that the scale of bank debt plays a significant governance effect on the in-service consumption behavior of managers in general. Long-term borrowing is more effective than short-term borrowing because short-term borrowing is shorter, less risky, and banks have less incentive to regulate, whereas long-term borrowing is relatively long. The banks are faced with more uncertain factors, thus the risks are higher, and the supervision motivation of the banks on the loan enterprises is also larger. Considering the nature of property rights, bank debts play a more important role in the governance of non-state-owned enterprises than the state-owned enterprises. This is caused by the widespread problem of soft budgetary constraints. From the point of view of the current macroeconomic environment in China, China is in a period of economic transition, and the merits and demerits of the financial environment will inevitably have a corresponding impact on the behavior of micro-enterprises. So this paper takes the financial environment as the macro background to analyze the governance effect of bank borrowing on the in-service consumption behavior. The influence of financial environment improvement on bank debt governance is studied from the perspective of financial development. The study shows that the higher the level of financial development, the stronger the governance effect of bank borrowing on senior executives' in-service consumption. And this role is more obvious in non-state-owned enterprises. The contribution of this paper lies in: providing a new perspective for the governance of in-service consumption, promoting the perfect development of the first kind of agency cost theory in the corporate governance theory, enriching and perfecting the corporate financing theory and corporate governance theory, In addition, the influence of macro-financial environment is considered to enrich and develop the research between macro-economic policy and micro-enterprise behavior.
【学位授予单位】:石河子大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F832.51;F275
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