股东监督、高管变更与高管薪酬变动

发布时间：2018-02-13 23:28

本文关键词： 股东监督管理层权力关键高管高管变更　出处：《深圳大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：随着我国证券市场的发展,各项制度也在不断的修正和完善,各高管的薪酬也在年报中进行了披露。由于高管薪酬与社会收入分配的公平性、高管腐败等存在密切的联系,因此备受关注。近年来,关于高管薪酬排名等报道频现,也引起了众多的评论。而在学术界,围绕高管薪酬合理性方面的议题也受到了众多学者的青睐。围绕着高管薪酬的现状和问题,众多国内外文献从不同的角度,用不同的方式以及不同的数据对其进行了分析,得到的结论也不尽相同。本文在参考现有文献的基础上,从股东监督、关键高管以及高管变更三个方面进行了对高管薪酬的变动进行了实证研究。采用2013-2015年各上市公司在年报中披露的各位高管薪酬为样本,经过处理之后得到高管薪酬的变动额。比之前的文献,本文衡量高管薪酬变动的数据更具可比性,并且本文的高管包括了所有在年报中披露薪酬的高管,具有广泛性。第四章中对整个数据的收集和处理过程有详细的描述。本文以高管薪酬的变动(ΔPay)作为被解释变量,以管理层权力(power)、股东监督(Supervise)、关键高管(Key)和高管变更(Change)作为主要的解释变量,并加入了职位(Duty)和行业(Industry)等控制变量。采用管理层规模等七个维度对管理层权力进行衡量,采用两权分离度等四个维度对股东监督的强度进行衡量。验证了良好的股东监督可以对高管薪酬的上升起到抑制作用,并进一步验证了良好的股东监督可以抑制管理层权力过大而导致的高管的自利行为。接着在股东监督的基础之上,本文研究了控股股东是否会增强关键高管的业绩关联性,通过激励作用降低代理成本。结果表明,关键高管的业绩薪酬的敏感性要高于非重要高管。最后,验证了高管变更之后,股东更倾向于对新任高管制定一个相对较低的薪酬契约。随后对所采用的模型进行了稳健性检验,结果未发生变化。最后,对本文的假设和结论进行总结。对文章中存在的问题和局限性进行说明,对未来研究的方向提出了自己的看法。
[Abstract]:With the development of China's securities market, various systems are constantly being revised and perfected, and the compensation of senior executives is also disclosed in the annual report. Due to the fairness of executive compensation and social income distribution, there is a close link between executive compensation and social income distribution, senior executive corruption, etc. So much attention. In recent years, reports such as executive compensation rankings have attracted a lot of comments. And in academia, The issue of the rationality of executive compensation is also favored by many scholars. Around the status quo and problems of executive compensation, many domestic and foreign literature from different angles, using different ways and different data to analyze it. The conclusions are also different. Based on the reference of the existing literature, this paper, from the perspective of shareholder supervision, An empirical study of executive compensation changes has been conducted in three areas, namely, key executives and executive changes. The sample of executive compensation disclosed by listed companies in their annual reports from 2013 to 2015 is used as a sample. After processing, we get the change in executive compensation. This paper measures the change in executive pay more comparable than the previous literature, and the executives in this paper include all the executives who disclose the compensation in the annual report. The whole process of data collection and processing is described in detail in Chapter 4th. The main explanatory variables are management power, shareholder supervision, key executive change and executive change, and control variables, such as position Dutch) and industry industry), are added to measure management power using seven dimensions such as management size. The intensity of shareholder supervision is measured by four dimensions of separation degree of two rights. It is proved that good shareholder supervision can restrain the rise of executive compensation. Furthermore, it proves that good shareholder supervision can restrain the self-interest behavior of executives caused by excessive management power. Then, on the basis of shareholder supervision, this paper studies whether controlling shareholders can enhance the performance relevance of key executives. The results show that the performance pay of key executives is more sensitive than that of non-important executives. Shareholders were more inclined to create a relatively low compensation contract for new executives. The model was then tested for robustness, and the results did not change. This paper summarizes the assumptions and conclusions of this paper, explains the problems and limitations in the paper, and puts forward its own views on the future research direction.
【学位授予单位】：深圳大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.51

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