谁在影响二手房的交易价格——来自北京市的经验证据

发布时间：2018-02-16 08:35

本文关键词： 信息不对称议价能力房价　出处：《财贸经济》2017年02期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：在我国部分重点城市逐渐步入"存量房时代"的背景下,由房产中介主导的二手房交易秩序混乱已成为一个不可忽视的重要问题。本文基于北京二手房交易的微观数据,采用双边随机前沿模型测算了买卖双方在通过委托房产中介进行交易时各方的信息不对称程度,并试图分析这种不对称信息对住房成交价格的影响。研究发现:(1)从全样本角度来看,平均而言,卖方至少将以低于市场公正基准价格的1.58%出售自有住房,买方至少将以高于市场公正基准价格的1.22%~8.36%购买住房;(2)在考虑中介佣金的情况下,对于普通住房而言,买方最终支付价格至少高于市场基准价格的0.38%~1.07%;对于非普通住房而言,买方最终支付价格至少高于市场基准价格的0.40%~1.09%。由此可知,作为委托方的买卖双方均在房产中介主导下的交易中被迫接受不平等的议价地位,而代理人房产中介是除政府以外的唯一获益者。本文研究认为,政府应着力于改善二手房市场上这种由房产中介主导的信息不对称局面;买卖双方需注重委托代理关系下激励与约束机制的契约设计。
[Abstract]:Under the background of "stock house era" in some key cities of our country, the disorder of second-hand housing transaction order led by real estate intermediary has become an important problem that can not be ignored. This paper is based on the micro data of second-hand housing transaction in Beijing. Using the bilateral stochastic frontier model, this paper measures the information asymmetry degree of the buyers and sellers when the transaction is carried out by entrusting the real estate agent. The study found that from the perspective of the whole sample, on average, the seller will sell his own home at least 1.58% below the benchmark price of market justice. The buyer will purchase housing at least 1.22% above the benchmark price of market justice.) for ordinary housing, the buyer will eventually pay a price of at least 0.381.07 above the market benchmark price for ordinary housing, taking into account intermediary commissions; for non-ordinary housing, The buyer eventually pays at least 0.40% of the benchmark price of the market. From this we can see that both the buyer and the seller are forced to accept an unequal bargaining position in transactions dominated by the real estate agent. The agent real estate agent is the only beneficiary except the government. This paper argues that the government should focus on improving the information asymmetry situation in the second-hand housing market dominated by the real estate intermediary; The buyer and seller should pay attention to the contract design of incentive and restraint mechanism under the principal-agent relationship.
【作者单位】：厦门大学经济学院;
【基金】：国家自然基金面上项目“交通设施的空间网络特征及异质性产业集聚效应研究”(71573218)
【分类号】：F299.23

【相似文献】