我国上市公司转移定价影响因素的实证研究

发布时间：2018-02-22 02:12

本文关键词： 转移定价利润转移关联交易影响因素　出处：《北京交通大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：摘要：近些年来,转移定价问题一直在学术界备受关注。究其原因,一方面,对转移定价的关注起源于跨国公司出现后引发的国际税收分配问题,另一方面,从盈余管理的角度来看,随着我国会计准则的不断完善,通过会计政策选择和会计估计变更进行盈余管理的空间愈来愈小,而通过关联交易进行盈余管理已经成为上市公司的首选方法,企业集团越来越倾向于利用关联交易来达到降低税负,操纵利润、粉饰财务报表等目的。关联交易是一种中性的经济现象,而衡量关联交易是否正常的一个重要指标就是关联交易的价格,即转移定价(Transfer Pricing)。本文通过理论分析和实证检验相结合的方法,研究了所得税率、管理层薪酬与财务报告相关度、政府持股比例对上市公司转移定价的影响。我国实行25%基本税率和特殊行业区域优惠减免税政策,因而集团内部可能存在不同等级税率。为了达到降低集团整体税负的目的,上市公司就存在强烈动机通过操控转移定价改变集团内部的利润分布格局；在实行股权激励政策的上市公司,管理层持股意味着管理层薪酬高低与财务报告盈余密切相关,为了追求更高的个人报酬,管理层也存在动机操控转移定价来增加上市公司报告盈余；政府控股或持股是我国上市公司的显著特征,国有企业占用更多的社会资源,履行社会责任的压力更大,作为控股母公司的中央或地方政府往往会通过强制抬高或降低转移定价来“掏空”上市公司利润。本文重点研究减轻税负动机、管理层股权激励动机、政府母公司的掏空行为动机下,税率、管理层持股和政府持股对转移定价的影响。在此基础上进一步研究了双重动机对于转移定价的交互影响。研究结果表明,通过提高或降低转移定价来转移利润的行为受到税率、管理层薪酬与报告盈余相关度和政府持股比例三个因素的影响。其中,管理层薪酬与报告盈余的相关程度越高或者上市公司税率越低,上市公司利用抬高转移定价转入利润的行为动机越强；上市公司中央或地方政府持股比例越高,上市公司通过降低转移定价转出利润的可能性越大。同时具有税率动机和政府持股动机的上市公司,研究结果没有表明一个因素对于另一个因素的控制作用。本文的研究结果能够在一定程度上帮助投资者更好的理解我国关联交易中的转移定价行为,而且为政策制定者提供一定的理论依据。
[Abstract]:Absrtact: in recent years, the issue of transfer pricing has attracted much attention in academic circles. On the one hand, the focus on transfer pricing originates from the international tax distribution problem caused by multinational corporations, on the other hand, From the perspective of earnings management, with the continuous improvement of accounting standards in China, there is less and less room for earnings management through the choice of accounting policies and changes in accounting estimates. However, earnings management through affiliated transactions has become the preferred method for listed companies. Enterprise groups are increasingly inclined to use related party transactions to reduce tax burden and manipulate profits. Related party transaction is a neutral economic phenomenon, and the price of related party transaction is the price of transfer pricing. This paper studies the correlation between income tax rate, management compensation and financial report through the combination of theoretical analysis and empirical test. The influence of the proportion of the Government shareholding on the transfer pricing of listed companies. China implements the basic tax rate of 25% and the preferential tax reduction and exemption policy for special industries, so there may be different levels of tax rates within the group, in order to achieve the purpose of reducing the overall tax burden of the group. There is a strong motivation for listed companies to change the distribution of profits within the group by manipulating transfer pricing. In listed companies with equity incentive policies, managerial ownership means that the level of management compensation is closely related to the earnings of financial reports. In order to pursue higher personal reward, the management also has the motive to manipulate the transfer pricing to increase the reported surplus of the listed company, the government holding or holding the stock is the remarkable characteristic of the listed company in our country, and the state-owned enterprises occupy more social resources. The pressure to fulfill social responsibility is greater. The central or local government, as the holding parent company, often "empties" the profits of listed companies by forcing up or lowering transfer pricing. On the basis of the incentive motivation of management equity, the influence of tax rate, management ownership and government ownership on transfer pricing, the interaction between double motivation and transfer pricing is further studied. The results show that the behavior of transferring profits by increasing or lowering transfer pricing is affected by three factors: tax rate, the correlation between management compensation and reported earnings, and the proportion of government ownership. The higher the correlation between the management compensation and the reported earnings or the lower the tax rate of the listed company, the stronger the motivation of the listed company to use the elevated transfer pricing to turn into the profit, and the higher the proportion of the central or local government holding the stock. The more likely a listed company is to make a profit by lowering its transfer price, the more likely it is that the listed company has both a tax incentive and a government ownership incentive. The results of the study do not show the controlling effect of one factor on the other. To some extent, the results of this study can help investors to better understand the transfer pricing behavior in related party transactions in China. And to provide some theoretical basis for policy makers.
【学位授予单位】：北京交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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