基于逆向剪枝模型的P2P网络借贷平台进退分析

发布时间：2018-02-27 21:39

本文关键词： PP网络借贷平台逆向剪枝模型进退分析　出处：《企业经济》2017年04期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：随着互联网金融的快速发展,P2P网络借贷行业之间的竞争日趋激烈,各网贷平台为了争夺市场份额而不断改变其竞争策略,甚至付出高昂代价,由此导致网贷行业的诸多问题日益凸显。本文根据P2P网络借贷平台的竞争状况,将其网贷平台划分为领军者、创新者和跟随者三类,并基于博弈论的视角,建立了逆向剪枝模型,在此基础上,对各类平台的进退问题进行了分析。结果发现:当领军者选择竞争时,跟随者以退出市场为最优选择;当领军者选择合作时,跟随者可继续留在市场,并以提高产品及服务的性价比来争得市场份额;潜在跟随者的最优策略是不进入市场;潜在创新者则应在分析平台的竞争优势及进一步创新的可能性之后,选择进入或不进入的策略。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of Internet finance, the competition between P2P network lending industry is becoming more and more fierce. In order to compete for market share, various network lending platforms constantly change their competitive strategy, even pay a high price. According to the competitive situation of P2P network lending platform, this paper divides the network loan platform into three categories: leader, innovator and follower, and based on the perspective of game theory, the network loan platform is divided into three categories: leader, innovator and follower. The reverse pruning model is established, and on this basis, the advance and retreat problems of various platforms are analyzed. The results show that when the leader chooses to compete, the follower takes exit from the market as the best choice, and when the leader chooses to cooperate, Followers can remain in the market and gain market share by improving the performance and price ratio of products and services, and the optimal strategy of potential followers is not to enter the market. After analyzing the competitive advantage of the platform and the possibility of further innovation, the potential innovator should choose the strategy of entering or not entering.
【作者单位】：东北师范大学经济学院;长春财经学院金融学院;吉林省中小企业和民营经济发展基金管理中心;
【基金】：吉林省教育厅“十三五”社会科学研究项目“基于互联网金融的吉林省中小微企业融资模式研究”(项目编号:吉教科文合字[2016]557号)
【分类号】：F724.6;F832.4

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