管理层权力，不同来源的负债与非效率投资

发布时间：2018-03-02 16:05

本文选题：管理层权力　切入点：经营性负债　出处：《南京理工大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：债务融资是现代企业资本融资必不可少的方式之一,并且我国上市公司2014年末的平均资产负债率已达到49.93%。国外学者从不同的角度进行分析检验,结果发现债务融资会对企业的非效率投资行为发挥约束作用。但是国内学者在进行相关研究时却发现,债务并不能总是发挥对非效率投资的治理作用。所以我们有必要基于中国具体的情境下研究分析债务治理失效的原因。在我国,因为政府作为国有企业中的第一大虚拟控股股东,这使得"内部人控制"问题十分严峻;而在民营企业中,公司创始人不仅是企业的第一大控股股东,还掌握着企业的各项经营活动的决策权,因此管理者会拥有更多的话语权。而在我国这样外部监督薄弱、公司内部治理不完善的大环境下,管理层为了侵占更多的利益极有可能采取各种各样的方法,例如选择更加符合自己利益的融资方式、信息披露的方式等,管理层所采取的这些行动会削弱债务的相机治理作用。所以我们必须从管理层权力这个角度来探索债务治理失效的原因。李心合等(2014)[1]指出,不同于西方国家成熟的资本市场,中国企业进行负债融资首选考虑的是内部融资,其次是经营性负债,最后是金融性负债。而国内很多研究把经营性负债排除在外,或者认为债务是同质的基础上来研究不同来源的负债与企业投资行为之间的关系,这样的做法并没有考虑中国具体的情况,因此必然对中国企业缺乏足够的解释力。因此本文利用沪深两市A股的数据,从债务的来源这个角度考察负债对我国上市公司非效率投资的影响以及管理层权力对债务治理作用的影响。研究结果表明:我国上市公司中的经营性负债可以约束过度投资以及缓解投资不足;金融性负债可以抑制过度投资以及缓解投资不足。所以在基于异质性的解释上,不同来源的负债对企业的非效率投资发挥了治理作用。管理层权力不仅可以削弱不同来源的负债对过度投资的抑制作用,也可以削弱不同来源的负债对投资不足的缓解作用。
[Abstract]:Debt financing is one of the indispensable ways of modern enterprise capital financing, and the average asset-liability ratio of listed companies in China has reached 49.93in end of 2014. The results show that debt financing can constrain the inefficient investment behavior of enterprises, but domestic scholars have found that, Debt can not always play a governance role in inefficient investment. Therefore, it is necessary for us to study and analyze the reasons for the failure of debt governance based on the specific situation in China. Because the government is the largest virtual controlling shareholder in state-owned enterprises, this makes the problem of "insider control" very serious. In private enterprises, the founder of the company is not only the largest controlling shareholder of the enterprise. It also holds the decision-making power of the various business activities of the enterprise, so the managers will have more voice. But in our country, the external supervision is weak, and the internal governance of the company is not perfect. In order to encroach on more interests, the management is very likely to adopt various methods, such as choosing financing methods that are more in line with their own interests, ways of information disclosure, and so on. These actions by management will weaken the camera governance role of debt. So we must explore the reasons for the failure of debt governance from the perspective of management power. [1] Li Xinhe et al. (1) pointed out that unlike mature capital markets in western countries, The preferred consideration for debt financing for Chinese enterprises is internal financing, followed by operational liabilities, and finally financial liabilities. However, many domestic studies exclude operating liabilities. Or that debt is based on homogeneity to study the relationship between debt from different sources and enterprise investment behavior. This approach does not take China's specific situation into account. Therefore, it is inevitable that there is a lack of sufficient explanatory power for Chinese enterprises. Therefore, this paper uses the data from the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares, From the perspective of the source of debt, this paper investigates the influence of liabilities on the inefficient investment of listed companies in China and the influence of management power on the governance of debt. The results show that the operating liabilities of listed companies in China can be reduced to one another. Overinvestment and mitigation of underinvestment; Financial liabilities can curb overinvestment and alleviate underinvestment. So in terms of heterogeneity, The power of management not only weakens the restraining effect of debt from different sources on overinvestment, but also weakens the mitigation of underinvestment by liabilities from different sources.
【学位授予单位】：南京理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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