自愿性信息披露、高管超额薪酬与企业业绩

发布时间：2018-03-09 22:19

本文选题：超额薪酬　切入点：自愿性信息披露　出处：《浙江财经大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：近年来,不断出现的上市公司天价高管薪酬现象引起了社会公众的广泛关注,最优薪酬契约理论认为的高管薪酬契约有效性也受到越来越多的质疑,薪酬契约是否还能够缓解高管与股东之间的代理冲突,企业的薪酬契约是否还存在适用性?管理者权力理论认为高管薪酬契约非但没有达到有效抑制委托代理问题的薪酬制度设计初衷,反而成为了管理层权力寻租的工具,造成高管为了自身利益而牺牲企业利益的困境。天价高管薪酬在一定程度上支持了管理层理论的假说,管理层权力的监督缺位造成的高管薪酬操纵,变向扭曲了薪酬契约假说,表现出来的是高管薪酬与企业业绩的脱钩。自愿性信息披露被认为是相对独立的外部监督机制,能够有效增强企业的信息透明度,包括高管的薪酬信息透明度,从而提高高管利用自身权力操纵薪酬的社会“愤怒成本”。全面的自愿性信息披露一定程度上加大了高管操纵薪酬的难度,有利于缓解高管薪酬与企业业绩的脱钩现象。基于此,本文选取了2012年至2014年上市公司为样本,通过管理层权力理论、信息不对称理论等研究分析了上市公司高管薪酬与企业业绩的关系,并实证检验了自愿性信息披露对上市公司薪酬业绩敏感性的影响。研究结果发现:(1)上市公司高管薪酬与企业业绩仍具有显著的正相关关系,说明上市公司的薪酬契约在一定程度上仍然具有很强的适用性,最优薪酬契约理论在缓解股东与高管的代理冲突上仍有一定作用。然而,高管的超额薪酬与企业业绩却呈现显著的负相关关系,这表明超额薪酬是对高管薪酬契约的扭曲产物,是高管通过自身权力对企业租金的攫取,并不能反映高管自身的努力程度以及企业的业绩状况。(2)高管与股东之间的代理冲突主要表现为高管缺乏有效的监督,本文将自愿性信息披露作为代偿的补充监督机制,发现自愿性信息披露对上市公司的薪酬业绩敏感性有显著的正向调节作用,全面的自愿性信息披露可以有效缓解高管超额薪酬与企业业绩的脱钩现象,提升企业业绩敏感性。依据研究结果,本文认为企业需要完善高管薪酬与企业业绩的管理体系,引入多种指标,有效防止高管获取超额薪酬;同时,提升自愿性信息披露水平,缓解因为信息不对称带来的逆向选择和道德风险;强化媒体、市场中介机构、社会公众的外部监督,提高高管薪酬的透明度。综上所述,本文的研究丰富了高管超额薪酬的相关性研究,验证了高管超额薪酬对企业薪酬契约有效性的扭曲现象,从自愿性信息披露的角度检验了其对上市公司薪酬业绩敏感性的影响,为上市公司缓解薪酬代理问题提供了新的思路。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the phenomenon of sky-high executive compensation of listed companies has aroused widespread concern of the public, and the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts under the theory of optimal compensation contract has been questioned more and more. Whether the compensation contract can alleviate the agency conflict between the executive and the shareholder, and whether the compensation contract of the enterprise still has the applicability? The executive power theory holds that the executive compensation contract has not only failed to achieve the original intention of effectively restraining the principal-agent problem, but also has become the tool of management power rent-seeking. To a certain extent, the sky-high executive compensation supports the hypothesis of management theory, and the executive compensation manipulation caused by the absence of supervision power of management distorts the compensation contract hypothesis. Voluntary disclosure is considered to be a relatively independent external oversight mechanism that can effectively enhance the information transparency of enterprises, including executive compensation information transparency. This increases the social "angry cost" of executives using their power to manipulate compensation. Full voluntary disclosure makes it somewhat more difficult for executives to manipulate compensation and helps ease the decoupling of executive pay from corporate performance. This paper selects listed companies from 2012 to 2014 as a sample and analyzes the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance through management power theory and information asymmetry theory. The empirical results show that there is still a significant positive correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance of listed companies. It shows that the salary contract of listed company still has strong applicability to a certain extent, and the theory of optimal salary contract still plays a certain role in alleviating the agency conflict between shareholders and executives. However, there is a significant negative correlation between the excess compensation and the enterprise performance, which indicates that the excess compensation is the distorted product of the executive compensation contract and the capture of the corporate rent by the executives through their own power. The agency conflict between executives and shareholders is mainly due to the lack of effective supervision. This paper regards voluntary information disclosure as a supplementary supervision mechanism for compensation. It is found that voluntary information disclosure has a significant positive effect on the performance sensitivity of listed companies, and comprehensive voluntary information disclosure can effectively alleviate the decoupling phenomenon between executive excess compensation and corporate performance. According to the research results, this paper thinks that enterprises need to improve the management system of executive compensation and corporate performance, introduce a variety of indicators to effectively prevent executives from getting excess compensation; at the same time, improve the level of voluntary information disclosure. To alleviate adverse selection and moral hazard caused by asymmetric information; to strengthen the external supervision of media, market intermediaries and the public; and to improve the transparency of executive compensation. The research in this paper enriches the correlation study of executive excess compensation, verifies the distortion phenomenon of executive excess compensation to the effectiveness of enterprise compensation contract, and tests its influence on the performance sensitivity of listed companies from the angle of voluntary information disclosure. It provides a new way for listed companies to alleviate the problem of salary agency.
【学位授予单位】：浙江财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.51;F275

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