基于委托代理理论的我国创业板公司治理研究

发布时间：2018-03-12 18:13

本文选题：创业板公司　切入点：委托代理　出处：《广西科技大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：有效的公司治理是我国创业板公司获取较高经营利润和实现可持续发展的前提条件。当前我国创业板公司在治理机制和规范化运作方面存在许多缺陷，如内部人控制、决策监督及激励机制残缺和股权激励缺失等有效治理不足问题。这些问题的出现已经成为我国创业板公司提高利润和获取竞争优势的绊脚石。为此，有效地解决上述公司治理结构问题，优化和改善我国创业板公司治理显得尤为重要和迫切。公司治理理论众多，尤其以委托代理理论最受国内外学者的关注和重视。本文在对公司治理和委托代理文献综述研究和我国创业板公司治理问题的分析基础上，认为股权结构不合理的代理机制缺乏、独立董事和监事会功能弱化的内部治理效率偏低、利益相关者治理不足的外部治理缺失等是我国创业板公司治理问题产生的根源。通过对我国创业板公司治理问题的委托代理分析发现公司治理的基本任务就是协调两者的利益关系，并使得所有权人和控制权人的利益最大化目标趋于一致。本文构建了我国创业板公司治理的委托代理完全信息静态博弈模型，通过委托人和代理人的最优策略选择，求出了博弈的混合纳什均衡。本文还对混合纳什均衡进行求解和经济学分析，指出了相关因素变量对我国创业板公司治理结构的影响。得出的结论包括四点：一是构建适合我国创业板公司规范化发展的委托代理经济契约关系，进一步明确有关各方的权利和义务，实现对控制权的有效管控，最小化监管成本，发挥外部市场监管功能；二是扩大代理人的职权范围，使代理人的努力成本最小化；三是强化代理人激励措施的幅度和力度，如提高代理人的基本薪酬和求偿份额，同时给予代理人适当的风险收入等；四是提高委托人对代理人违规（不尽职）的罚款数额，，使得代理人的违规概率下降。基于委托代理的我国创业板公司治理博弈分析，进一步提出完善我国创业板公司的内外部治理对策和建议。一是优化股权结构，增强决策科学性；二是增强董事会治理的创造力；三是健全监事会监督职权；四是完善和拓展经理市场；五是提升利益相关者共同治理水平；六是健全法律体系和监管机制。
[Abstract]:Effective corporate governance is a prerequisite for gem companies to obtain higher operating profits and achieve sustainable development. At present, there are many defects in the governance mechanism and standardized operation of gem companies, such as insider control. Lack of effective governance, such as incomplete decision-making supervision and incentive mechanism and lack of equity incentive. These problems have become a stumbling block for gem companies to increase profits and gain competitive advantage. It is very important and urgent to solve the above problems effectively and optimize and improve the governance of gem in our country. There are many theories of corporate governance, especially the principal-agent theory, which is paid more attention by scholars at home and abroad. The author holds that the agency mechanism with unreasonable ownership structure is lacking, and the internal governance efficiency of the weakening function of independent director and board of supervisors is on the low side. The lack of external governance of stakeholders is the root of the governance problems of gem companies in China. Through the principal-agent analysis of the governance problems of gem companies in China, it is found that the basic task of corporate governance is to cooperate with each other. Adjusting the interests of the two, And makes the owner and the control person's benefit maximization goal tends to be consistent. In this paper, we construct a static game model of principal-agent complete information in the governance of gem companies in China, and choose the optimal strategy of the principal and agent. The mixed Nash equilibrium of the game is obtained, and the solution and economic analysis of the mixed Nash equilibrium are also given in this paper. The paper points out the influence of relevant factor variables on the governance structure of gem companies in our country. The conclusions include four points: one is to construct the principal-agent economic contract relationship suitable for the standardized development of gem companies in our country. To further clarify the rights and obligations of the parties concerned, to achieve effective control of control, to minimize the regulatory costs, to play the role of external market supervision, second, to expand the scope of authority of the agent, so as to minimize the cost of the agent's efforts; Third, to strengthen the scope and intensity of the agent's incentives, such as increasing the agent's basic salary and compensation share, and giving the agent appropriate risk income at the same time, and fourth, increasing the amount of fines imposed by the principal on the agent's violation (failure to do his duty). Based on the principal-agent game analysis of the governance of gem companies in China, the author puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions to improve the governance of gem companies. First, it should optimize the ownership structure and enhance the scientific decision-making; The second is to enhance the creativity of the board of directors governance; the third is to improve the supervisory authority of the board of supervisors; the fourth is to improve and expand the manager market; the fifth is to improve the level of common governance of stakeholders; sixth, to improve the legal system and supervision mechanism.
【学位授予单位】：广西科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F271;F832.51

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