二级资本债与薪酬设计

发布时间：2018-03-15 23:08

本文选题：二级资本债券　切入点：或有现金收入　出处：《中国管理科学》2017年03期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：2014年以来我国几乎所有银行都发行了可减记的二级资本债,直观上这一新型或有资本显著提高了薪酬结构为固定工资加股权激励的管理者的冒险动机。为此,本文提出在管理者薪酬结构中引入或有现金收入的新举措,分析了二级资本债和或有现金薪酬对管理者冒险动机、公司价值以及破产概率的影响。利用风险中性定价方法给出了二级资本债和管理者薪酬定价的显式解。数量分析表明:发行二级资本债可以通过减少破产概率而增加公司价值,但同时显著提高了管理者的冒险动机。而或有现金薪酬设计有效抑制了这一动机。不仅银行股东可以选择管理者或有现金收入和股权激励来调节管理者的冒险动机,而且银行监管机构可以通过调节减记触发水平来控制银行系统风险。
[Abstract]:Since 2014, almost all banks in China have issued writable secondary capital debt, which intuitively increases the incentive for managers whose salary structure is fixed pay plus equity incentive to take risks. This paper proposes a new measure of introducing contingent cash income into the executive compensation structure, and analyzes the incentive of second-class capital debt and contingent cash compensation for managers to take risks. By using the risk-neutral pricing method, the explicit solutions of the pricing of second-class capital debt and manager's salary are given. The quantitative analysis shows that issuing second-class capital debt can increase the company's value by reducing the probability of bankruptcy. But at the same time, it has significantly improved the managers' motivation to take risks, which is effectively suppressed by contingent cash compensation design. Not only can bank shareholders choose managers or have cash income and equity incentives to regulate managers' motivation to take risks, but not only bank shareholders can choose managers or have cash and equity incentives to regulate managers' motivation to take risks. And bank regulators can control the risk of the banking system by adjusting the level of writedowns.
【作者单位】：暨南大学经济学院;南方科技大学商学院;湖南大学金融与统计学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71502054,71371068) 湖南省研究生创新项目(CX2016B138,521293392)
【分类号】：F832.51;F272.92

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