基于董事会特征的国有上市公司过度投资问题研究

发布时间：2018-03-17 13:07

本文选题：公司治理　切入点：过度投资　出处：《暨南大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：投资决策作为财务运作的重要决策之一，直接影响着企业当前的市场价值和未来的发展前景。所有权和经营权相分离的现代企业经营模式使得上市公司普遍面临委托代理成本问题，我国尚未成熟的资本市场加剧了信息不对称程度，加上我国国有企业面临着国有控股股东缺位、自由现金流较充裕、政府干预较多等特殊背景，国有控股上市公司过度投资问题较普遍，资源配置效率低下，国有资产流失严重。因此，提高国有控股上市公司的投资效率，降低过度投资程度对于保护国有资产的完整性，提高经济运作效率具有重要的现实意义。良好的公司治理能有效缓解委托代理成本问题和信息不对称带来的非效率投资问题，董事会制度作为公司治理的核心机制之一，设置合理、运作良好的董事会能否发挥抑制过度投资的公司治理作用，这是本文研究的问题。本文借鉴Richardson（2006）的预期投资模型，使用预期投资规模与实际投资规模之间的差额衡量非效率投资。本文将董事会特征划分为独立性、勤勉性、激励性和能力背景特征四大类，对于每类特征分别采用两个衡量指标加以反映，并以2009~2012年我国沪深两市A股上市的国有控股上市公司为研究样本，，检验我国国有控股上市公司董事会是否发挥着抑制经理人过度投资行为的作用。本文研究结果表明，我国国有控股上市公司的独立董事制度并不能发挥有效的公司治理作用，提高独立董事比例和独立董事的董事会会议出勤率并不能对经理人的过度投资行为产生抑制作用；董事会下设专业委员会也无法降低过度投资程度；但董事的个人能力与投资效率之间存在显著关系，非独立董事的平均年龄越大，过度投资程度越低，这为上市公司选拔董事提供了参考；董事会会议频率与过度投资之间也不存在显著相关关系；而上市公司的激励机制部分有效，董事薪酬激励机制对过度投资产生了显著的抑制作用，但是由于董事会成员持股比例较低，董事持股机制尚未发挥显著的公司治理作用，因此，完善薪酬制度设计，提高董事持股比例具有一定的公司治理意义。
[Abstract]:Investment decision is one of the important decisions in financial operation. It has a direct impact on the current market value and future development prospects of enterprises. The modern business model, which separates ownership and management rights, makes listed companies generally face the problem of principal-agent cost. China's immature capital market has aggravated the degree of information asymmetry, coupled with the fact that state-owned enterprises are facing the absence of state-owned controlling shareholders, free cash flow is abundant, government intervention is more and other special background. The overinvestment of state-owned holding listed companies is common, the efficiency of resource allocation is low, and the loss of state-owned assets is serious. Therefore, improving the investment efficiency of state-owned holding listed companies and reducing the degree of overinvestment can protect the integrity of state-owned assets. It is of great practical significance to improve the efficiency of economic operation. Good corporate governance can effectively alleviate the problem of principal-agent cost and inefficient investment caused by asymmetric information. As one of the core mechanisms of corporate governance, the board of directors system is one of the core mechanisms of corporate governance. Whether the board of directors with reasonable setting and good operation can play the role of corporate governance to restrain overinvestment is the problem studied in this paper. This paper uses the expected investment model of Richardson's 2006) and uses the difference between the expected investment scale and the actual investment scale to measure the inefficient investment. In this paper, the characteristics of the board of directors are divided into four categories: independence, diligence, motivation and ability background. For each type of characteristics, two measurement indexes are used to reflect the characteristics, and a sample of state-owned holding listed companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares from 2009 to 2012 is taken as the research sample. To test whether the board of directors of the state-owned listed company plays a role in restraining managers' overinvestment. The results of this paper show that the independent director system of the state-owned listed companies can not play an effective role in corporate governance. Increasing the proportion of independent directors and the attendance of independent directors' meeting can not restrain the managers' over-investment behavior, nor can the establishment of professional committee under the board of directors reduce the degree of over-investment. However, there is a significant relationship between the individual ability of directors and investment efficiency. The older the average age of non-independent directors, the lower the degree of overinvestment, which provides a reference for the selection of directors of listed companies. There is no significant correlation between the frequency of board meetings and overinvestment, and the incentive mechanism of listed companies is partly effective, and the incentive mechanism of directors' compensation has a significant inhibitory effect on overinvestment. However, due to the low proportion of board members holding shares, the mechanism of directors holding shares has not played a significant role in corporate governance. Therefore, it is of certain significance to improve the design of compensation system and increase the proportion of directors holding shares.
【学位授予单位】：暨南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51;F275

【参考文献】