投资者调研与高管薪酬契约有效性研究

发布时间：2018-03-22 09:15

本文选题：投资者调研　切入点：高管薪酬契约　出处：《当代财经》2017年03期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：立足于信息不对称视角,以深圳交易所2013-2015年上市公司为研究样本,从薪酬业绩敏感性和薪酬粘性两方面实证检验了投资者调研与高管薪酬契约有效性的关系,并进一步考察公司股权结构对二者关系的影响。研究发现:投资者调研强度越大的公司,薪酬业绩敏感性越高而薪酬粘性越低,这种影响在公司不存在绝对控股股东时更为显著;进一步检验发现,投资者调研通过提高财务报告质量作用于高管薪酬契约。此外,相对于买方机构,卖方机构的调研强度对高管薪酬契约有效性的影响更显著。
[Abstract]:Based on the perspective of asymmetric information, this paper tests the relationship between investor research and executive compensation contract effectiveness in terms of compensation performance sensitivity and compensation stickiness, taking Shenzhen Stock Exchange as a research sample from 2013 to 2015. Furthermore, the influence of equity structure on the relationship between them is investigated. It is found that the stronger the investor investigation is, the higher the sensitivity of salary performance is and the lower the stickiness of compensation is. This effect is more pronounced when the company does not have absolute controlling shareholders; further tests show that investor research works on executive compensation contracts by improving the quality of financial reporting. The research intensity of seller's organization has a more significant effect on the effectiveness of executive compensation contract.
【作者单位】：北京交通大学经济管理学院;中央财经大学会计学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金面上项目“内部控制缺陷披露的经济后果:盈余质量、权益价值与资本成本”(71272055);国家自然科学基金面上项目“市场化环境对企业创新投资效率的影响研究:宏微观视角”(71572009);国家自然科学基金面上项目“新兴市场国家IFRS制定过程中的博弈及经济后果研究”(71372011)
【分类号】：F272.92;F272.91;F832.51

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