高管激励、内控质量与真实活动盈余管理

发布时间：2018-03-25 12:16

本文选题：高管激励　切入点：内控质量　出处：《北京交通大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：随着现代企业的发展,股东逐渐将企业经营权委托给高管,并根据其对企业的贡献程度确定高管激励。但是,由于代理成本以及信息不对成的存在,股东无法全面有效的衡量高管的贡献程度,不合理的高管激励措施可能会引起高管操纵真实活动盈余管理,从而损害了公司利益。因此,如何实施有效的高管激励措施引起了极大的关注。目前,很多学者研究管理层激励中显性薪酬与应计项盈余管理的关系,而真实活动盈余管理主可以直接作用于现金流,不受会计政策、会计估计变更的影响,可以在会计期间的任何时点发生,它更为隐蔽且更具破坏性与风险性,高管在获得激励时是否还会选择这种高风险的盈余管理方式是值得探究的。因此,本文将真实活动盈余管理作为盈余管理的代理变量,同时薪酬激励分别以货币薪酬、股权激励、在职消费作为代理变量,从显性薪酬、隐性薪酬两个角度全面分析高管激励对真实活动盈余管理的影响。同时,学者多集中于研究高管权力在中间的影响,很少关注内部控制是否作为调节变量也对薪酬契约产生重要作用。随着内部控制规范的颁布,上市公司内部控制质量不断提高,降低了上市公司盈余管理水平,对企业价值创造和保护投资者利益都产生了重要影响,基于此,本文分析了内部控制在其二者之间是否存在调节作用,是否能够促进高管薪酬激励更有效的地发挥作用,同时提出合理建议,对完善企业对内部控制制度与薪酬契约的建立健全提供了理论与实践紧密结合的新视角。本文依据委托代理理论、信息不对称理论、管理层权力理论以2010-2014年A股上市公司为样本,以非正常生产成本、非正常费用与非正常经营现金净流量为真实活动盈余管理的代理变量,深入分析了高管激励与真实活动盈余管理的相关性,并进一步研究了内部控制对高管激励与真实活动盈余管理的调节效应。结果表明:高管货币薪酬能够抑制真实活动盈余管理;高管股权激励能够抑制真实活动盈余管理;适度在职消费对高管进行真实活动盈余管理行为具有替代作用,但过度在职消费会诱发真实活动盈余管理的发生。并且,内部控制质量高时抑制作用、替代作用更明显且减轻了诱发程度。
[Abstract]:With the development of modern enterprises, shareholders gradually entrust the management power of the enterprises to the executives and determine the incentive of the executives according to their contribution to the enterprises. However, due to the existence of agency costs and mismatch of information, Shareholders cannot fully and effectively measure the contribution of senior executives, and unreasonable executive incentives may lead to executives manipulating earnings management in real activities to the detriment of the company. At present, many scholars have studied the relationship between explicit compensation and accrual earnings management in management incentive, while real earnings management can directly affect cash flow. Changes in accounting estimates, which are not subject to accounting policies, can occur at any point in the accounting period and are more subtle and destructive and risky, Therefore, this paper regards real activity earnings management as the proxy variable of earnings management, and the compensation incentive is based on monetary compensation. Equity incentive, in-service consumption as a proxy variable, comprehensively analyzes the impact of executive incentive on earnings management in real activities from the perspective of explicit compensation and implicit compensation. At the same time, scholars mostly focus on the impact of executive power in the middle. With the promulgation of internal control norms, the quality of internal control of listed companies continues to improve, which reduces the earnings management level of listed companies. It has an important impact on the creation of enterprise value and the protection of investors' interests. Based on this, this paper analyzes whether the internal control has a regulating role between them and whether it can promote the executive compensation incentive to play a more effective role. At the same time, it provides a new angle of view to perfect the establishment of internal control system and salary contract. According to the principal-agent theory and information asymmetry theory, this paper provides a new angle of view which combines theory and practice closely. The management power theory takes A share listed companies from 2010 to 2014 as a sample and takes abnormal production costs, abnormal operating cash flows and abnormal operating cash flows as agent variables of real earnings management. The correlation between executive motivation and earnings management of real activities is deeply analyzed. The effect of internal control on executive incentive and real activity earnings management is further studied. The results show that executive monetary compensation can restrain real activity earnings management, executive equity incentive can restrain real activity earnings management, and executive equity incentive can restrain real activity earnings management. Moderate on the job consumption has the substitution function to the executive to carry on the real activity earnings management behavior, but the excessive on-the-job consumption will induce the real activity earnings management to occur, moreover, when the internal control quality is high, the restraint effect, The substitution effect was more obvious and reduced the degree of induction.
【学位授予单位】：北京交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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