政府管制下我国上市公司薪酬的尺蠖效应研究

发布时间：2018-03-26 08:04

本文选题：政府管制　切入点：薪酬变动　出处：《广东财经大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：人力资本作为企业资源要素中最为积极和重要的因素,是企业发展和价值增值的动力和源泉。公司治理理论主要围绕高管薪酬激励研究展开,作为人力资本重要组成元素的普通职工如何影响企业价值,研究一直相对较少。本文从企业价值与薪酬体系关系出发,以2009-2015年中国上市公司为样本,将高管薪酬与普通职工薪酬进行对比分析,同时,在政府政策影响背景下,分国有和非国有上市公司,研究高管与普通职工薪酬的差距变化以及薪酬——业绩敏感性。研究发现:(1)在企业加薪时,高管薪酬增加幅度高于普通职工;在企业减薪时,高管薪酬降低幅度低于普通职工。(2)在企业业绩上升时,高管享有比普通职工更高的报酬增幅;当企业业绩下降时,高管薪酬变化幅度相比于普通职工无明显差异、或仍有一定增幅;即在公司薪酬总额的分享上,由于高管享有企业代理权和控制权,高管与普通职工薪酬存在随业绩变动的不对称性,从而使得薪酬机制最大限度偏向于高管薪酬的保全。(3)政府政策的影响对象为国有企业高级管理人员,因此,国有企业高管薪酬变动与薪酬业绩敏感性低于非国有企业,同时,高管管理层权力越低,受政府政策影响程度越大。本文实证结果有助于政府改良和推进实施企业薪酬管制;有助于企业所有者合理制定激励机制;对于预防人才流失将起到一个不容忽视的重要作用。
[Abstract]:As the most active and important factor of enterprise resource, human capital is the motive force and source of enterprise development and value increment. As an important element of human capital, there has been relatively little research on how ordinary workers and staff members influence the enterprise value. This paper, based on the relationship between the enterprise value and the compensation system, takes the Chinese listed companies from 2009-2015 as a sample. This paper makes a comparative analysis of executive compensation and ordinary staff compensation, and at the same time, under the influence of government policies, the listed companies are divided into state-owned and non-state-owned listed companies. Study on the pay gap between executives and ordinary employees and pay sensitivity. The study found that: 1) when a company raises a salary, the increase in executive pay is higher than that of an ordinary worker; when a company reduces its salary, The reduction of executive compensation is lower than that of ordinary employees.) when the performance of the enterprise rises, the executive enjoys a higher increase in compensation than the ordinary employees; when the performance of the enterprise drops, the range of the change of the executive pay is not significantly different from that of the ordinary employees. Or there is still a certain increase; that is, in the share of the total compensation of the company, because the executives have the power of agency and control of the enterprise, there is asymmetry between the executive and the ordinary employees' compensation with the change of the performance. As a result, the compensation mechanism is biased towards the preservation of executive compensation to the maximum extent. (3) the government policy affects the senior managers of state-owned enterprises. Therefore, the sensitivity of executive compensation and salary performance of state-owned enterprises is lower than that of non-state-owned enterprises, at the same time, The lower the power of executive management, the greater the degree of influence by government policy. The empirical results of this paper are helpful for the government to improve and promote the implementation of corporate compensation control, to help business owners to develop a reasonable incentive mechanism; For the prevention of brain drain will play an important role that can not be ignored.
【学位授予单位】：广东财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.51

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