产品市场竞争与上市公司盈余管理方式研究
发布时间:2018-03-29 05:28
本文选题:产品市场竞争 切入点:竞争类型 出处:《西南财经大学》2014年博士论文
【摘要】:盈余管理作为学术界的研究热点,吸引了大量学者的关注。直到真实盈余管理的出现,这股盈余管理的研究热潮又一次涌起。但无论应计盈余管理还是真实盈余管理,研究都只是停留在公司治理层面。大量的文献集中于研究产权性质,股权结构等内部治理机制与应计或真实盈余管理之间的关系。但对于经营层面因素是否影响公司盈余管理策略的研究还较少,虽然国外学者在该方面的研究处于领先地位,但其研究均指向应计盈余管理,尚未涉及真实盈余管理。产品市场竞争力如何影响公司盈余管理策略以实现管理公司报告盈余仍是一个被忽略的问题。 虽然研究表明产品市场竞争主要通过公司治理机制和信息机制影响盈余管理,但研究都仅限于“竞争强度”这个概念,事实上,竞争强度只是产品市场竞争最基本的一个维度,单从竞争强度这个概念,并不能明晰产品竞争对盈余管理的作用机制。管理层在进行盈余管理决策时,除了受到产品市场竞争强度的影响,必定会受到其他可能因素的影响。因此,有必要将产品市场竞争进行多维度划分后,再进行研究。 竞争强度衡量了公司所处行业的竞争程度以及行业内所处的竞争地位,代表了一种外部竞争环境。在面临不同程度的竞争压力时,企业由于自身所处行业的特质以及在行业内所处的竞争地位,在面对需求下降的风险时,拥有不同程度的缓冲能力,因此,盈余下降程度也不尽相同,管理层的盈余管理动机强弱程度自然也受到相应的影响。总体来说,竞争强度主要考量的是外部竞争环境对盈余管理动机强弱问题的影响。 单个企业在面临竞争压力的情况下,势必会根据现时的产业竞争强度分析结果,确定一种可成为努力目标的竞争优势,即确定竞争战略,成本化或差异化竞争战略。差异化和成本化战略是市场上公司实现竞争优势的两大典型战略方式,每种战略都是基于不同的价值链活动和不同的资源契约。从事差异化竞争战略的公司,要么在技术上领先,要么拥有较高的客户忠诚度,只有这样才能使自己与竞争对手区分开来。为了实现这一目标,差异化战略实行者需要在关键领域增加投资,比如:新产品的研发,品牌的创建,市场营销和广告的推广,雇员培训,质量控制等。然而,这些资源是专门用来实现其战略化目标的,一般是不可移动或者不能完全移动的,因此,对于差异化战略实行者来说,减少这些专业化资源的调整成本过高,当收入下降时,差异化战略实行者较成本化战略实行者会将闲置资源保留至下一期使用,只要这些资源的调整成本高于保留成本。对于成本化战略实行者,该类型的公司试图以最低的成本提供产品和服务,实现利润最大化。为了实现这一目标,成本化战略实行者集中于成本控制活动,对于成本化战略实行者来说,维持一定的销售规模和市场份额远比专业化资源重要的多,当遭遇同等水平的需求下降,成本化战略企业会较快并且较大程度的削减闲置资源,最大限度的降低成本以减少利润下降程度。也就是说,在收入下降时,差异化战略较成本化战略实行者具有较高的成本粘性。 如果竞争战略类型确实影响成本粘性,则意味着不同战略类型的企业在成本性态上存在差异。那么,当遭遇需求下降或者利润下降的困境时,成本性态的差异会不会使企业在盈余下降程度上存在差异?从长期来看,是否影响企业盈余的波动性,进而影响分析师盈余预测偏差?这种差异是否会影响企业管理层的盈余管理动机强弱程度?从而导致管理层从事不同程度及不同方式的盈余管理行为?这些问题将在文中进行详细探讨。 竞争战略衡量了单个企业面对外部竞争压力时为维持竞争优势所作出的战略选择,当这些竞争战略仍然无法实现企业的竞争目标时,就会主动寻求与竞争对手建立一种长期或短期的合作关系以实现战略性目的,这种多个企业之间达成的战略合作关系称之为“战略联盟”。这种合作是企业为了现实生存或长远发展的需要而采取的行动,具有明确的战略意图和目标,但合作关系本身则不一定是长期稳定的,战略联盟成员之间既是合作伙伴又是竞争对手。 通常,企业群体之间容易达成的两类战略互动联盟是产量竞争和价格竞争联盟。这种竞争类型的差异,往往导致企业在经营策略和管理策略上存在一定的差异。对于产量竞争类型的公司,最重要的是确定下阶段是否有能力实现目标产量的增加以实现利润最大化,为了实现该目标,公司需要获得融资进行资本投资,此时,以最低成本获取资金就变得尤为重要。这种经营目标导向使得企业将注意力集中在融资市场上,竞争成员之间即合作又竞争的关系使其提供高质量的盈余信息以获得低成本的资金成为其首选;处于价格竞争类型的公司,由于产能已经在经营的上一阶段确定,下一阶段的主要目标是维持企业在联盟成员之间以及行业内的竞争地位,战略联盟即合作又竞争的关系,使其选择披露更低质量的盈余报告,以阻止竞争对手聚焦于他们的公司,这是因为过多的重要信息披露给竞争伙伴或者对手,很可能使战略伙伴通过战略联盟探测市场,等到“羽翼丰满”,再分灶吃饭。这样一来,昔日的“兄弟”很有可能成为不共戴天的对手,提供高质量的盈余信息,只会削减企业未来的自身边际收益并享受不到任何资本成本下降带来的好处,因此,该类型的企业将会选择提供质量更低的盈余报告。 如上所述,对于产量竞争类型的公司,其盈余管理的主要动机是基于资本市场动机,而价格竞争类型的公司,其盈余管理的动机主要是基于产品市场。因此,产品市场竞争类型这一维度主要考察竞争类型对盈余管理动机差异的影响,以及对盈余管理程度及方式的影响。 本文将从产品市场竞争角度出发,在对产品市场竞争进行多维度细分的情况下,试图研究经营层面因素如何影响管理者盈余管理决策。具体的,本论文拟从产品市场竞争的三个维度:产品市场竞争强度、产品市场竞争战略和产品市场竞争类型分别展开研究。 实证研究部分的研究结论可概括为以下几点: (1)产品市场竞争强度与盈余管理策略。本章通过将行业竞争强度细分为行业间竞争强度和行业内竞争优势两个层面,检验了产品市场竞争对盈余管理水平以及盈余管理方式的影响,同时对国有与非国有企业做了比较分析。研究表明:从盈余管理程度来看,无论行业层面还是公司层面,面临较高竞争程度和竞争压力的企业(竞争性行业和竞争劣势企业),盈余管理水平较高,产品市场竞争并未有效发挥治理机制;在盈余管理方式上,竞争性行业的企业偏向使用应计盈余管理,处于竞争劣势地位的企业偏向使用应计和真实盈余管理相结合的方式;而区分产权性质后,国有企业中处于竞争性行业以及处于竞争劣势的企业更偏向使用真实盈余管理,而非国有企业中,以上企业则选择使用应计盈余管理,尤其偏向使用负向应计盈余管理,说明产品市场竞争在非国有企业更多的发挥了信息机制,使其为避免掠夺性威胁采取了调减利润的行为。 (2)产品市场竞争战略与盈余管理策略。本章将产品市场竞争战略作为主要研究对象,通过引入成本粘性的分析,发现产品市场竞争战略与盈余管理存在以下关系:差异化竞争战略与成本化竞争战略对盈余管理程度的影响并不显著,只在盈余管理方式上存在显著差异,从整体来看,成本化战略实行者偏向使用真实盈余管理。进一步的,考虑竞争强度这一外部因素,笔者发现,从行业间竞争强度来看,在竞争程度较低的行业,差异化战略偏向应计盈余管理,成本化战略选择应计与真实盈余管理相结合的方式。从行业内竞争地位来看,处于竞争劣势的企业,采用差异化战略程度越高,越偏向使用应计盈余管理实现战略目标,而处于竞争优势的企业,成本化战略的使用程度越高,越偏向使用真实盈余管理。最后,按照产权性质分类后,在国有企业,差异化战略企业偏向使用应计盈余管理,成本化战略企业偏向使用应计和真实盈余管理相结合的方式。以上结果表明,差异化战略和成本化战略虽然在成本粘性上存在显著差异,但这种成本粘性的差异对盈余管理水平并没有显著影响,而对盈余管理方式作用显著。 (3)产品市场竞争类型与盈余管理策略。本章主要研究了产量竞争和价格竞争两种类型的公司在盈余管理水平及盈余管理方式上是否存在显著差异,以及行业竞争环境是否影响了其作用机制。研究成果表明:首先,与经典文献中的假设不同,产量竞争类型的公司较价格竞争类型公司从事了更多的盈余管理活动,并在盈余管理方式上呈现出显著差异,产量竞争类型偏向使用应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理相结合的方式实现特定盈余动机,而价格竞争类型只偏向与负向应计盈余管理;其次,较非战略互动公司而言,产量竞争类型和价格竞争类型的公司都从事了较高程度的盈余管理,也就是说,战略互动的公司比非战略互动公司从事了较多的盈余管理;考虑产品竞争强度后,研究发现激烈的竞争环境(行业间与行业内结论一致)加剧了产量竞争类型和价格竞争类型的盈余管理活动;最后,考虑产权背景后,经验证据发现在国有产权背景下,行业竞争环境越发激烈,产量竞争类型从事盈余管理的动机越强,并且主要方式是真实盈余管理;而价格竞争类型公司从事负向应计盈余管理的动机也随之增强。在行业内竞争优势方面,实证结果并未得出竞争优势地位降低两类竞争类型公司盈余管理程度的证据,反而支持了竞争优势地位的国有价格竞争类型企业,更容易采取负向应计盈余管理隐瞒利润。 本文可能的创新体现在以下几点: 1.与以往研究不同,本文从经营层面的因素—产品市场竞争出发,研究其与盈余管理水平之间的关系,打破了盈余管理与公司治理之间的固定思维模式,拓展了盈余管理影响因素的研究;另外,本文将真实盈余管理纳入研究范围,在拓展盈余管理影响因素研究的同时,也丰富了真实盈余管理领域的研究成果;最后,结合产权背景,明晰了产品市场竞争的两大作用机制在不同产权背景下所发挥的不同作用,将产品市场竞争与制度背景有机的结合在一起,具有一定的现实意义。 2.与以往研究不同,本文通过实证方法将产品市场竞争细分为3个维度:产品市场竞争强度、产品市场竞争战略和产品市场竞争类型,尤其是对竞争类型的划分,在国内研究成果中十分罕见。同时,对各种维度下,产品市场竞争对盈余管理的作用机制展开详细研究。细化了产品市场竞争领域的相关研究。 3.本文提出企业竞争战略因在成本粘性上存在差异,因其应对风险时对闲置资源调整幅度施的差异,导致其盈余波动性存在差异,进而影响外部分析师的盈余预测偏差,最终导致两者采取的盈余管理程度及盈余管理方式也有所差异,这一研究成果是对成本粘性领域的拓展研究,丰富了成本粘性经济后果方面的研究成果。
[Abstract]:Earnings management has attracted a lot of scholars ' attention as a hot spot in the academic circle . However , the research of surplus management is only staying at the corporate governance level until the emergence of real earnings management . However , the research is focused on the research on the property of property rights and equity structure and the relationship between the internal governance mechanism and the accrual or real earnings management . However , the research on whether the management level factor affects the management of earnings management has not been involved in real earnings management .
Although the research shows that the product market competition mainly affects earnings management through corporate governance mechanism and information mechanism , the research is limited to the concept of " competitive strength " . In fact , competition intensity is only one dimension of product market competition . In fact , the competition intensity is only one dimension of product market competition .
The competition intensity measures the competition degree of the industry and the competitive position in the industry . It represents an external competitive environment . In the face of the different degree of competition pressure , the enterprise has different degree of buffering capacity in the face of the characteristics of the industry and the competitive position in the industry . Therefore , the degree of earnings decline is not the same , and the strength and weakness degree of the management ' s earnings management motivation are also affected . Generally speaking , the competition intensity mainly considers the influence of the external competitive environment on the weak problem of earnings management motivation .
In order to achieve this goal , differentiated strategy practitioners need to increase investment in key areas , such as R & D of new products , brand creation , marketing and advertising promotion , employee training , quality control , etc . In order to achieve this goal , differentiated strategy implementers need to increase investment in key areas , such as the development of new products , brand creation , marketing and advertising promotion , employee training , quality control , etc .
If the type of competitive strategy does affect the cost stickiness , it means that there is a difference in the cost behavior of enterprises with different strategic types . In the long run , whether the difference in the cost behavior will not make the enterprise difference in earnings fall ? From the long term , it will affect the earnings forecast deviation of the analyst . Will this difference affect the earnings management motivation of the management of the enterprise ? These problems will be discussed in detail in this paper .
The competitive strategy measures the strategic choices made by a single enterprise to maintain competitive advantage in the face of external competitive pressure . When these competition strategies still fail to achieve the enterprise ' s competitive goals , it will actively seek to establish a long - term or short - term cooperative relationship with the competitors to achieve strategic objectives . Such cooperation is an action taken by the enterprise to achieve the needs of survival or long - term development , with clear strategic intentions and objectives , but the cooperative relationship itself is not necessarily long - term stable , and the strategic alliance members are both partners and competitors .
Generally speaking , the two types of strategic interaction alliance which is easy to achieve among the enterprise groups is the alliance of production competition and price competition . The difference of this kind of competition often leads to the existence of some differences in the business strategy and management strategy . For the company with the competitive type of production , it is important to determine whether the next stage has the ability to achieve the maximization of profit . In order to achieve the goal , the company needs to obtain financing for capital investment . At this time , the company needs to obtain financing for capital investment .
Companies that are of the type of price contend that , as capacity has been identified in the previous phase of operations , the main objective of the next phase is to maintain the competitive position of the business between the members of the Alliance and within the industry , the strategic alliance , which is a cooperative and competitive relationship , to prevent competitors from focusing on their companies , because too much of the important information is likely to become a rival , providing high - quality surplus information , reducing the future self - marginal benefits of the enterprise and enjoying the benefits of a decline in any cost of capital . Therefore , the type of business will choose to provide a lower quality surplus report .
As mentioned above , for companies of the type of production competition , the main motivation of earnings management is based on the incentive of capital market , while the company with price competition type is mainly based on the product market . Therefore , the dimension of product market competition type mainly examines the influence of the competition type on the difference of earnings management motivation and the influence on the degree of earnings management and the way .
From the point of view of product market competition , this paper attempts to study how to influence managers ' earnings management decision - making in the case of multi - dimension segmentation of product market competition .
The conclusions of the empirical research can be summarized as follows :
( 1 ) Product market competition intensity and surplus management strategy . This chapter examines the impact of product market competition on earnings management and earnings management by dividing industry competition intensity into two levels of competition intensity in industry and competitive advantage in industry .
In the way of surplus management , enterprises in competitive industries prefer to use accrual surplus management , and the enterprises in competitive disadvantage are biased towards the combination of using accrual and real earnings management ;
After distinguishing the property right property , the enterprises in the state - owned enterprises are in the competitive industry and the enterprises in the competitive disadvantage are more inclined to use the real earnings management , while in the non - state - owned enterprises , the above enterprises choose to use the accrual surplus management , in particular to the use of the negative accrual surplus management , which indicates that the market competition of the products has played an information mechanism more in the non - state - owned enterprises , so as to adopt the action of reducing profits to avoid predatory threats .
( 2 ) The strategy of product market competition and surplus management strategy are discussed in this chapter .
( 3 ) Product market competition type and surplus management strategy . This chapter mainly studies whether there are significant differences in earnings management and earnings management of companies with different types of production competition and price competition , and whether the competition environment of industry affects their mechanism of action .
Secondly , compared with non - strategic interactive companies , companies of the type of production competition and price competition are engaged in a higher degree of earnings management , that is , the firms with strategic interaction are engaged in more surplus management than non - strategic interactive companies ;
After considering the competitive strength of the products , the research finds that the fierce competition environment ( which is consistent with the conclusion in the industry ) increases the profit management activities of the yield competition type and the price competition type ;
Finally , after considering the background of property rights , empirical evidence has found that under the background of state - owned property , the stronger the competition environment of the industry , the stronger the incentive for the surplus management of the production competition type , and the main way is the real earnings management ;
In the field of competitive advantage , the empirical results do not conclude that the competitive advantage position reduces the earnings management level of the two types of competition types , but instead supports the state - owned price competition type enterprise with competitive advantage status , and it is easier to take the negative accrual surplus management to conceal the profit .
Possible innovations of this article are reflected in the following points :
1 . Unlike previous research , this paper studies the relationship between earnings management and earnings management from the factors of management level - product market competition , breaks the fixed thinking mode between earnings management and corporate governance , and expands the research on the influencing factors of earnings management ;
In addition , in this paper , the real surplus management is included in the research scope , and the research results of real earnings management are also enriched while the influence factors of surplus management are expanded .
Finally , with the background of property right , the different roles of the two mechanisms of product market competition in different property rights background are clarified , and the market competition and the system background are combined together , which has practical significance .
2 . Unlike previous research , this paper divides the product market competition into three dimensions : product market competition intensity , product market competition strategy and product market competition type , especially the classification of competition type , which is very rare in domestic research results .
3 . In this paper , the author puts forward that the enterprise ' s competitive strategy is different because of the difference in the cost viscosity , which leads to the difference of the surplus volatility and the surplus forecast deviation of the external analyst . The result is that the surplus management degree and the surplus management method are different . The research result is an expansion study in the field of cost sticky , which enriches the research results in the economic consequences of cost sticky economy .
【学位授予单位】:西南财经大学
【学位级别】:博士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F832.51;F275;F273.2
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