控股股东定向增发择时问题研究

发布时间：2018-04-03 05:21

本文选题：控股股东　切入点：定向增发　出处：《西安工业大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：我国上市公司再融资具有明显的股权偏好,定向增发自确立以来,已迅速成为上市公司再融资方式的首选。伴随着资本市场对定向增发高度热情一起出现的,是过度融资、频繁增发,利益输送等问题,定向增发已从简单的再融资方式发展为上市公司控股股东进行资本运作的手段和途径。本文结合证券发行管制制度,基于择时理论,从市场时机和政府管制时机两个维度出发,对上市公司控股股东定向增发过程中的择时问题进行系统研究。本文在理论分析的基础上,通过研究2010--2016年6月沪深两市A股定向增发成功的上市公司,并采用logistic回归估计研究方法,分析了定向增发过程中市场时机以及政府管制时机变化对控股股东定向增发行为的影响,并将样本进一步分离,检验不同市场行情下的控股股东择时行为,比较市场时机与政府管制时机对于控股股东定向增发行为的影响程度。研究发现,控股股东的定向增发具体行为,是斟酌市场时机和政府管制时机的结果。市场时机相较于政府管制时机,对控股股东定向增发行为影响更深。在上述研究结论基础上,通过采用定价折扣率作为利益输送代理变量,本文实证研究发现市场时机与政府管制时机对定价折扣率有着显著的影响,控股股东越能够有效的把握和利用这样的时机来进行利益输送。资产认购方式由于其特殊的双重“关联性”,可以有效的弥补市场时机的不足。本文的研究结论认为,控股股东定向增发行为受市场时机和政府管制时机影响,市场时机是控股股东考虑定向增发行为的基础,控股股东通过择时确定相应定向增发行为,隐蔽而有效的进行了利益的输送,损害了中小股东的利益。
[Abstract]:The refinancing of listed companies in China has obvious equity preference. Since the establishment of directional additional issuance, it has rapidly become the first choice of refinancing methods of listed companies.Along with the high enthusiasm of the capital market for additional directional offerings, there are problems such as excessive financing, frequent issuance, transmission of benefits, and so on.Directional placement has developed from simple refinancing to capital operation of controlling shareholders of listed companies.In this paper, based on the timing theory, this paper systematically studies the timing problem in the process of controlling shareholders' directional issuance of listed companies from the two dimensions of market timing and government regulatory opportunity, combined with the regulation system of securities issuance.On the basis of theoretical analysis, this paper studies the successful listed companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares in June 2010-2016, and adopts the logistic regression estimation method.This paper analyzes the influence of market timing and government regulation on the behavior of controlling shareholders in the process of directional placement, and further separates the samples to test the timing behavior of controlling shareholders under different market conditions.To compare the influence of market opportunity and government regulation on controlling shareholder's behavior of directional placement.It is found that the specific behavior of controlling shareholders is the result of market timing and government regulation.Market timing has a deeper impact on controlling shareholders' targeted placement than government regulation.On the basis of the above conclusions, by using the pricing discount rate as the proxy variable, the empirical study shows that the market opportunity and the government regulation opportunity have a significant impact on the pricing discount rate.The more the controlling shareholder can effectively grasp and utilize such an opportunity to carry out profit transmission.Because of its special "relevance", the asset subscription method can effectively make up for the shortage of market opportunity.The conclusion of this paper is that the behavior of the controlling shareholder is influenced by the market opportunity and the government control opportunity, which is the basis of the controlling shareholder to consider the behavior of the private placement, and the controlling shareholder determines the corresponding behavior by timing.Concealed and effective transmission of interests, to the detriment of the interests of small and medium shareholders.
【学位授予单位】：西安工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F832.51

【参考文献】