放松卖空管制与企业环境信息披露质量——基于重污染企业的准自然实验

发布时间：2018-04-04 06:40

本文选题：环境信息披露　切入点：卖空　出处：《中国软科学》2017年11期

【摘要】：环境问题已受到各界的普遍关注,环境信息披露成为企业接受社会监督、承担社会责任的重要纽带。本文采用2009-2015年的中国重污染行业上市公司为样本,借助于中国资本市场2010年放松卖空管制这一"准自然实验",实证检验了放松卖空管制对企业环境信息披露质量的影响机制。研究发现,放松卖空管制提高了企业环境信息披露质量,这一影响主要体现在第一大股东持股比例较高的企业中,并且在环境规制相对较弱的地区,这种影响更为显著。本文的研究结论表明:市场监督机制不仅能够有效促进公司治理的发挥,还可以与政府治理机制形成替代作用,为我国建立市场化机制,推进环境保护市场化提供了经验证据。
[Abstract]:Environmental problems have received widespread attention from all walks of life. Environmental information disclosure has become an important link for enterprises to accept social supervision and undertake social responsibility.In this paper, the listed companies of heavy pollution industries in China from 2009-2015 are used as samples. With the aid of the "quasi-natural experiment" of the deregulation of short selling in China's capital market in 2010, the paper empirically tests the mechanism of the impact of deregulation on the quality of environmental information disclosure of enterprises.It is found that the deregulation of short selling improves the quality of environmental information disclosure, which is mainly reflected in the enterprises with higher shareholding ratio of the largest shareholders, and in the regions where environmental regulation is relatively weak, this effect is more significant.The conclusion of this paper shows that the market supervision mechanism can not only effectively promote the corporate governance, but also form a substitute role with the government governance mechanism, which provides empirical evidence for China to establish a market-oriented mechanism and promote the marketization of environmental protection.
【作者单位】：对外经济贸易大学国际商学院;新疆财经大学会计学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71662209);国家自然科学基金项目(71662209,71602004) 教育部“新世纪优秀人才支持计划”(NCET-11-0623) 对外经济贸易大学研究生科研创新基金资助(2017076)
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;X322

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