机构投资者持股、证券分析师跟随与上市公司违规行为

发布时间：2018-04-10 03:30

本文选题：机构投资者　切入点：证券分析师　出处：《南京理工大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：我国股市建立20多年来,已经在国民经济的持续快速增长中占据了重要的地位。但是,我们同时也要看到上市公司违法违规事件屡禁不止,使广大中小投资者蒙受惨重损失,也阻碍了证券市场资源优化配置功能的有效发挥。防范和治理上市公司违规行为变得极为重要和迫切。公司内部治理对上市公司违规行为的影响一直受到学术界的关注,但是相对外部的一些治理因素研究甚少。一方面,作为证券市场的专业投资人士,机构投资者因持股比例高而受到抛售自由度的限制,同时随着证券市场和机构投资者的不断发展,机构投资者对上市公司的积极影响日益凸显。另一方面,作为上市公司信息的搜集、加工和传递者,证券分析师在降低公司的信息不对称程度的同时也能对管理层的行为加以监督,并且也有学者研究发现其在揭发公司财务丑闻等发面也具有一定的优势,可谓是一种重要的外部治理机制。本文以我国沪深两市的A股上市公司为研究对象,深入探讨了机构投资者持股、证券分析师跟随状况对上市公司违规行为的影响。首先,从我国证券市场特有的制度背景出发,对近年来年我国上市公司违规行为的数量特征和质量特征进行描述性统计及深层次的原因分析,从而对我国上市公司违规行为概况有一个整体的把握。其次,本文以2008-2011年沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,分别考察了机构投资者持股和证券分析师跟随对上市公司违规行为的影响,并重点考察了同时考虑机构投资者持股与证券分析师跟随相互作用情况下的影响差异。最后,基于自变量与因变量的内生性问题,本文检验了上一期机构投资者持股与分析师跟随情况对当期上市公司违规行为的影响,从而对回归结果进行内生性控制。统计结果发现,近年来我国上市公司违规被公开处罚的数量呈现由增到减再增的变化趋势,违规类型主要以信息披露违规为主。实证研究结果发现,机构投资者持股、证券分析师跟随与上市公司违规行为显著负相关。同时,机构投资者持股与证券分析师跟随之间相互影响,一方的存在减弱了另一方在上市公司中发挥的监督作用。在控制内生性问题后得到的结果仍然稳健。以上研究结果说明我国机构投资者和证券分析师在预防上市公司违规行为方面发挥了重要的监督作用,同时也提供了治理和防范公司违规行为的线索。
[Abstract]:China's stock market has occupied an important position in the sustained and rapid growth of the national economy since the establishment of the stock market more than 20 years ago.But at the same time, we should also see that the illegal and illegal events of listed companies do not stop repeatedly, which makes the majority of small and medium-sized investors suffer heavy losses, and also hinders the effective exertion of the function of optimizing the allocation of resources in the securities market.It is very important and urgent to prevent and manage the illegal behavior of listed companies.The influence of corporate internal governance on listed companies' illegal behavior has been concerned by academic circles, but there are few researches on some external governance factors.On the one hand, as a professional investor in the securities market, institutional investors are restricted by the freedom to sell because of their high shareholdings. At the same time, with the continuous development of the securities market and institutional investors,The positive influence of institutional investors on listed companies is increasingly prominent.On the other hand, as the information collection, processing and transmission of listed companies, securities analysts can also monitor the behavior of management while reducing the degree of information asymmetry.And some scholars find that it also has some advantages in exposing corporate financial scandals, which is an important external governance mechanism.This paper takes the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets as the research object, and discusses the influence of institutional investors' shareholding and the stock analyst's follow on the listed companies' illegal behavior.First of all, based on the unique institutional background of China's securities market, the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of illegal behaviors of listed companies in China in recent years are analyzed by descriptive statistics and deep-seated reasons.Thus, the general situation of illegal behavior of listed companies in China has a holistic grasp.Secondly, taking the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as the research samples from 2008 to 2011, this paper examines the influence of institutional investors' shareholding and securities analysts' following on the listed companies' illegal behavior.The influence of institutional investor holding and securities analyst following is considered.Finally, based on the endogenous problem of independent variables and dependent variables, this paper examines the influence of institutional investors' shareholding and analyst's follow on the current listed companies' illegal behavior in the last period, and then carries on the endogenous control to the regression results.The statistical results show that in recent years, the number of listed companies' illegal punishment has changed from increasing to decreasing and increasing, and the main types of violations are information disclosure violations.The empirical results show that institutional investors' shareholding and securities analysts' followings are negatively correlated with listed companies' irregularities.At the same time, institutional investor holdings and securities analysts follow each other, with the presence of one attenuating the other's supervisory role in listed companies.The results obtained after controlling the endogenetic problem are still robust.The results show that institutional investors and securities analysts play an important supervisory role in preventing listed companies from violating the regulations, and also provide clues to the governance and prevention of corporate irregularities.
【学位授予单位】：南京理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F830.42;F832.51

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