股权激励、税收征管与盈余管理

发布时间：2018-04-11 07:36

本文选题：股权激励 + 税收征管　；参考：《浙江大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：股权激励是公司治理领域的重要内容,采用股权激励计划,公司可以降低经理人的道德风险,减少因为股东和经理人之间的利益矛盾而造成的委托—代理成本。国内外研究表明,虽然股权激励对于公司治理来说具有积极意义,但却也可能成为诱使经理人进行盈余管理的动因。经理人可能采取一定的方式人为调节报表盈余,使自己能够在股权激励方案当中取得更多的利益。在股权激励授予之前,经理人可能实施向下的盈余管理,从而提高激励标的价值。这样的行为可能对公司所有者的利益造成侵害,因而,研究和识别股权激励前后经理人的盈余管理行为有利于维护公司所有者的利益,提高股权激励实施的有效性,有利于公司的长远发展。由于盈余管理的手段多种多样,既涉及应税行为,又涉及非应税行为。因此,在股权激励计划实施的过程中,所得税成本成为了盈余管理方式选择的一个重要参考因素。本文从股权激励这一特定公司治理行为出发,研究不同宏观环境下经理人盈余管理行为的异质性,填补相关研究的空白,识别经理人机会主义行为,也为进一步完善公司治理机制提供依据。同时,税收征管强度变量的引入有助于识别经理人进行盈余管理方式选择时的避税动因,可以为税收征管部门提供一定的参考。本文研究发现,在股权激励授予前,公司会实施向下的真实活动盈余管理。在高强度的税收征管水平下,公司向下的真实活动盈余管理会受到抑制。进一步地,股权激励授予阶段的公司,税收征管显著抑制其向下的真实活动盈余管理,经理人更加倾向采用应计项目盈余管理达到业绩目标。基于研究结论,本文认为公司应提高内部治理水平,识别并控制经理人对利润的过度操控;投资者在分析公司投资价值时应重点关注公司行为对盈余管理可能造成的影响,并加以识别,从而排除"盈余异象"的干扰,判断公司的真实价值;税收征管部门应当依法实施行政监管,对异常报税的公司进行识别和审核,防止逃税行为的滋生。
[Abstract]:Equity incentive is an important content in the field of corporate governance. By adopting the equity incentive plan, the company can reduce the moral hazard of managers and the principal-agent cost caused by the conflict of interests between shareholders and managers.Studies at home and abroad show that although equity incentive has positive significance for corporate governance, it may also become an incentive to induce managers to carry out earnings management.Managers may adopt a certain way to artificially adjust their earnings so that they can gain more benefits from equity incentive schemes.Managers may implement downward earnings management before equity incentives are awarded, thus increasing the value of incentive marks.Such behavior may infringe upon the interests of the owner of the company. Therefore, studying and identifying the earnings management behavior of the managers before and after equity incentive is conducive to safeguarding the interests of the owner of the company and improving the effectiveness of the implementation of the equity incentive.It is good for the long-term development of the company.Earnings management involves both taxable and non-taxable behavior because of its variety of means.Therefore, the cost of income tax has become an important reference factor in the choice of earnings management during the implementation of equity incentive plan.Starting from the specific corporate governance behavior of equity incentive, this paper studies the heterogeneity of managers' earnings management behavior in different macro environments, fills up the gaps in relevant research, and identifies the opportunistic behavior of managers.Also for the further improvement of corporate governance mechanism to provide the basis.At the same time, the introduction of the intensity variable of tax collection is helpful to identify the tax avoidance motivation when managers choose the way of earnings management, and can provide a certain reference for the tax collection and management department.In this paper, we find that before equity incentive is granted, the company will carry out downward earnings management of real activities.At the level of high-intensity tax collection, the downward earnings management of the company's real activity will be restrained.Further, in the stock incentive awarding stage, the tax collection and management significantly inhibit the downward true earnings management, and managers tend to use accrual earnings management to achieve performance goals.Based on the conclusion of the study, this paper holds that the company should improve the level of internal governance, identify and control the excessive manipulation of profits by managers, and that investors should focus on the possible impact of corporate behavior on earnings management when analyzing the investment value of the company.In order to eliminate the interference of "earnings anomaly" and judge the true value of the company, the tax collection and management department should carry out administrative supervision according to law, identify and examine the abnormal tax return companies, and prevent the breeding of tax evasion.
【学位授予单位】：浙江大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F272.92

【参考文献】