杠杆并购中负债水平对并购绩效敏感性研究——基于高管持股代理成本效应视角

发布时间：2018-04-18 09:50

本文选题：并购绩效 + 融资结构　；参考：《会计之友》2017年14期

【摘要】：融资结构是决定公司并购成败的基础和关键,合理的融资结构不仅能提供充裕的并购资金,还可以降低并购方的融资成本和财务负担,影响并购方资本结构的变化和控制权的转移。文章选取2003—2015年中国沪深两市A股6 459个上市公司成功主动并购事件的数据,利用多元线性回归模型,实证分析了融资结构对并购绩效的影响以及在高管持股条件下对其的影响作用。研究结果表明:在普遍采取现金并购的支付方式下,高债权融资结构有利于提高并购绩效;高管持股比例越大的公司,采用高债权融资结构对并购绩效的正向作用越弱;另外,高债权融资结构对公司并购绩效保持短期持续性正向作用后趋于稳定。本研究认为,有主动并购倾向的国内上市公司在考虑融资时应更多地采取债权融资方式,同时限制高管行为,削弱高管对公司的控制权。
[Abstract]:Financing structure is the basis and key to the success or failure of M & A. Reasonable financing structure can not only provide abundant M & A funds, but also reduce the financing cost and financial burden of the M & A parties.It affects the change of capital structure and the transfer of control right.In this paper, the data of 6 459 successful M & A events of A shares listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in China from 2003 to 2015 are selected, and the multivariate linear regression model is used.The influence of financing structure on M & A performance and the influence of executive ownership on M & A performance are analyzed empirically.The results show that: under the payment of cash M & A, the structure of high creditor's rights financing is beneficial to improve the performance of M & A; the larger the proportion of senior management is, the weaker the positive effect of high debt financing structure is on the performance of M & A;The financing structure of high creditor's rights has a positive effect on M & A performance in the short term and then tends to be stable.In this study, domestic listed companies with active M & A tendency should adopt debt financing more when considering financing, while limiting executive behavior and weakening executive control over the company.
【作者单位】：吉林大学;海南大学;
【基金】：海南省自然科学基金项目“海南省旅游业发展对农民收入影响的理论与实证研究”(20157257)
【分类号】：F271;F275;F832.51

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