股权激励与公司绩效：基于调整成本

发布时间：2018-04-21 21:32

本文选题：股权激励 + 公司绩效　；参考：《上海交通大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：股权激励与公司绩效一直是公司金融领域研究中十分重要的问题。股权激励的实施旨在减少代理成本，促使管理层与股东的利益达成一致。较多的股权激励会增加股东成本，造成“掘壕自守效应”，较少的股权激励难以匹敌管理层利用职务便利带来的好处，股权激励没有相应的效果。因此，只有股权激励能够快速调整到最优水平时，才能对公司绩效起到正向的影响，保障大股东的利益不受损害。然而，为了达到最佳公司绩效或是为了达到最佳的股权结构水平，企业适时的改变股权激励计划以及公司绩效是有调整成本的。由于调整成本的存在，均衡所有权结构与可观察到的所有权结构不一致。本文将从调整成本的视角入手，定义调整成本为把股权激励以及公司绩效调整到合理水平所需的“费用”。正是这些“费用”，导致了公司实际股权结构（公司绩效）与最佳股权结构（公司绩效）的偏差。文章首先对比研究了考虑调整成本之前以及考虑调整成本之后股权激励与公司绩效之间的关系。在不考虑调整成本的情况下，股权激励与公司绩效相互间有显著的负向关系，但是考虑调整成本之后，公司绩效对于股权激励的负向影响消失；同时，，一些之前对解释股权激励以及公司绩效显著的控制变量变的不再显著。这证明如果忽略了调整成本，会造成股权激励、公司绩效以及公司特点之间的谬误关系。文章最后寻找了调整成本的决定因素。在决定因素方面，股权激励的调整速度与机构投资者持股比例、高管数量以及市场价格正相关，公司绩效的调整速度与沉没成本正相关而与公司定价能力负相关。
[Abstract]:Equity incentive and corporate performance are very important issues in the field of corporate finance. The implementation of equity incentives aims to reduce agency costs and promote agreement between management and shareholders. More equity incentive will increase the cost of shareholders, resulting in "trench self-defense effect", less equity incentive is difficult to match the advantages of management to take advantage of job convenience, equity incentive has no corresponding effect. Therefore, only when the equity incentive can be adjusted to the optimal level quickly, can it have a positive impact on the corporate performance and protect the interests of the major shareholders from being harmed. However, in order to achieve the best corporate performance or to achieve the best level of equity structure, the enterprise timely changes the equity incentive plan and corporate performance is the adjustment cost. Due to the existence of adjustment cost, the equilibrium ownership structure is inconsistent with the observable ownership structure. From the perspective of adjustment cost, this paper defines the adjustment cost as the "cost" required to adjust the equity incentive and corporate performance to a reasonable level. It is these "expenses" that lead to the deviation between the actual ownership structure (corporate performance) and the optimal ownership structure (corporate performance). In this paper, the relationship between equity incentive and corporate performance before and after adjusting cost is compared. Without considering the adjustment cost, there is a significant negative relationship between equity incentive and corporate performance, but after considering the adjustment cost, the negative impact of corporate performance on equity incentive disappears. Some of the previous control variables that explain equity incentives and corporate performance have become less significant. This proves that if the adjustment cost is ignored, there is a false relationship between equity incentive, corporate performance and corporate characteristics. Finally, the article looks for the determinants of adjustment cost. In terms of determinants, the adjusting speed of equity incentive is positively related to the proportion of institutional investors, the number of senior executives and the market price. The adjustment speed of corporate performance is positively correlated with sunk cost and negatively correlated with the pricing ability of the company.
【学位授予单位】：上海交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51;F275

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