创业板公司控制权配置模式与公司绩效研究

发布时间：2018-04-22 05:38

  本文选题：控制权配置 + 公司绩效　； 参考：《首都经济贸易大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：2009年10月30日至今，我国创业板市场已经成立了四年的时间，在完善我国资本市场结构、为优秀企业提供融资平台的同时，也面临着许多问题，尤其是创业板上市公司的公司治理问题，再加之创业板上市公司的自身特点也使其内部治理问题更加突出。 控制权的有效配置是公司治理环节中非常重要的部分，也是提升公司绩效的关键因素。随着企业经营的不断扩大，所有权与经营权的分离导致了控制权的产生，国内外学者通常把控制权机制分为控制权市场和控制权配置，本文主要研究创业板上市公司中控制权配置模式与公司绩效的关系，从理论和实证两方面，探讨我国上市公司控制权配置的状态以及对公司绩效的影响，最终通过优化公司内部控制来提高公司经营绩效。 在企业中，完整的控制权应包括两个层面，一是作为外部治理机制的股份制公司控制权市场范畴中的控制权，也就是我们所说的控制权市场；二是企业的内部治理机制的控制权，是指控制权在公司股东、董事会、经理层之间的分配状况以及各个经济主体之间的相互作用关系。本文则将三大经济主体统一起来构建了一个综合的控制权配置模型，这样做能够使我们从一个更加系统的角度看待公司控制权配置，同时各个经济主体间的相互影响和作用也进行了实证分析。首先，本文依据股东、董事会以及经理层的自身特点，按照一定的依据对这三大主体进行了类型的划分，将股东按照第一大股东持股比例分为四类，董事会按照其由大股东控制、经理层控制或是独立状态分为三类，经理层依据其归属性分为两类，按此进行排列组合得出24种控制权配置模式，并对其治理方式及绩效在理论上进行了分析。然后选取主营业务利润率作为绩效指标，加入控制变量进行回归分析，选取我国创业板上市公司共355家作为样本，，得出我国大部分的控制权配置状态是第一大股东拥有10%-50%的股权，董事会处于独立制衡的状态，总经理由董事会任命。实证研究结果表明，第一大股东的持股比例越低公司绩效越高，并且统计学意义上极为显著；在董事会层面上相对独立的董事会对公司绩效有显著的正相关关系；在经理层层面上有董事会委派的经理层对公司绩效有不显著的负相关关系，结果有待考核。我国创业板上市公司中最为集中的控制权配置模式并不是绩效最优的，对于大股东的制约、独立董事的选择以及总经理的激励等问题都有待解决和完善。
[Abstract]:Since October 30, 2009, China's gem market has been established for four years, while perfecting the structure of our capital market and providing financing platform for excellent enterprises, it also faces many problems. In particular, the corporate governance of gem listed companies, plus the gem listed companies own characteristics also make its internal governance problems more prominent. The effective allocation of control rights is a very important part of corporate governance and a key factor to improve corporate performance. With the continuous expansion of enterprise management, the separation of ownership and management rights leads to the emergence of control rights. Domestic and foreign scholars usually divide the control rights mechanism into control market and control rights allocation. This paper mainly studies the relationship between control allocation mode and corporate performance in gem listed companies, and discusses the status of control allocation and its impact on corporate performance in China's listed companies from both theoretical and empirical aspects. Finally, improve the performance of the company by optimizing the internal control. In the enterprise, the complete control right should include two levels, one is the control right in the control market category of the joint-stock company as the external governance mechanism, that is, the control right market that we call; The second is the control right of the internal governance mechanism of the enterprise, which refers to the distribution of the control right among the shareholders, the board of directors and the managers of the company, as well as the interaction between the various economic entities. In this paper, the three economic entities are unified to construct a comprehensive control allocation model, which enables us to look at corporate control allocation from a more systematic perspective. At the same time, the interaction between the economic entities and the role of the empirical analysis. First of all, according to the characteristics of shareholders, board of directors and managers, this paper divides the three main bodies into four categories according to the proportion of the largest shareholders. The board of directors can be divided into three categories according to their control by large shareholders, managers or independent states. According to their attributes, the board of directors can be divided into two categories. According to this arrangement and combination, 24 control allocation modes can be obtained. And its governance and performance in the theoretical analysis. Then select the main business profit rate as the performance index, add control variables for regression analysis, choose 355 listed companies in the gem as the sample. It is concluded that most of the allocation of control rights in China is that the largest shareholder has 10% to 50% equity, the board of directors is in the state of independent checks and balances, and the general manager is appointed by the board of directors. The empirical results show that the lower the shareholding ratio of the first largest shareholder, the higher the corporate performance, and statistically significant, the relatively independent board of directors on the board level has a significant positive correlation with corporate performance. At the managerial level, there is no significant negative correlation between company performance and the manager appointed by the board of directors, and the results need to be evaluated. The most centralized control allocation mode of listed companies in gem is not the best performance. The constraints of large shareholders, the selection of independent directors and the incentive of the general manager need to be solved and improved.
【学位授予单位】：首都经济贸易大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51;F271;F275


本文编号：1785867