企业国际化经营、股份信息含量与股权激励有效性

发布时间：2018-04-28 10:34

本文选题：国际化 + 股价信息含量　；参考：《西南财经大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：现代企业制度中,所有权与经营权的分离促使所有者分解其职能,经理人获得企业的控制权履行公司契约的权力和义务。然而,经理人往往以自身效益最大化为目标谋取个人私利,实施如粉饰公司业绩的盈余管理和获得私有收益的无效率投资等机会主义行为,严重损害了企业所有者的权益,产生了至今仍未妥善解决的委托代理问题。因此,最优薪酬契约理论逐渐进入人们的视野,Jensen和Meckling (1976)给出了一个可能解决代理问题的方案：紧密连结所有者与经理人的利益,将经理人的薪酬与公司业绩挂钩,这种形式下的薪酬激励契约可能更为合理,使经理人为所有者利益最大化进行持续有效经营。所有者将部分股权偿付给经理人,使其变成一定程度意义上的所有者,风险和收益同向变动,国外上市公司的股权激励在众多薪酬激励方式中占据重要地位。随着我国股权分置改革的逐步推进,资本市场获得进一步的改革开放与平稳发展,达成A股全流通的局面,这些为我国上市公司的股权激励提供一定依据。股权激励在我国起步较晚,现有关于股权激励的部分研究支持股权激励的有效性,然而,仍有大量研究结论存在明显质疑。可能在不同的情境下,股权激励在公司治理机制中发挥的作用不尽相同。因此,所有者需要针对上市公司的具体特点,在提升经理人努力程度的前提下,制订合理的薪酬激励契约,实现所有者与经理人利益的“双赢”。我国实行的“改革开放”是一项重要的基本国策,实现“走出去”的发展战略也是奠定我国社会主义市场经济的重要举措,国际化是中国上市公司的必然选择。企业国际化经营能够得到更多市场准入并获取更多资源机会,意在打开我国产业发展的优势,学习先进知识,提高我国企业的国际竞争力。但国际化经营也增加了企业经营的不确定性和国外市场宏观波动所带来的风险,经理人极有可能因道德风险与逆向选择做出损害投资者利益的举动,代理问题较国内经营来说存在特殊性。为解决此问题,通过股价变动连接股东与经理人共同财富的股权激励可能是一个更好的选择。然而,国际化经营的企业中,股权激励实施效果究竟如何,是一个非常值得探讨的话题。近期研究发现经理人激励与市场微观结构有较大关联。市场微观结构理论认为股票市场整合了公司经营信启、而导致了股价的形成,股价整合的信息中可能显示了经理人行为与经理人的努力程度,股东可以利用这些信息制订最优的薪酬契约以更好地激励经理人。另外,市场能够通过股价信息传递改进公司治理结构的积极信号,股东利益最大化,成为经理人努力工作的重要目标。因此,最优薪酬契约的制订受到了市场微观结构的影响,股权激励作为一种基于市场的业绩评价方法,其是否有效,很大程度上又取决于股票价格与经理人努力程度的关系,股票价格能否反映企业的特质信息,是否具有信息含量。股价信息含量很可能在企业国际化经营与股权激励效果之间发挥了重要作用,有必要将其作为一个单独的变量加以研究。那么企业国际化经营的深入是否有助于股权激励效果的提升?如果存在影响,这种内在的作用机制为何?股价信息含量在这种机制中扮演什么样的角色?这些问题一直缺乏必要的经验证据加以探索与检验。基于上述简要分析,扎根于我国的实际情况,本文利用沪深A股上市公司的经验数据进行档案式研究。为回答上述三个问题,本文拟从以下思路展开论述：(1)企业国际化经营的深入对股权激励有效性造成何种影响；(2)为打开这种影响的内在机理,国际化经营是否通过股价信息含量作用于股权激励有效性,进一步而言,股价信息含量是否在国际化经营与股权激励有效性之间存在一定的中介作用。本文的主要内容安排如下：第一章,导论。本部分从本文的研究背景和研究意义切入,概括主要的研究内容,详细介绍了文章的研究方法、研究框架以及创新点。第二章,文献综述。本章结合国内外已有的经典与前沿文献对企业国际化经营、股价信息含量和股权激励有效性三者之间进行详尽的理论综述,了解系统性的研究理念,学习了一定的研究方法。第三章,理论分析和研究假设。本文结合最优薪酬契约理论与市场微观结构理论提出了三个研究假设,详细定义了本文主要的研究变量,对数据选取进行说明并作初步的数据整理。第四章,实证分析与研究结果。本章对样本数据进行描述性统计与相关性分析,初步进行说明。进而建立回归模型,运用Stata统计软件对样本数据进行多元回归分析,对相关的研究结果进行阐述。另外,本文运用包括PSM等检验方法对研究结果作稳健性检验。第五章,研究结论、政策建议及不足。本章全面阐述并总结了本文的研究结论,针对中国国际化企业面临的现实问题提出可尝试的政策建议,最后,本章主要从研究内容和研究方法说明本文不足,为后期研究作简要展望。本文以2008年至2011年中国沪深A股上市公司为样本,通过股价信息含量实证探究企业国际化对股权激励有效性影响的作用机理,研究结果表明：第一,我国上市公司国际化经营深入可能加剧了代理问题,降低了股权激励有效性。这是因为国际化企业经营地域多元化,区域拓展经营造成经营过程在地理、文化以及制度方面存在巨大的差异,这种复杂性极大增加了国际化公司对经理人的监督成本,产生了信息不对称和外部经营的不确定性,结果增加了“道德风险”与“逆向选择”发生的可能性。尽管授予经理人部分的股权,经理人承担的风险仍然小于公司的所有者,信息不对称可能带来的私人收益大于被赋予的股权激励收益时,经理人仍有可能做出损害投资者利益的行为,股权激励的方式在企业国际化经营逐渐深入的过程中是失效的。第二,在企业国际化经营对股权激励有效性作用机制的进一步研究中,本文发现股价信息含量在两者之间具有一定的中介作用。具体而言,股价信息含量是提升股权激励有效性的重要因素,企业国际化经营通过降低股价信息含量而削弱了股权激励有效性,并且,股价信息含量在国际化经营与股权激励有效性之间具有明显的中介作用。在企业内部治理机制作用有限的情况下,市场微观结构理论为我们提供了一个新的视角,市场外部运作机制提供的股价信息含量有益于经理人薪酬激励契约的制订。企业国际化经营增加了投资者对经理人的监督成本,产生了信息不对称,信息透明度较低,在外部市场来看,这无疑增加了投资者搜寻公司特质信息的成本并且降低搜寻公司特质信息的动机,在市场交易的过程中不利于公司特质信息融入到股价中,降低了股价信息含量。市场微观结构理论认为股价信息含量为制定最优薪酬激励契约提供重要的价值参考,股价信息含量越丰富,薪酬激励契约越有效。那么,国际化经营对股价信息含量的作用最终传递到薪酬激励契约的实施效果,因此,国际化经营降低了股价信息含量,削弱了股权激励有效性。本文的创新和贡献主要有以下几点：第一,本文结合最优薪酬契约理论与市场微观结构理论从股价信息含量这一全新视角揭示了中国企业国际化经营对经理人股权激励有效性的影响。具体来说,本文不仅关注国际化经营对股权激励有效性的影响,更从内部的作用机理机制入手,探究股价信息含量在其中所扮演的角色。在国际贸易的视角下,拓展了最优薪酬契约理论与市场微观结构理论,丰富了相关的研究文献。第二,本文从不同的产权性质对研究内容进行详细探索,深刻比较不同类别企业下国际化经营通过股价信息含量对经理人股权激励效果的作用机理。以往研究认为国有企业股权激励机制缺失,相比之下本文得出不同的结论,企业的国际经营,通过影响竞争环境,打破部分国有企业在国内市场的垄断利润,内在的激励机制设计得到一定的改善。造成股权激励失效的原因并不在于激励机制设计缺陷,而是国际化经营深入面临复杂的经济环境造成高程度的监督成本以及低程度的股价信息含量。本文为我党十八大以来制定的走向国际化战略决策提供一定的经验证据。第三,本文提供的经验证据深化了对企业国际化经营后果的认识,对于民营企业与国有企业而言,尽管在现阶段国际化经营中,股权激励均存在一定的缺陷和问题,但改进的方向,在侧重点上有所不同。基于此,本文在防范国际化经营风险,理顺企业管理体制问题提供了政策建议和启示。第四,行文中笔者选择了具有一定特色的研究方法。在证明股价信息含量的中介作用时,使用了中介作用三步法；利用倾向得分匹配法以及Heckman两阶段法对文章结论进行稳健性测试。本文的局限性主要体现在：第一,只选取股权激励,并没有选择其他薪酬激励方式进行研究。薪酬激励契约有多种形式,如货币薪酬、在职消费、股权激励与政治晋升等,本文只采用股权激励进行研究,并未探究国际化经营是否最终影响了其它薪酬激励契约效果,股价信息含量在内部作用机制中是否仍然发挥着重要作用,这些问题仍然需要进一步探讨。第二,变量度量存在一定的缺陷。企业国际化经营的度量指标较为单一本文采用中国大陆以外的销售收入与全部销售收入的比值度量企业国际化经营,单一的国际化指标不能充分体现企业国际化经营的所有特征。采用股权持股比例只能是经理人股权激励的粗略测度,受制于股权激励方案数据的可获得性以及样本的规模,难以在现阶段针对具体股权激励样本展开本文研究。待样本规模扩大后,研究者将进一步针对该问题展开稳健性检验。第三,本文使用倾向得分匹配法以及Heckman两阶段方法克服了部分内生性对研究结果进行稳健性检验,并不能消除变量之间的全部影响,实证结果仍存在一定偏差,尚需更佳的方法对经验数据加以检验。第四,企业国际化经营指标是笔者在公开的财务报表中手工收集,收集过程可能存在一定的疏忽和错漏,另外,公开的财务报表也可能存在错报,这些对实证结果存在一定程度的负面影响。
[Abstract]:In the modern enterprise system, the separation of ownership and management power causes the owner to decompose its function, and the manager obtains the power and obligation of the company to fulfill the company's contract. However, the manager often takes the personal profit as the goal of maximizing its own benefit, and implements the surplus management and the inefficiency of obtaining private income, such as whitewashing the performance of the company. Opportunism, such as rate of investment, has seriously damaged the rights and interests of the owner of the enterprise, and produced the principal-agent problem that has still not been properly solved. Therefore, the theory of optimal compensation contract has gradually entered the field of vision. Jensen and Meckling (1976) give a possible solution to the agency problem: close the interests of the owner and the manager. The compensation incentive contract in this form may be more reasonable, which makes the manager make a continuous and effective management for the owner's benefit maximization. The owner pays a part of the stock to the manager to make the owner to a certain extent, the risk and the income change, the foreign listing public. The stock incentive of the company occupies an important position in many ways of compensation incentive. With the gradual advance of the reform of the share division in China, the capital market has gained further reform and opening up and smooth development, and reached a full circulation of A shares, which provide a certain basis for the equity incentive of listed companies in our country. There are some research on equity incentive to support the effectiveness of equity incentive. However, there are still a lot of research conclusions in question. In different situations, the role of equity incentive in the corporate governance mechanism is different. Therefore, the owner needs to improve the manager's effort in view of the specific characteristics of the listed company. Under the premise, a reasonable remuneration incentive contract should be worked out to achieve the "win-win" between owners and managers.
China's "reform and opening up" is an important basic national policy. To realize the development strategy of "going out" is also an important measure to establish the socialist market economy of our country. Internationalization is the inevitable choice of Chinese listed companies. The internationalization of enterprises can get more market access and gain more resource opportunities, which is intended to open me The advantages of the development of domestic industry, learning advanced knowledge, and improving the international competitiveness of Chinese enterprises. However, international management also increases the uncertainty of business management and the risks caused by macroeconomic fluctuations in foreign markets. Managers are likely to do harm to investors' interests due to moral risk and adverse selection. The agency problem is more domestic than domestic. In order to solve this problem, it may be a better choice to connect equity incentive to the common wealth of shareholders and managers through stock price changes. However, it is a very important question to discuss how the effect of equity incentive in the enterprise of international operation is very worthy of discussion.
Recent studies have found that manager incentives have a great relationship with market microstructures. The market microstructure theory holds that the stock market integrates the company's business credit and leads to the formation of the stock price. The information of the stock price integration may show the managers' behavior and the managers' effort, and the shareholders can use the information to make the best salary. In addition, the market can improve the positive signal of the company's governance structure through the stock price information, and the maximization of the shareholders' interest has become an important goal for the managers to work hard. Therefore, the formulation of the optimal compensation contract is influenced by the market microstructure, and the equity incentive is a market based industry. The effectiveness of the performance evaluation method depends largely on the relationship between the stock price and the manager's effort. Can the stock price reflect the characteristic information of the enterprise and whether it has the information content. The information content of the stock price may play an important role between the enterprise's international management and the incentive effect of equity incentive. A single variable is studied. Does the depth of enterprise internationalization help improve the effectiveness of equity incentive? If there is an impact, what is the internal mechanism? What role does the share price information play in this mechanism? These questions have not been explored and tested by the necessary empirical evidence.
Based on the above analysis, this paper takes root in the actual situation of our country. This paper uses the empirical data of the Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares listed companies to carry out the archival research. In order to answer the above three questions, this paper intends to discuss the following ideas: (1) what effect is the effect of the deepening of the enterprise internationalization management on the effectiveness of equity incentive; (2) to open this effect Internal mechanism, whether international operation is effective on equity incentive through stock price information content, further, whether the information content of stock price has a certain intermediary role between international management and equity incentive effectiveness.
The main contents of this article are as follows:
The first chapter, introduction. This part from the research background and research significance of this article, summarize the main research content, detailed introduction of the research methods, research framework and innovation.
The second chapter, literature review. This chapter combines the classic and Frontier Literature at home and abroad to carry out a detailed theoretical overview of the enterprise internationalization management, stock price information content and equity incentive effectiveness, to understand the systematic research concept and learn a certain research method.
The third chapter, theoretical analysis and research hypothesis. This paper puts forward three research hypotheses based on the optimal compensation contract theory and the market micro structure theory, and defines the main research variables in this paper, and explains the data selection and makes preliminary data arrangement.
The fourth chapter, empirical analysis and research results. This chapter carries out descriptive statistics and correlation analysis of sample data, preliminarily explains, and then establishes a regression model, uses Stata statistical software to analyze the sample data by multiple regression analysis, and expounds the related research results. In addition, this paper uses PSM and other testing methods to study the research knot. Fruit is tested for robustness.
The fifth chapter, research conclusions, policy recommendations and shortcomings. This chapter comprehensively expounds and summarizes the conclusions of this paper, and puts forward some tentative policy suggestions for the practical problems faced by Chinese internationalized enterprises. Finally, this chapter mainly from the research content and research methods to explain the shortage of this paper, and make a brief prospect for the later research.
In this paper, from 2008 to 2011, China Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares listed companies as samples, through the stock price information content to explore the effect of enterprise internationalization on the effectiveness of equity incentive effectiveness. The results show that:
First, the internationalization of China's listed companies may deepen the agency problem and reduce the effectiveness of equity incentive. This is because the diversification of the international enterprises, the regional expansion and operation of the business process in the geographical, cultural and institutional aspects of the huge difference, this complexity greatly increases the international company to the classics The supervision cost of human beings leads to the uncertainty of information asymmetry and external management. The result increases the possibility of "moral hazard" and "reverse choice". Although the managers' equity is granted, the risk of managers is still less than the owner of the company, and the private income may be greater than that given by the asymmetric information. When the equity incentive returns, the manager may still be able to harm the interests of the investor, and the way of equity incentive is ineffective in the process of the enterprise's internationalization.
Second, in the further study of the effect mechanism of enterprise internationalization on the effectiveness of equity incentive, this paper finds that the information content of stock price has a certain intermediary role between the two. In particular, the information content of the stock price is an important factor to improve the effectiveness of equity incentive, and the enterprise internationalization management is weakened by reducing the information content of the stock price. In the case of the limited role of the internal governance mechanism of the enterprise, the market micro structure theory provides us a new angle of view, and the information content of the stock price provided by the external operation mechanism of the market is beneficial to the information content of the stock price. The enterprise internationalization management increases the supervision cost of the investor to the manager, produces the information asymmetry, the information transparency is low, and in the external market, it undoubtedly increases the investor's search for the cost of the company's characteristic information and reduces the motivation of the search for the company's idiosyncratic information, and deals in the market. The market micro structure theory holds that the information content of the stock price provides important value reference for the formulation of the optimal compensation incentive contract, the more information content of the stock price is, the more effective the compensation incentive contract is. With the final transfer to the implementation effect of the compensation incentive contract, international operation reduces the information content of stock price and weakens the effectiveness of equity incentive.
The innovation and contribution of this article are mainly as follows:
First, this paper, combining the theory of optimal compensation contract and the market microstructure theory, reveals the effect of the internationalization of Chinese enterprises on the effectiveness of managers' equity incentive from a new perspective of the information content of the stock price. In the perspective of international trade, we expand the optimal compensation contract theory and the market micro structure theory, and enrich the related research literature.
Second, this paper makes a detailed exploration of the research content from different property rights, and deeply compares the mechanism of the effect of international management under different categories of enterprises under the information content of the stock price on the incentive effect of managers' equity incentive. Management, by affecting the competitive environment, breaking the monopoly profits of some state-owned enterprises in the domestic market, the internal incentive mechanism design has been improved. The cause of the failure of equity incentive is not the design defects of the incentive mechanism, but the high degree of supervision cost and low level of the international operation in depth facing the complex economic environment. This article provides some empirical evidence for our party's eighteen strategic decisions towards internationalization.
Third, the empirical evidence provided by this article deepens the understanding of the consequences of enterprise internationalization. For private enterprises and state-owned enterprises, although there are some defects and problems in the current international operation, the direction of improvement is different. Based on this, this paper is to prevent the risk of international operation. It also provides policy suggestions and Enlightenment for straightening out the management system of enterprises.
Fourth, in this paper, the author chooses a research method with certain characteristics. In proving the intermediary role of the stock price information content, the three step method is used in the medium effect, and the consistency test of the conclusion of the article is carried out by using the tendency score matching method and the Heckman two stage method.
The limitations of this article are mainly reflected in the following:
First, we only choose equity incentive, and do not choose other remuneration incentive methods to study. There are many forms of compensation incentive contract, such as monetary compensation, on-the-job consumption, equity incentive and political promotion. This paper only uses equity incentive to study, and does not explore whether the internationalization of the camp ultimately affects the effect of other compensation incentive contracts. Whether price information content is still playing an important role in the internal mechanism of action remains to be further explored.
Second, there are some defects in the measurement of variables. The measurement index of enterprise internationalization is relatively simple. This paper uses the ratio of sales income outside China and all sales revenue to measure the internationalization of enterprises, and a single international index.

【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F272.3;F275

【参考文献】