PPP项目资产证券化主要参与者的博弈研究

发布时间：2018-04-28 15:20

本文选题：PPP模式 + PPP项目资产证券化　；参考：《重庆工商大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：近年来,随着我国城镇化的高速推行,要求保障基础设施建设的需求就越来越高,单靠政府财政支出已经很难满足。基础设施项目建设的特点有投资时间较长、投资成本较高且风险大,则需要探索一条新的融资渠道来满足后期建设,即PPP资产证券化。政府大力倡导基础设施PPP项目资产证券化这种新的融资模式,为我国民间资本进入基础设施领域打开了一条新的通道,更好的深化投融资体系的改革。本文在分析PPP项目资产证券化参与者委托代理关系以及信息不对称的基础上,研究参与者之间的博弈并提出相关的对策建议和机制建设。首先,阐述PPP项目资产证券化的研究背景,研究意义,并提出研究思路和框架。综合国内外研究现状,决定以PPP项目资产证券化为主要探讨研究问题,以对参与者进行博弈分析为主要研究方法。其次,概述了资产证券化理论和博弈论理论,界定PPP项目资产证券化过程中的参与人为分析对象,包括政府、PPP项目公司、SPV与投资者。同时说明主要参与方在资产证券化过程中所处的信息优劣地位,及参与方之间因信息不对称会出现道德风险和逆向选择问题。再次,构建三组两方博弈模型,包括政府与PPP项目公司的博弈、PPP项目公司与SPV的博弈以及SPV与投资者的博弈,得出PPP项目公司筛选行为、SPV出售行为、投资者投资行为以及政府监督行为的最优概率解。假设PPP项目公司与SPV存在合谋的情况下,构建了三方博弈模型,分析投资者采取投诉策略的最优行动,从投资者角度来提出防范合谋风险的对策。最后,提出参与人最优行动的建议并建立相关的机制,以此规避信息不对称的风险。在机制设计上,对监督机制、激励机制、审查机制、跟踪参与机制和沟通机制这几方面进行说明。根据博弈分析提出参与人相对应的建议,优化参与人的行为,达到项目整体利益最大化。通过对参与人信息不对称博弈及对策的研究,为PPP项目资产证券化健康发展提供了实际参考。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the rapid implementation of urbanization in China, the demand for ensuring infrastructure construction has become higher and higher. The construction of infrastructure projects is characterized by long investment time, high investment cost and high risk. Therefore, it is necessary to explore a new financing channel to satisfy the later construction, that is, PPP asset securitization. The government strongly advocates the new financing mode of asset securitization of infrastructure PPP project, which opens a new channel for the private capital to enter the infrastructure field and deepens the reform of investment and financing system. Based on the analysis of the principal-agent relationship and information asymmetry among the participants in the asset securitization of PPP project, this paper studies the game among the participants and puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions as well as the construction of the mechanism. Firstly, the research background and significance of asset securitization of PPP project are expounded, and the research ideas and framework are put forward. Based on the current research situation at home and abroad, it is decided to take the PPP project asset securitization as the main research problem and the game analysis of the participants as the main research method. Secondly, it summarizes the theory of asset securitization and game theory, and defines the participants in the process of asset securitization of PPP project, including the government and investors. At the same time, it explains the information advantages and disadvantages of the main participants in the process of asset securitization, and the moral hazard and adverse selection of the participants due to asymmetric information. Thirdly, three groups of two-party game models are constructed, including the game between the government and the PPP project company and the game between the SPV and the SPV, and the game between the SPV and the investors, and the selection behavior of the PPP project company is obtained. The optimal probability solution of investor investment behavior and government supervision behavior. Under the condition of PPP project company and SPV collusion, this paper constructs a tripartite game model, analyzes the optimal action of investors' complaint strategy, and puts forward countermeasures to prevent collusion risk from investor's point of view. Finally, we propose the optimal action of participants and establish relevant mechanisms to avoid the risk of asymmetric information. In terms of mechanism design, it explains the supervision mechanism, incentive mechanism, review mechanism, tracking participation mechanism and communication mechanism. According to the game analysis, the corresponding suggestions of the participants are put forward to optimize the behavior of the participants to maximize the overall interests of the project. By studying the asymmetric game of participants' information and its countermeasures, this paper provides a practical reference for the healthy development of PPP project asset securitization.
【学位授予单位】：重庆工商大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F283;F832.51

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