我国上市公司总经理薪酬和业绩与运气的实证研究

发布时间：2018-05-01 08:09

本文选题：总经理薪酬 + 公司业绩　；参考：《湘潭大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：委托代理理论认为，薪酬是能够很好的解决所有权和经营权分离所产生的代理问题；最优契约理论认为，通过设置合理的薪酬契约（将薪酬与公司业绩挂钩）可以使高管按照股东的利益做出决策。然而，越来越多的研究结果则表明设置薪酬的过程会产生新的代理问题；薪酬契约并不能很好的激励高级管理人员。由于股东与高管之前存在着信息不对称，使得高管可以利用手中的权力自设薪酬。本文以总经理薪酬与业绩不挂钩为出发点，将超出总经理控制范围的业绩变动定义为“运气”，，并且以行业加权平均的ROE（权益收益率）——剔除公司自身的ROE和账面总资产的权重——作为“运气”的工具变量，来检验总经理薪酬中是否包含运气成分，以及通过改善公司治理结构能否降低支付给总经理的运气薪酬。本文的理论部分基于信息不对称理论、委托代理理论和最优契约理论，概述了薪酬作为解决代理问题的理论基础；本文的实证部分，首先以Excel、Stata10等统计软件对各个变量进行描述性统计分析；然后以2008——2012年间的非平衡面板数据（共9535个观测值）为样本，通过2SLS回归，研究了沪深两市A股上市公司（非银行金融）总经理薪酬与运气的关系，并且以董事会规模、股权集中度、董事长与总经理是否兼任作为公司治理结构的代理变量来研究公司治理结构与总经理运气薪酬的关系。本文的研究结果主要有以下四点：（1）我国上市公司总经理薪酬中普遍存在运气薪酬的现象；（2）股权集中度高的公司能够有效的减少公司支付给总经理的运气薪酬；（3）当公司总经理与董事长不是同一人时，会降低支付给总经理的运气薪酬；（4）董事会规模越小的公司支付给总经理的运气薪酬越少并没有得到很好的验证。最后，根据文章的实证结果，证实了总经理薪酬中存在的运气成分，提出通过提高股权集中度、避免出现总经理与董事长两职合一的情形出现等措施可以有效的改善公司治理结构，从而降低公司支付给总经理的运气薪酬的这一建议。
[Abstract]:According to the principal-agent theory, salary is a good solution to the problem of agency caused by the separation of ownership and management, and the optimal contract theory holds that, By setting up a reasonable compensation contract (linking compensation to the company's performance), executives can make decisions in the interests of shareholders. However, more and more research results show that the process of setting up the compensation will lead to new agency problems; the compensation contract is not a good incentive for senior managers. Because of the information asymmetry between shareholders and executives, executives can use their power to set their own compensation. Based on the fact that the salary of the general manager is not linked to the performance, this paper defines the change of the performance beyond the control of the general manager as "luck". And the industry-weighted average ROE-excluding the company's own ROE and the weight of the total book assets as a tool variable of "luck" to test whether the general manager's compensation includes luck. And by improving the corporate governance structure can reduce the pay to the General Manager's luck pay. The theoretical part of this paper is based on information asymmetry theory, principal-agent theory and optimal contract theory. First, the statistical software Excel Stata10 was used to analyze the variables, and then the non-equilibrium panel data from 2008 to 2012 (9535 observations) were used as samples, and then the data were regressed by 2SLS. This paper studies the relationship between the compensation and luck of the general manager of A-share listed companies (non-bank finance) in Shanghai and Shenzhen, and the size of the board of directors and the degree of equity concentration. Whether the chairman and the general manager are the agent variables of the corporate governance structure to study the relationship between the corporate governance structure and the general manager's luck compensation. The main findings of this paper are as follows: 1) there is a common phenomenon of luck compensation in the salary of general managers of listed companies in China. (2) companies with high concentration of equity can effectively reduce the salary of luck paid by companies to the general manager. When the general manager and the chairman of the company are not the same person, The smaller the board size, the less luck the company pays to the managing director and the less proven it is. Finally, according to the empirical results of the article, confirmed the existence of luck in the compensation of the general manager, and proposed to improve the degree of ownership concentration, The suggestion that measures such as avoiding the combination of the general manager and the chairman can effectively improve the corporate governance structure and reduce the compensation of the company's luck to the general manager.
【学位授予单位】：湘潭大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51;F272.92;F275

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