股权稳定、盈余管理与非效率投资——来自中国A股上市公司的经验证据

发布时间：2018-05-04 08:51

本文选题：股权稳定 + 代理冲突　；参考：《经济体制改革》2017年06期

【摘要】：在股权稳定的两个测度指标构建基础上,基于2007~2016年沪深两市A股上市公司数据,研究了股权稳定与盈余管理和非效率投资的关系,发现股权稳定可抑制应计和真实盈余管理;股权稳定可抑制非效率投资;股权稳定与盈余管理的交互影响仍可抑制非效率投资。在研究结论的基础上,从股权稳定和公司治理视角,提出了我国企业特别是国有企业缓解股东间及股东与管理层之间代理冲突,进而遏制管理层盈余管理、非效率投资等机会主义行为的政策建议。
[Abstract]:On the basis of the construction of two measure indexes of equity stability, based on the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2007 to 2016, this paper studies the relationship between equity stability and earnings management and inefficient investment, and finds that equity stability can restrain accrual and real earnings management. Equity stability can inhibit inefficient investment, and the interaction between equity stability and earnings management can still inhibit inefficient investment. On the basis of the conclusion of the study, from the perspective of equity stability and corporate governance, this paper puts forward that Chinese enterprises, especially state-owned enterprises, can alleviate the agency conflict among shareholders and between shareholders and management, and then contain the earnings management of management. Policy recommendations for opportunistic behavior such as inefficient investment.
【作者单位】：济南大学商学院;澳门大学工商管理学院;天津财经大学经济学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金项目“我国制造业转型升级与劳动力成本上涨的耦合研究”(16BGL098) 山东省社会科学规划重大委托研究项目“绿色治理研究”(16AWTJ07) 山东省社会科学规划研究项目“山东省生态文明建设绩效评价及对策研究”(15BKJJ04);山东省社会科学规划研究项目“产业转型升级下企业并购风险动态评价与预警研究”(16BKJJ01)
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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