高管股票期权激励与研发支出研究--基于国有上市公司的数据

发布时间：2018-05-05 19:19

本文选题：国有企业 + 高管股票期权激励　；参考：基于国有上市公司的数据

【摘要】：在企业中,技术研发的创新能力决定了企业在市场中的竞争能力。但是,企业是否进行研发则完全由企业的高管决定。在现代企业中,领导权与所有权分离导致了委托代理问题的产生,而企业引入股票期权激励却能使二者的利益趋同,有效地缓解代理问题,进而影响高管做出相关的研发决策。本文以2007年—2011年披露了企业研发支出的国有上市公司为样本,构建多元回归模型,研究了国有上市公司的高管股票期权激励与研发支出之间的关系。研究结果表明:在国有企业中,高管股票期权激励与研发支出显著正相关,高管股票期权激励越大,研发支出越多,同时,高管股票期权激励与RD支出之间存在显著的正U型的非线性关系,而非直接的线性关系;第二,当国有企业处于较高业绩或具有良好成长机会时,企业会忽视RD的投入;国企冗余资源类型不同,对高管股票期权激励与企业RD支出之间关系的影响不同;潜在的冗余资源越多,高管股票期权激励对研发支出的影响越小,未吸收的冗余资源越多,高管股票期权激励对研发支出的影响越大。
[Abstract]:In the enterprise, the innovation ability of technology research and development determines the competitive ability of the enterprise in the market. However, whether the enterprise carries on the research and development is entirely by the enterprise senior management decision. In modern enterprises, the separation of leadership and ownership leads to the principal-agent problem, but the introduction of stock option incentive can make the interests of the two converge, effectively alleviate the agency problem, and then affect executives to make relevant R & D decisions. This paper studies the relationship between the executive stock option incentive and R & D expenditure of the state-owned listed companies from 2007 to 2011 by constructing a multivariate regression model based on the sample of state-owned listed companies that disclosed their R & D expenditure. The results show that: in state-owned enterprises, executive stock option incentive and R & D expenditure are significantly positive correlation, the higher the executive stock option incentive, the more R & D expenditure, at the same time, There is a significant positive U-type nonlinear relationship between executive stock option incentive and R D expenditure, but not a direct linear relationship. Second, when state-owned enterprises are in high performance or have good growth opportunities, enterprises will ignore R D input. Different types of redundant resources in state-owned enterprises have different effects on the relationship between executive stock option incentive and R D expenditure. The more potential redundant resources, the smaller the impact of executive stock option incentive on R & D expenditure, and the more redundant resources are not absorbed. The greater the impact of executive stock option incentives on R & D spending.
【作者单位】：吉林大学商学院;吉林大学经济学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金面上项目“非线性状态空间混频数据模型在中国第三产业结构演变研究中的应用”(项目编号:71573104) 吉林大学青年学术领袖培育计划项目“非线性状态空间混频数据模型在中国宏观经济研究中的应用”(项目编号:2015FRLX15)
【分类号】：F272.92;F275;F832.51

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