林权抵押、信贷约束与林农信贷可得性——基于一个静态博弈模型的分析

发布时间：2018-05-06 03:20

本文选题：林权抵押 + 信贷约束　；参考：《林业经济问题》2017年03期

【摘要】：通过设计博弈模型,讨论了单期博弈下的信贷约束、在假设条件下的动态及重复博弈分析以及林权抵押改善信贷约束。首先确定信贷存在利率约束,为了降低信贷风险,对林农等信贷需求者采取信贷约束措施;在动态和重复博弈中,银行和林农之间的均衡策略为合作,也即银行放贷,林农还贷;通过抵押担保模型发现,森林资源可以降低银行的预期贴现。因此,提出继续确定林权抵押政策的确切内涵、增强团体贷款能力、政府分担银行部分信贷风险等相关建议对策。
[Abstract]:By designing the game model, the paper discusses the credit constraint under the single-period game, the dynamic and repeated game analysis under the hypothetical condition and the improvement of the credit constraint under the forest right mortgage. In order to reduce the credit risk, credit constraint measures should be taken to the credit demanders such as forest farmers. In the dynamic and repeated game, the equilibrium strategy between banks and forest farmers is cooperation, that is, bank lending. Through the mortgage guarantee model, it is found that forest resources can reduce the bank's expected discount. Therefore, this paper puts forward some suggestions to continue to determine the exact connotation of forest tenure mortgage policy, to strengthen the ability of group loans, and to share some credit risks among banks.
【作者单位】：南京林业大学经济管理学院;南京师范大学泰州学院;
【基金】：江苏省高校哲学社会科学研究课题(2015SJB106)
【分类号】：F326.23;F832.43

【相似文献】