中小微企业信用担保贷款风险比例分担研究——提供政府补贴的两方合作博弈模型

发布时间：2018-05-08 16:29

本文选题：中小微企业融资 + 信用担保贷款　；参考：《商业经济与管理》2017年03期

【摘要】：信用担保贷款是我国中小微企业融资的重要渠道之一。然而在我国融资实践中,担保机构几乎承担了信用担保贷款的全部风险敞口,加之中小微企业自身弱势和较高的违约风险,担保机构与商业银行更加难以达成合作。相关研究表明,中小微企业具有"准公共品"的性质,其融资适用于"政府和市场共同分担"原则。文章在政府提供补贴的前提下,构建商业银行与担保机构的两方合作博弈模型,运用Shapley值法求解公平合理的风险分担比例,进而为中小微企业信用担保贷款融资体系形成并可持续发展提供理论和实践支持。
[Abstract]:Credit guarantee loan is one of the important financing channels for small and medium enterprises in China. However, in the practice of financing in China, the guarantee institutions almost bear the full exposure of credit guarantee loans, combined with the weakness and high default risk of small and medium-sized enterprises, it is more difficult for the guarantee institutions and commercial banks to cooperate. Relevant studies show that small and medium-sized enterprises have the nature of "quasi-public goods" and their financing is applicable to the principle of "government and market share together". On the premise of government subsidies, this paper constructs a two-party cooperative game model between commercial banks and guarantee agencies, and applies Shapley value method to solve the fair and reasonable risk sharing ratio. Then it provides theoretical and practical support for the formation and sustainable development of credit guarantee loan system.
【作者单位】：天津财经大学经济学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金青年项目“经济周期、融资约束与营运资本的动态协同选择”(71302114) 天津市哲学社会科学研究规划项目“银政企合作博弈框架下的中小微企业贷款融资机制研究”(TJYY13-042) 天津市教委项目天津市高等学校人文社会科学研究项目“滨海新区构建富有竞争力的现代金融产业集群研究”(2014ZD08)
【分类号】：F832.4;F276.3;F275

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