银行贷款、自由现金流量与过度投资

发布时间：2018-05-10 09:03

本文选题：债务约束 + 自由现金流量　；参考：《西南财经大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：改革开放以来,随着市场经济的不断深化,我国进入了迅速增长的阶段,经济体制改革取得了历史性成就。经济转轨带来的高投资、高收益、高成长固然值得欣喜,然而近十年来,我国的固定资产投资率持续攀升,受到消费需求以及有限资源的影响,很多行业已经出现了投资过剩的现象,比如钢铁、电解铝、水泥行业等,投资过热问题开始引起社会各界的关注,2013年9月,北京工商大学发布了“2013上市公司会计投资者保护指数”,由于上市公司过度投资问题严重,该指数已连续四年呈现下滑趋势。在这样的大背景下,如何有效地抑制企业的过度投资行为,确保经济的良性发展已迫在眉睫。在现代企业中债务已经成为了一种不可或缺的资本,1976年,Jensen和Meckling开始着手探讨债务的治理功能,从此开启了对债务治理效果研究的新时代。本文采用规范研究与实证研究相结合的方法,在规范研究方面,本文尝试以Jensen(1986)的自由现金流量假说为基础,结合代理成本理论以及债务的相机治理,通过分析债务治理效果的生成机制,研究银行贷款对管理者过度投资行为的影响路径。在理论上,本文认为由于银行的外部监督以及银行贷款到期还本付息的强制性要求,约束了管理者对自由现金流量的自由支配权,在一定程度上缓解了管理者与所有者之间的利益矛盾,进而抑制了管理者的过度投资行为。在实证研究方面,本文通过建立研究模型,实证检验了理论分析的结论,通过对银行贷款影响过度投资作用机制的分析,不仅考察了银行作为外部监督机制是否发挥了对企业应有的治理作用,同时也为我国的公司治理研究提供了新的视角。在前述研究的基础之上,本文进一步基于贷款期限结构、产权性质以及制度环境的差异来研究银行贷款对管理者过度投资的抑制作用,提出完善我国制度环境的建议和措施,为促进当代经济稳步健康发展提供有价值的参考。本文的逻辑思路为：随着市场经济的不断深化,我国企业内部两权分离的特征越发明显,所有者与管理者之间的代理问题较为严重,当企业内部存有充裕的自由现金流量时,管理者会在自身利益的驱动下选择净现值为负的投资项目,带来了企业的过度投资问题。债务融资作为有效的公司治理机制之一,能够发挥应有的积极治理效应。由于债权人的外部监督以及迫于债务到期还本付息的压力,管理者的自由裁量权受到了制约,约束了其随意支配自由现金流量的行为,缓解了所有者与管理者之间的代理问题,进而可以对企业的投资水平起到改善的作用。并且本文认为贷款期限结构、产权性质和制度环境的不同也能够带来债务融资治理效应的差异,从而对企业的投资行为产生不同的影响。银行贷款作为我国企业最主要的债务来源,同样应该能够发挥上述作用。根据文章的逻辑思路,本文的主要研究内容可以分为以下几个部分：第一部分为绪论,主要阐述了本文的研究背景、研究目的、研究意义、研究思路及方法、研究框架、主要贡献与不足。第二部分为文献综述,主要对过度投资的存在性、自由现金流量对过度投资的影响、过度投资的债务制约机制进行了综述,并评述了相关文献。第三部分为理论分析,这一部分主要阐述了过度投资的含义与度量方法,分析了相关理论基础,其中包括代理成本理论、自由现金流量假说、债务的相机治理,并且在该部分的最后阐述了本文的推导框架和理论途径。第四部分为实证研究,这一部分首先是假设的提出,在理论分析的基础之上提出本文需要研究的七个假设；其次是研究设计与实证结果的分析部分,本文选择了2008-2012年深沪A股上市公司为样本,借鉴Richardson (2006)提出的预期投资模型来衡量过度投资规模,逐个检验了本文提出的七个假设,旨在研究银行贷款是否能够约束管理者对自由现金流量的滥用,缓解所有者与管理者之间的代理问题,进而抑制其过度投资行为,在此基础之上,该部分还进一步研究了贷款期限结构、产权性质和制度环境差异对银行贷款这一相机治理作用的影响；最后是稳健性检验部分,本文将通过以下两种方式进行稳健性检验：(1)过度投资的重新度量；(2)分年度单独检验。第五部分为研究结论、建议与局限性,主要根据研究得出的结论,提出旨在提高我国银行贷款发挥债务治理效应的相关建议和措施。通过以上五个部分的分析,本文研究发现：(1)我国所有者与管理者之间的代理问题严重,管理者有着随意支配自由现金流量来满足自身利益的动机,从而企业内部自由现金流量越多,.过度投资问题就越严重；(2)银行贷款能够有效减少管理者能够随意支配的自由现金流量,缓解所有者与管理者之间的代理问题,进而抑制其过度投资行为,并且这种作用更多的体现在短期贷款上；(3)产权性质的差异能够影响银行贷款对管理者过度投资的抑制作用,即在非国有企业中,银行贷款对管理者过度投资的相机治理作用更强；(4)不同的制度环境也能影响银行贷款的治理效用,金融发展水平越高、法治环境越好、政府干预越少的地区,银行贷款对管理者过度投资行为的抑制作用越强。根据上述分析,本文提出以下几个建议：(1)完善企业信息披露制度,加强对自由现金流量的监管；(2)适当引入债务融资,完善企业资本结构；(3)完善相关法律法规,建立有效的偿债保障机制；(4)改革官员考评机制,减少政府干预；(5)进一步深化国有商业银行的改革。本文的贡献主要有：第一,与以往的多数文献不同,本文单独选取了银行贷款这个视角来研究债务对管理者过度投资的治理作用,这是因为对我国的大多数公司而言,银行贷款仍然是最主要的债务融资来源,研究银行贷款的现实意义更强。第二,本文将从银行贷款期限结构来进行分析,通过这样的细化来研究不同期限结构的银行贷款对管理者过度投资抑制作用的差异。第三,本文根据产权性质的差异将企业分为国有与非国有进行探讨,旨在研究经过多年的改革,国有企业预算软约束的程度是否仍旧高于非国有企业。第四,本文进一步探讨了制度环境带来的影响,旨在发现制度环境层面的差异是否能够影响银行贷款对管理者过度投资的抑制作用,有助于从动态层面考察我国制度环境发展的成果,并且可以从宏观层面探讨如何完善制度环境来更好的发挥银行贷款的相机治理作用,以期能够为保障经济稳步发展提供有价值的参考。本文的不足之处在于：第一,本文仅选取了上市公司的数据进行研究,非上市公司文中并未涉及。但是现实生活中,我国的非上市公司面临的外部监督管理较少,部分公司的过度投资问题更为严重。并且一方面,由于非上市公司的融资渠道较为狭窄,债务融资中银行贷款的比重更高,另一方面,部分非上市公司的股东、管理者、债权人之间的关系可能区别于上市公司,从而对该类公司的过度投资行为进行研究也具有一定的现实意义。第二,实际生产经营活动中,管理者能够自由支配的现金流量并非仅由经营活动而产生,非经营活动以及以前的留存部分也可能带来管理者的过度投资问题,本文在计算自由现金流量时,仅根据Richardson (2006)的说法使用了经营活动产生的现金流量净额,对于其他部分并未涉及,这可以成为未来的一个研究方向。第三,本文根据Richardson (2006)提出的预期投资模型对过度投资规模进行衡量,此模型虽然在该领域已经有着一定的权威性,但是其衡量还是较为主观。首先,在现实社会中能够影响企业投资行为的因素很多,模型的度量很难全面；其次,模型中成长性的衡量一直说法不一,有人采用托宾Q,也有人采用主营业务收入增长率等,不管采用何种方法度量,都存在一定的局限性。
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up, with the continuous deepening of the market economy, China has entered a stage of rapid growth, and the reform of the economic system has made historic achievements. The high investment, high income and high growth of the economic transition are worthy of joy. However, in the past ten years, the investment rate of fixed assets in China has continued to rise, and is subject to consumption demand and limited capital. In many industries, there have been overinvestment phenomena in many industries, such as iron and steel, electrolytic aluminum, cement industry, and so on. Investment overheating has begun to attract attention from all walks of life. In September 2013, Beijing Technology and Business University issued the "2013 listed company accounting investor protection index", due to the serious problem of overinvestment of listed companies, the index has already In the past four years, there has been a downward trend. Under such a background, how to effectively curb the excessive investment behavior of enterprises and ensure the healthy development of the economy is imminent.
In the modern enterprise, debt has become an indispensable capital. In 1976, Jensen and Meckling began to explore the governance function of debt. Since then, a new era of research on the effect of debt governance has been opened. This article adopts the method of combining normative research and empirical research. In the normative research, this paper tries to use Jensen (1986). Based on the free cash flow hypothesis, combined with the agency cost theory and the debt camera governance, the impact path of bank loans on overinvestment behavior of managers is studied by analyzing the generation mechanism of debt governance effect. In theory, this paper argues that the external supervision of the bank and the mandatory requirement of the repayment of bank loans due to the maturity of the bank loans are in theory. It restrains the manager's free control of free cash flow, to a certain extent, alleviates the contradiction between the managers and the owners, and then inhibits the overinvestment behavior of the managers. In the empirical study, this paper empirically tests the conclusion of theoretical analysis through the establishment of a research model, which has influenced bank loans. The analysis of the mechanism of degree investment not only examines whether the bank has played a role in the governance of the enterprise as an external supervision mechanism, but also provides a new perspective for the study of corporate governance in China. On the basis of the previous research, this paper further studies the difference between the term structure of the loan, the property property and the institutional environment. To investigate the restraining effect of bank loans on the overinvestment of the managers, the suggestions and measures to improve the institutional environment of our country are put forward to provide valuable reference for promoting the steady and healthy development of the contemporary economy.
The logical idea of this article is: with the continuous deepening of the market economy, the characteristics of the separation of the two rights in our enterprises are more obvious. The agency problem between the owners and the managers is more serious. When there are plenty of free cash flows in the enterprises, the managers will choose the investment projects with negative net present value under the drive of their own interests. The debt financing, as one of the effective corporate governance mechanisms, can give full play to the positive effect of governance. Due to the external supervision of the creditor and the pressure on the repayment of the debt due to the debt maturity, the discretion of the managers is restricted, and the free cash flow is controlled at random. It relieves the agency problem between the owner and the manager, and then can improve the investment level of the enterprise. And this paper thinks that the loan term structure, the property property and the institutional environment can also bring the difference of the debt financing effect, and have different influence on the investment behavior of the enterprise. According to the logic of the article, the main research content of this article can be divided into the following parts:
The first part is the introduction, which mainly describes the research background, purpose, significance, research ideas and methods, research framework, main contributions and deficiencies.
The second part is the literature review, mainly on the existence of overinvestment, the effect of free cash flow on overinvestment, the debt restriction mechanism of overinvestment, and the related literature.
The third part is the theoretical analysis. This part mainly expounds the meaning and measurement method of overinvestment, and analyzes the relevant theoretical basis, including the agency cost theory, the free cash flow hypothesis, the debt management of the camera, and at the end of this part expounds the derivation framework and theoretical approaches of this paper.
The fourth part is an empirical study. This part is the first of the hypothesis, on the basis of theoretical analysis, the seven hypotheses need to be studied. Secondly, the analysis part of the research design and the empirical results. This paper selects the A shares listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai as the sample for reference, and draws on the expected investment model proposed by Richardson (2006). To measure the scale of overinvestment, the seven hypotheses are tested one by one to study whether bank loans can restrain the abuse of free cash flow, alleviate the agency problem between owners and managers, and then restrain their overinvestment behavior. On this basis, this part further studies the loan term. The influence of the structure, property property and institutional environment difference on the management of the bank loan, and finally the robustness test part, the robustness test will be carried out in the following two ways: (1) the re measurement of overinvestment; (2) separate inspection in the year.
The fifth part is the research conclusion, the suggestion and the limitation, mainly based on the conclusion of the study, and puts forward the relevant suggestions and measures to improve the effect of the bank loans in our country to play the debt governance effect.
Through the analysis of the above five parts, this paper finds that: (1) the problem of agency between the owner and the manager is serious, and the managers have the motivation to satisfy their own interests at random. The more free cash flow within the enterprise, the more serious the problem of overinvestment; (2) the bank loan can be effectively reduced. The free cash flow that managers can control at random can relieve the agent problem between owners and managers, and then restrain their overinvestment behavior, and this effect is more reflected in short-term loans. (3) the difference of property property can affect the restraining effect of bank loans on overinvestment of managers, that is, in non-state-owned enterprises, Bank loans have a stronger effect on the management of overinvestment by managers; (4) different institutional environments can also affect the governance effectiveness of bank loans, the higher the level of financial development, the better the rule of law environment, the less government intervention, the stronger the restraining effect of bank loans to managers over investment. According to the above analysis, this paper proposes The following suggestions are as follows: (1) improving the enterprise information disclosure system and strengthening the supervision of free cash flow; (2) proper introduction of debt financing, perfect enterprise capital structure; (3) perfect relevant laws and regulations, establish effective debt service guarantee mechanism; (4) reform officials' examination and evaluation mechanism, reduce government intervention; (5) further deepen state-owned commercial banks Reform.
The main contributions of this article are as follows:
First, unlike most of the previous literature, this paper selects the perspective of bank loan to study the governance effect of debt on overinvestment of managers. This is because bank loans are still the most important source of debt financing for most of our companies, and the practical significance of studying bank loans is stronger.
Second, this article will analyze the term structure of the bank loan, and through such a refinement, we will study the difference between the bank loans of different term structures and the restraining effect of overinvestment on managers.
Third, according to the differences in property rights, this paper divides enterprises into state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises. The purpose of this study is to study whether the degree of soft budget constraints of state-owned enterprises is still higher than that of non-state-owned enterprises after years of reform.
Fourth, this paper further explores the impact of the institutional environment, and aims to find out whether the differences in the institutional environment can affect the restraining effect of the bank loans on the overinvestment of the managers. It is helpful to investigate the achievements of the development of our institutional environment from the dynamic level, and to discuss how to improve the institutional environment from the macro level. We should give full play to the role of camera governance of bank loans in order to provide valuable reference for ensuring the steady development of the economy.
The shortcomings of this paper are as follows:
First, this article only selects the data of the listed companies to carry on the research, the non-listed company article does not involve. But in real life, the external supervision and management of the non-listed company in our country is less, the over investment problem of some companies is more serious. On the one hand, the financing channels of non-listed company are relatively narrow, and the debt financing is in the middle. The proportion of bank loans is higher, on the other hand, the relationship between the shareholders, managers and creditors of some non-listed company may be different from the listed companies, so it is also of practical significance to study the overinvestment behavior of this kind of company.
Second, in the actual production and operation activities, the cash flow that the manager can freely control is not only produced by the operating activities. The non operating activities and the previous remaining parts may also bring about the overinvestment of the managers. In this paper, when calculating the free cash flow, the management activities are used only according to the Richardson (2006) statement. The net cash flow is not related to other parts, which can become a research direction in the future.
Third, this paper measures the scale of overinvestment based on the expected investment model proposed by Richardson (2006). Although this model has some authority in this field, it is still more subjective. First, there are many factors that can affect the investment bank in the real society, and the measurement of the model is difficult to be comprehensive; secondly, The measurement of growth in the model has always been different. Some people adopt Tobin Q, and some people adopt the growth rate of main business income. No matter what measure, there are certain limitations.

【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.4;F275

【参考文献】