我国上市公司可转债融资选择与非效率投资双向治理研究

发布时间：2018-05-13 02:08

本文选题：可转换公司债券 + 融资选择　；参考：《首都经济贸易大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：随着经济的高速发展，我国的无效投资现象越来越严重，投资效率令人堪忧。过度投资和投资不足是我国上市公司投资过程中亟待解决的问题。本文在已有文献的基础上进一步研究了可转债作为现在最重要的融资方式之一对于企业非效率投资的治理作用。理论上,可转债融资具有降低外部融资成本和改善特定类型公司治理绩效的作用。首先从理论上探讨和总结了可转债降低外部融资成本和改善特定类型公司非效率投资的作用机制和途径。在此基础上,对我国可转债融资选择行为和效果进行了全面的研究和刻画。通过研究，本文发现我国可转债融资公司特征表现为具有较高的负债率、较高的成长性、较低的获取经营现金能力、较高的自由现金流量、较大的资产规模。理论上,可转债融资公司所具有的“小规模、高财务杠杆、高成长、高风险和较多自由现金流”特征在我国可转债融资企业中部分得到体现，这说明上市公司在选择可转债融资时，考虑了财务危机风险，代理问题和信息不对称可能引起的资产替代风险、逆向选择成本以及风险估计困难等因素。可转换公司债券能够抑制过度投资行为，且其对投资不足具有很好的改善作用，这说明可转债确实具有双向治理无效投资的作用；另外，本文还对可转债条款设计对治理非效率投资效果进行了实证研究，，研究证明，可转债赎回条款在短期内对过度投资有一定的抑制作用，但是其对投资不足的影响并不显著，回售条款对于过度投资和投资不足都有一定的治理作用。这意味着在保持必要监管的基础上适度放开对于公司使用可转债进行融资的政策限制，积极发展债券市场，将有助于提高我国上市公司的整体投资效率。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of economy, the phenomenon of invalid investment is becoming more and more serious, and the efficiency of investment is worrying. Excessive investment and insufficient investment are the problems to be solved in the process of investment of listed companies in China. Based on the existing literature, this paper further studies the governance role of convertible bonds as one of the most important financing methods for enterprises' inefficient investment. Theoretically, convertible bond financing can reduce the cost of external financing and improve the performance of certain types of corporate governance. Firstly, the paper discusses and summarizes the mechanism and ways of reducing the external financing cost and improving the inefficiency investment of certain types of companies. On this basis, the paper makes a comprehensive study and characterization of the behavior and effect of convertible bond financing in China. Through research, this paper finds that the characteristics of convertible bond financing companies in China are higher debt ratio, higher growth, lower ability to obtain operating cash, higher free cash flow and larger asset scale. Theoretically, the characteristics of "small scale, high financial leverage, high growth, high risk and more free cash flow" of convertible bond financing companies are partly reflected in Chinese convertible bond financing enterprises. This shows that the listed companies consider the risk of financial crisis, the agent problem and the risk of asset substitution caused by asymmetric information, the cost of adverse selection and the difficulty of risk estimation when choosing convertible bond financing. Convertible corporate bonds can inhibit excessive investment behavior and have a good effect on improving underinvestment, which shows that convertible bonds do have the effect of two-way governance of ineffective investment; in addition, This paper also makes an empirical study on the effect of convertible bond clause design on the governance of inefficient investment. The research proves that the convertible bond redemption clause has a certain restraining effect on overinvestment in the short term, but its impact on investment insufficiency is not significant. The return clause for excessive investment and insufficient investment has a certain governance role. This means that on the basis of maintaining the necessary supervision, we should liberalize appropriately the policy restrictions on the use of convertible bonds to finance companies, and actively develop the bond market, which will help to improve the overall investment efficiency of listed companies in China.
【学位授予单位】：首都经济贸易大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51;F275

【参考文献】