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股权投资与企业股权激励机制

发布时间:2018-05-17 20:36

  本文选题:股权投资 + 股权激励 ; 参考:《暨南大学》2014年硕士论文


【摘要】:股权投资向企业注入资金后,,通过投资后管理来促进企业快速升值也是重要工作内容。监督控制是投资后管理的两大内容之一,股权投资者通过监督控制来降低其与被投资企业家之间的委托-代理风险,企业激励机制是监督控制内容的重要组成部分。激励机制包括短期激励和长期激励,其中,短期激励机制容易使激励者做出短视行为,不能与企业一起面向未来。因此,作为长期激励的股权激励机制设计就变得尤为重要。 基于以上,本文主要研究股权投资的介入是否为被投资企业长期激励——股权激励机制的设计带来新的特征。结合理论分析和实证回归分析,本文得出以下结论:(1)有股权投资介入的企业,股权激励强度更高,激励股权数量、对象人数都显著高于无股权投资介入的企业;(2)股权激励强度与企业业绩呈现显著的正相关关系,激励对象人数越多企业业绩越好。研究结论证明股权投资的介入确为企业股权激励机制设计带来新特征,这一新特征能有效促进企业业绩提升,这一结论可为投资后管理的实践提供理论指导。本文通过量化、实证的研究在已有文献的感性认知上有所进步,但是也由于数据的搜集和整理较为困难,文中所用数据可能不够成熟,这也是在今后的研究中需要改进的地方。
[Abstract]:After equity investment injects funds into enterprises, it is also important to promote the rapid appreciation of enterprises through post-investment management. Supervision and control is one of the two major contents of post-investment management. Equity investors reduce the principal-agent risk between them and the entrepreneurs through supervision and control. The incentive mechanism of enterprises is an important part of supervision and control. The incentive mechanism includes short-term incentive and long-term incentive, among which, short-term incentive mechanism is easy to make the motivator make short-sighted behavior, and can not face the future together with the enterprise. Therefore, as a long-term incentive equity incentive mechanism design has become particularly important. Based on the above, this paper mainly studies whether the intervention of equity investment brings new features to the design of long-term incentive-equity incentive mechanism of invested enterprises. Combined with theoretical analysis and empirical regression analysis, this paper draws the following conclusion: 1) the enterprises with equity investment have higher intensity of equity incentive and the number of incentive shares. The number of subjects is significantly higher than that of enterprises without equity investment.) the intensity of equity incentive has a significant positive correlation with corporate performance, and the more the number of incentive objects, the better the performance of enterprises. It is proved that the intervention of equity investment can bring new features to the design of equity incentive mechanism, and this new feature can effectively promote the performance of enterprises. This conclusion can provide theoretical guidance for the practice of post-investment management. Through quantification, the empirical research has made some progress in the perceptual cognition of the existing literature, but also because of the difficulty of collecting and arranging the data, the data used in this paper may not be mature enough, which is also the place that needs to be improved in the future research.
【学位授予单位】:暨南大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F272.92;F832.51

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