独立董事兼任:声誉抑或忙碌——基于债券市场的经验证据

发布时间：2018-05-21 01:07

本文选题：独立董事兼任 + 质量假说　；参考：《审计研究》2017年05期

【摘要】：本文利用我国债券市场中发债上市公司2010~2013年数据,通过检验独立董事兼任与债券违约风险之间的关系,实证检验了独立董事兼任对企业债务融资成本的影响,分析了独立董事兼任的质量假说与忙碌假说在中国债券市场的存在性。研究发现,独立董事兼任席位越多,独立董事监督效率越低。总体上来看,债券市场中独立董事兼任的忙碌假说占据主导地位。具体表现为,随着独立董事兼任数量的增加,企业债务融资成本将增大。进一步从公司层面和个体层面进行检验后,发现提高机构投资者持股比率和增加独立董事薪酬,减弱了独立董事兼任的忙碌假说效应,即降低了企业债券融资成本。
[Abstract]:In this paper, by using the 2010~2013 data of debt listed companies in China's bond market, by examining the relationship between independent directors and bond default risks, this paper empirically examines the influence of independent directors on the cost of corporate debt financing, and analyzes the existence of the quality hypothesis and the busy hypothesis of independent directors in the Chinese bond market. The study found that the more independent directors have more seats, the less efficient the independent directors supervise. In general, the busy hypothesis of the independent directors in the bond market is dominant. The specific performance is that with the increase of the number of independent directors, the cost of debt financing will increase. Further from the corporate and individual levels, the test will be further tested. After that, it is found that raising the shareholding ratio of institutional investors and increasing the salary of independent directors has weakened the busy hypothesis effect of independent directors, that is, reducing the cost of corporate bond financing.
【作者单位】：中央财经大学会计学院;中国人民银行;湘潭大学商学院;
【基金】：教育部人文社科青年项目“卖空机制、信息传递与债券市场反应”(项目批准号:16YJC630065) 湖南省教育厅湘潭大学科研项目“上市公司CEO变更与财务转移效应研究”(项目批准号:KZ08063) 湖南省预算与会计理论研究基地的资助
【分类号】：F271;F832.51

【相似文献】