IPO保荐机构主动担责与投资者利益保护

发布时间：2018-05-20 21:35

本文选题：先行赔付 + 风险偏好　；参考：《中国工业经济》2017年02期

【摘要】：2013年5月10日,平安证券开创了"先行赔付"的先例,即在行政处罚程序尚未终结并且未被起诉的情况下,出资3亿元设立赔偿基金先行赔付投资者。虽然"先行赔付"为投资者利益保护提供了新的途径,得到了监管方的赞同并加以推广,但投资者对"先行赔付"的态度尚不明确。本文利用市场反应考察投资者对于"先行赔付"的认同程度,并比较了不同投资者类型和投资行为特征是否影响"先行赔付"的认同程度。研究表明,"先行赔付"从整体上得到了投资者的认同,但中小投资者对"先行赔付"表现出显著负面的反应,这与理论预期截然相反。进一步的研究表明,这主要是由于中小投资者对于风险的偏好与"先行赔付"降低风险的效应产生冲突所致。从投资行为特征看,长期持股的投资者对于"先行赔付"的认同程度更高。本文的研究结论表明,在中国投资者保护法律尚不完善的情况下,通过强化中介机构问责机制来提高投资者保护水平,能够得到投资者的认可。但是,现有投资者保护制度对于不同类型投资者的风险偏好判断可能存在偏差。为进一步发挥"先行赔付"的作用,监管方应在制度建设的同时,开展投资者教育,降低投资行为的非理性程度。
[Abstract]:On May 10, 2013, Ping an Securities set a precedent of "advance compensation", that is, if the administrative penalty procedure has not yet been completed and has not been prosecuted, it will contribute 300 million yuan to set up a compensation fund in advance to compensate investors. Although "advance indemnity" provides a new way to protect the interests of investors, has been approved and promoted by regulators, but the attitude of investors to "advance payment" is not clear. This paper makes use of market reaction to investigate the degree of recognition of "advance payment" by investors, and compares whether different types of investors and characteristics of investment behavior influence the degree of recognition of "advance payment". The research shows that the "advance payment" has been accepted by the investors as a whole, but the small and medium-sized investors have shown a significant negative reaction to the "advance payment", which is contrary to the theoretical expectation. Further research shows that this is mainly due to the conflict between the risk preference of the small and medium-sized investors and the effect of reducing the risk by "prepayment". According to the characteristics of investment behavior, investors holding long-term shares have a higher degree of recognition of "advance compensation". The conclusion of this paper shows that under the condition that the law of investor protection in China is not perfect, the level of investor protection can be improved by strengthening the accountability mechanism of intermediary institutions, which can be recognized by investors. However, the existing investor protection system may deviate from the risk preference judgment of different types of investors. In order to further play the role of "compensation in advance", the supervisor should carry out investor education and reduce the irrational degree of investment behavior while establishing the system.
【作者单位】：东北财经大学会计学;东北财经大学中国内部控制研究中心;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金青年项目“规避行为对量化监管有效性的影响”(批准号71202039) 辽宁省高等学校杰出青年学者成长计划“保荐人声誉机制研究”(批准号WJQ2014038)
【分类号】：D922.287;F832.51

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