CEO海外经历、内部控制与股价崩盘风险
本文选题:海外经历 + 内部控制 ; 参考:《中国矿业大学》2017年硕士论文
【摘要】:股市的稳定与良好运行是保证国家经济发展、保护投资者利益的必要条件,然而长期以来,股价暴跌、股市动荡不稳的情况时有发生,我国股市自2008年至今也一直处于持续起伏阶段,个股的股价崩盘事件不断发生。因此,研究股价崩盘风险的影响因素,建立预防股价暴跌机制是目前亟需解决的重要难题。目前,有关股价崩盘风险影响因素的研究大多集中在股票收益率、股票流动性、会计稳健性、机构投资者、分析师偏差、审计师专长、公司信息透明度等角度。根据股价崩盘风险的形成机理,管理层机会主义倾向于隐藏公司的“坏消息”,当“坏消息”积累过多便会同时曝出,导致股价迅速下跌以致崩盘。从已有研究可知,公司内部控制可以有效降低管理层机会主义的动机和机会,因此论文从公司内部控制的角度研究内部控制有效性对股价崩盘风险的影响,并加入CEO海外经历与产权性质调节变量,分别研究二者对内部控制与股价崩盘风险之间关系的影响。论文在回顾与高管背景特征、内部控制、股价崩盘风险有关的文献的基础上,结合委托代理理论、高阶管理理论与信息不对称理论,对公司内部控制与股价崩盘风险之间的关系、CEO海外经历和产权性质分别对内部控制与股价崩盘风险之间关系的影响进行了理论分析,并提出相应假设。之后根据提出的假设进行实证分析,得出以下结论:(1)公司内部控制越高,股价崩盘风险就会越低,即公司良好的内部控制可以有效抑制股价崩盘风险;(2)CEO有海外经历的公司,内部控制对股价崩盘风险的抑制作用减弱,这一结论在全样本组、国有上市公司样本组和非国有上市公司样本组中都成立;(3)与国有上市公司相比,非国有上市公司中内部控制对股价崩盘风险的抑制作用更强,这一结论在全样本组、CEO有海外经历的样本组和CEO无海外经历的样本组中都成立。最后,使用内部控制的替代变量和增加新的控制变量进行稳健性检验,得出结果与实证分析结果一致。论文从高管背景特征与公司内部控制两个角度研究了二者对股价崩盘风险的影响,丰富了高阶管理理论与信息不对称理论的内容,同时在一定程度上拓宽了股价崩盘风险影响因素的范围,为平稳股市、控制股价崩盘风险的措施提供了新的方向。
[Abstract]:The stability and good operation of the stock market is a necessary condition for ensuring the country's economic development and protecting the interests of investors. However, for a long time, stock prices have plummeted and the stock market has been volatile and unstable. China's stock market has been in a continuous ups and downs since 2008, the stock price crash has occurred. Therefore, it is an important problem to study the risk factors of stock price collapse and to establish a mechanism to prevent stock price collapse. At present, most of the studies on the risk factors of stock price collapse focus on stock returns, stock liquidity, accounting conservatism, institutional investors, analyst bias, auditor expertise, corporate information transparency, and so on. According to the formation mechanism of the risk of stock price collapse, management opportunism tends to hide the "bad news" of the company. When "bad news" accumulates too much, it will come out at the same time, causing the stock price to fall quickly and collapse. According to the existing research, internal control can effectively reduce the motivation and opportunity of management opportunism. Therefore, this paper studies the effect of the effectiveness of internal control on the risk of stock price collapse from the perspective of internal control. The relationship between internal control and the risk of stock price collapse is studied by adding CEO's overseas experience and property rights regulation variables. On the basis of reviewing the literature related to executive background characteristics, internal control, stock price collapse risk, combined with principal-agent theory, higher-order management theory and information asymmetry theory, This paper analyzes the relationship between internal control and the risk of stock price collapse. The influence of CEO's overseas experience and property right on the relationship between internal control and the risk of stock price collapse is analyzed theoretically, and the corresponding assumptions are put forward. Then according to the hypothesis put forward, empirical analysis shows the following conclusion: 1) the higher the internal control of the company, the lower the risk of a stock price crash. That is, good internal control of the company can effectively suppress the risk of a stock price collapse. The effect of internal control on the risk of stock price collapse is weakened. This conclusion is established in the whole sample group, the sample group of state-owned listed companies and the sample group of non-state-owned listed companies. The internal controls of non-state-owned listed companies have a stronger inhibitory effect on the risk of stock price collapse, which is true in all sample groups with CEO's overseas experience and CEO sample group with no overseas experience. Finally, the robustness test is carried out by using the alternative variables of internal control and adding new control variables, and the results are consistent with the results of empirical analysis. This paper studies the impact of executive background and internal control on the risk of stock price collapse, which enriches the content of higher-order management theory and information asymmetry theory. At the same time, it broadens the scope of the risk factors of stock price crash to some extent, and provides a new direction for stabilizing the stock market and controlling the risk of stock price collapse.
【学位授予单位】:中国矿业大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:F832.51;F272.91;F275
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