中国上市公司跨省担保的动机和效果研究

发布时间：2018-06-01 16:13

本文选题：跨省担保 + 动机　；参考：《山东大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：担保为企业间融通资金提供了保证,应属于一种企业间的正常行为。然而,最近市场上频繁地爆出担保圈的问题,甚至是因为担保圈的问题引发出来的债务危机事件。从早期的深圳担保圈到近期的河北担保圈和上海担保圈,再到最近的潍坊担保圈。上市公司通过担保圈把各自的命运联系在一起,一旦某一环出现问题,整个担保圈都将陷入困境,甚至出现区域性债务危机。由此可见,担保圈问题严重阻碍了上市公司的发展,对金融市场稳定运行造成了严重的破坏。在我国学术界,上市公司存在的担保问题总是备受关注,本文通过探究我国上市公司跨省担保的动机和产生的经济效果,为解决当下担保产生的问题提出理论依据。文章总共分为六个章节。第一章为导论,主要说明与文章主题跨省担保相关的研究背景、研究意义、研究思路和研究方法、文章的创新和不足等。第二章文献综述主要对三个方面的内容进行了总结,一是对目前担保相关理论文献进行梳理,二是整理了公司参与担保影响因素的相关文献,三是梳理了参与担保对公司自身影响的相关文献。经过整理总结现有的文献内容,参考上市公司最新披露的关于担保的信息,分析上市公司参与担保面临的现实问题,概括出上市公司参与担保的原因和担保对其产生的影响。第三章分析了我国上市公司目前的担保概况,对呈现出的担保行为的特性进行了剖析,并总结了上市公司参与担保带来的危害和导致担保问题的主要原因。第四章是研究设计,我们从Wind数据库中下载了中国上市公司2006年到2015年披露的担保数据,并对选取的变量给出解释,同时设计相关模型。第五章是实证检验,通过实证分析探究上市公司跨省担保的动机;同时,我们选取了资产收益率、股东占款、商业信用等三个变量,对上市公司参与担保的经济效果做了回归分析。第六章是主要结论与启示,针对上述出现的问题,从健全担保法律法规、健全上市公司内部担保审批机制、强化上市公司对担保事项的信息披露制度、加强银行等金融机构的监管、拓宽资本市场融资渠道等方面提出政策建议。实证检验发现:受共同的实际控制人控制的两家上市公司之间有更大的可能性跨省担保;存在相同董事的上市公司之间有更大的可能性发生跨省担保;但是同一行业的上市公司之间参与跨省担保的影响效果不显著;资产总额越大的公司参与跨省担保的概率越小;董事会规模和独立董事所占比例都与跨省担保的概率呈现显著负相关关系。国有企业参与跨省担保的概率相对于非国企较大;市场化程度越高的地区参与跨省担保的概率也越大。通过对跨省担保的效果进行实证检验后发现,上市公司参与跨省担保会降低公司的盈利性水平,减少大股东占款数量和公司的商业信用。
[Abstract]:Guarantee provides guarantee for financing funds between enterprises and should be a normal behavior among enterprises. However, the problems of the guarantee circle have been frequently popped up in the market recently, even because of the debt crisis caused by the problem of the guarantee circle. From early Shenzhen guarantee circle to Hebei guarantee circle and Shanghai guarantee circle, to Weifang guarantee circle. The listed companies connect their fates together through the guarantee circle. Once there is a problem in a certain ring, the whole guarantee circle will be in a dilemma, even a regional debt crisis. Thus, the problem of guarantee circle seriously hinders the development of listed companies and seriously damages the stable operation of financial market. In the academic circles of our country, the guarantee problem of listed companies is always paid close attention to. By exploring the motive and economic effect of cross-provincial guarantee of listed companies in China, this paper puts forward the theoretical basis for solving the problem of underguarantee. The article is divided into six chapters. The first chapter is the introduction, which mainly explains the research background, research significance, research ideas and research methods, innovation and deficiency of the article. The second chapter summarizes three aspects of the literature review, one is to sort out the current relevant theoretical literature on guarantee, the other is to sort out the relevant literature on the factors affecting the company's participation in the guarantee. Third, combing the relevant literature on the impact of the participation guarantee on the company itself. After summarizing the existing literature, referring to the latest disclosure of information on the guarantee of listed companies, this paper analyzes the practical problems faced by the listed companies participating in the guarantee, and summarizes the reasons for the participation of the listed companies in the guarantee and the impact of the guarantee on it. The third chapter analyzes the current situation of the guarantee of listed companies in China, analyzes the characteristics of the security behavior, and summarizes the harm caused by the participation of the listed companies in the guarantee and the main reasons leading to the guarantee problem. The fourth chapter is the research and design. We download the guarantee data from 2006 to 2015 from the Wind database, explain the selected variables and design the relevant models. The fifth chapter is the empirical test, through empirical analysis to explore the motivation of cross-provincial guarantee of listed companies; at the same time, we select three variables: return on assets, shareholders' share, commercial credit, etc. The economic effect of participating in the guarantee of listed companies is analyzed by regression analysis. The sixth chapter is the main conclusion and enlightenment, aiming at the above problems, from perfecting the guarantee laws and regulations, perfecting the internal guarantee examination and approval mechanism of the listed company, strengthening the information disclosure system of the listed company to the guarantee matter, Strengthen the supervision of banks and other financial institutions, broaden the capital market financing channels and other aspects of policy recommendations. The empirical results show that there is a greater possibility of inter-provincial guarantee between two listed companies controlled by common actual controllers, a greater possibility of inter-provincial guarantee between listed companies with the same directors, and a greater possibility of inter-provincial guarantee between two listed companies under the control of common actual controllers. However, the effect of participating in inter-provincial guarantee between listed companies in the same industry is not significant, and the probability of participating in inter-provincial guarantee is smaller for the company with larger total assets. The size of board and the proportion of independent directors are negatively correlated with the probability of interprovincial guarantee. The probability of state-owned enterprises participating in inter-provincial guarantee is greater than that of non-state-owned enterprises, and the higher the degree of marketization, the greater the probability of participating in inter-provincial guarantee. Through the empirical test of the effect of inter-provincial guarantee, it is found that the participation of listed companies in inter-provincial guarantee will reduce the profitability of the company, reduce the number of large shareholders and the commercial credit of the company.
【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F832.51

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