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中国创业板上市公司CEO更替影响机制研究

发布时间:2018-06-02 00:39

  本文选题:创业板 + CEO更替 ; 参考:《西南财经大学》2014年硕士论文


【摘要】:随着跨国公司全球业务的高速拓展,企业决策层和执行层需要面对和处理越来越多的内部和外部信息,而传统的董事会—董事长—总经理式的公司治理结构阻滞了决策层和执行层之间的信息传递,影响了经理层对企业重大决策的快速反应和执行能力,降低了企业的经营效率,一些大型跨国企业开始重新审视这类公司治理结构并对其进行变革,CEO制度孕育而生,CEO的出现为企业更有效率的经营管理开辟了新途径,也体现了企业真真正正的所有权和经营权的分离,CEO的设立体现了能者为之,以人为本和为人力资本合理定价的思想,目前设立CEO已成为国际上通行的一种公司治理方式。 CEO从某种意义上说是公司的掌舵人,拥有最终的执行经营管理决策的权力。由于行业的经营环境愈加复杂多变,带来了行业的深层次的洗牌,企业高层管理者尤其是CEO变动越来越频繁,全球领先的管理咨询公司博斯于2013年4月18日发布了针对全球规模最大的2500家上市公司的CEO调查报告,据报告显示:2012年全球范围内CEO更替率为15%,为近十年以来历史第二高,计划内的CEO更替占到全部更替的72%,且新任CEO大多来自企业内部,中国企业的CEO更替相对较低,但也达到8.1%,与2007-2011年的5.5%相比,增长幅度还是较大,达到47.2%,其中CEO继任来源上64%的新任CEO是来由内部提拔产生,从另一个方面也反映出中国企业对待CEO更替的积极态度,在面对经济好转带来的大好形势时,通过积极地制定继任计划,稳定企业的领导层,帮助企业实现发展和突破。 长期以来,CEO更替一直是国内外资本市场和公司治理研究中的一项重要内容,也是管理学研究中的一个热点问题。CEO更替作为最具影响力的管理层变动,影响到企业运作的方方面面,他们处于企业的权力中心,其管理能力和企业家才能一定程度上决定着一个企业的成长和绩效,企业的生存和发展也与CEO个人的成败息息相关。因此CEO更替被视为企业发展过程中最重要的战略决策之一。 基于传统的委托代理理论和早期的公司治理理论,西方学者于20世纪60年代就开始对工业化国家上市公司的CEO更替问题进行了大量卓有成效的研究。经过长达10多年的实证研究,直到70年代CEO更替的理论框架才初具雏形。国外有关CEO更替的研究是在成熟的市场经济下展开的,而我国目前正处于经济体制转轨阶段,自上世纪90年代,国有企业进行了大规模的公司制改革,初步建立现代企业制度,形成权责明确、相互制约的法人治理结构并逐步上市,资本市场的不完善以及研究CEO更替的相对不足,国外的研究结果并不能解释当下中国上市公司CEO更替的深层次原因。另一方面,我国大多数上市公司是由国有企业转制而来,这类具有强烈政府背景的企业,他们的CEO更替相对比较复杂,且以行政任免居多。为尽量避免主观成分(行政任免)对CEO更替的影响,本文将选取已初步建立现代企业治理结构且较大规模的创业板上市公司为样本,对创业板上市公司CEO更替的动因进行深入研究。 由于创业板市场不够成熟、社会的创业机制不够完善及创业板风险与收益不对称等原因,自2009年10月30日中国创业板市场开市以来,创业板迎来高管离职高潮,而CEO作为高管团队的核心人物,对企业的生存和发展有着不可估量的作用,因此专业、系统地去研究这类企业CEO更替的问题显得非常有意义。据此本文提出了主要研究对象,即中国创业板上市公司CEO更替的影响机制。相比国外较为成熟的创业板市场,中国创业板市场目前还处于起步阶段,还有许多不完善和需要改进的地方,但其成长速度惊人,截止2013年12月31日,短短的几年时间内,总计355家自主创新型及创业型企业在深交所创业板成功上市。为了能更全面、系统地分析创业板上市公司CEO更替的影响机制,笔者认为应该从更替的结果和更替的过程两方面进行研究。基于以往研究的成果和上述分析,本文的研究主要分为两块:一是探讨创业板所有上市公司发生CEO更替的影响因素;二是以发生CEO更替的上市公司为样本,研究其CEO更替过程的影响因素,其中CEO更替过程分为离任类型和继任者来源,离任类型包括强迫离任和自愿离任,继任者来源包括内部继任和外部继任。 本文的总体研究思路是:基于委托代理理论、人力资本理论和资源依赖理论,总结和归纳以往的研究成果,以正处于快速发展期的创业板上市公司为样本,从企业绩效、公司特性、CEO特性、控制权市场这四个方面提出相应的假设和建立模型,并用大量上市公司信息披露的财务数据和公司治理数据进行验证假设。希望通过对该类企业CEO更替的动因进行全面、深入地研究,能为中国民营企业在公司治理结构上的完善、证券市场监管部门相关制度的完善以及市场环境的改善提供参考依据。 本文研究的逻辑框架为:(1)绪论:阐述研究背景,结合国内外有关CEO更替的研究,继而提出本文的研究问题;其次论述本研究的理论意义和现实意义;在此基础上总括本文的研究思路、研究方法、研究内容和研究架构;最后总结本文的创新点。(2)文献综述:集中国内外有关CEO更替的研究成果,分别从企业绩效、公司特性、CEO特性、公司控制权市场这四个方面整理成文献综述。(3)理论框架和假设:本章详细论述了本文研究的三大理论基础—委托代理理论、人力资本理论、资源依赖理论,并用这三大理论对CEO更替进行了简要的分析。建立在理论的基础上和结合文献的研究成果,提出本文的研究假设。本章首先结合中国具体的情景,从我国实际出发,对CEO、CEO更替、CEO离任(强迫离任、自愿离任)、CEO继任来源(内部继任、外部继任)等概念加以清晰界定;其次详细论述了本文研究的三大理论基础—委托代理理论、人力资本理论、资源依赖理论,并用这三大理论对CEO更替进行了详细的分析。(4)实证研究设计:首先对样本和数据进行整理和筛选;然后根据研究假设选取相应的解释变量和被解释变量,并对CEO相关概念和变量进行了界定;最后根据变量类别选择本文研究的模型和模型设计。(5)实证研究:首先从CSMAR数据库和深圳证券交易所官方网站上收集创业板上市公司的财务数据和公司治理数据,并进行归纳和整理,对研究的样本进行统计性描述;其次对建立的Logit模型进行假设检验,在得到回归结果后,通过进一步分析得出实证结论。(6)结论与展望:总结本文的研究成果,指出本文研究的局限性与不足,并对未来研究的方向进行展望。 本文通过回归分析方法,运用统计学软件SPSS20.0,对理论模型中的假设进行了验证,主要得到以下结论: (1)公司绩效与CEO更替显著负相关 (2)公司绩效与CEO强迫离任显著负相关 (3)公司绩效与CEO外部继任显著负相关 (4)产业别与CEO更替显著正相关 (5)公司规模与CEO内部继任显著正相关 (6)第一大股东持股比例与外部继任显著正相关 (7)董监事会规模与CEO更替显著正相关 (8)CEO年龄与CEO强迫离任显著负相关 (9)CEO教育程度与CEO更替显著负相关 (10)CEO教育程度与CEO强迫离任显著负相关 (11)CEO任职年限与CEO强迫离任显著负相关 (12)并购重组与CEO更替显著正相关
[Abstract]:With the rapid expansion of global business in MNCs, the decision layer and the executive layer need to face and deal with more and more internal and external information. The traditional board of directors general manager type corporate governance block the information transfer between the decision layer and the executive layer, which affects the rapid decision of the managers. The quick response and execution ability have reduced the business efficiency of the enterprise. Some large multinational enterprises have begun to reexamine the corporate governance structure and change them. The CEO system is born. The emergence of CEO has opened up a new way for the more efficient management of the enterprise, and it also embodies the real and true separation of ownership and management rights of the enterprise, CE The establishment of O embodies the idea of "people oriented" and "rational pricing for human capital". At present, the establishment of CEO has become a popular way of corporate governance in the world.
CEO, in a sense, is the company's helm, and has the ultimate power to carry out management decisions. As the business environment is increasingly complex and complex, it has brought the deep shuffle of the industry, and the top management of the enterprise, especially the CEO, is becoming more and more frequent. The leading global management consulting company, Bois, was released in April 18, 2013. The CEO survey report for the 2500 largest listed companies in the world shows that the global replacement rate of CEO in 2012 was 15%, which was second high in the past ten years. The CEO replacement in the plan accounted for 72% of the total replacement, and the new CEO was mostly from the internal enterprises, and the CEO turnover of Chinese enterprises was relatively low, but also reached 8.1%, Compared with the 2007-2011 year 5.5%, the growth rate is still larger, reaching 47.2%, of which the new CEO of CEO's successor source is produced by the new CEO. From another aspect, it also reflects the positive attitude of Chinese enterprises to the replacement of the CEO. The leadership, to help enterprises to achieve development and breakthrough.
For a long time, CEO replacement has been an important content in the research of capital market and corporate governance at home and abroad. It is also a hot issue in the study of management..CEO replacement is the most influential management change. It affects all aspects of the operation of the enterprise. They are in the power center of the enterprise, its management ability and entrepreneur ability. To a certain extent, the growth and performance of an enterprise are determined, and the survival and development of the enterprise are also closely related to the success or failure of CEO individuals. Therefore, the replacement of CEO is regarded as one of the most important strategic decisions in the process of enterprise development.
Based on the traditional principal-agent theory and the early corporate governance theory, western scholars began to make a great deal of fruitful research on the CEO replacement of the listed companies in the industrialized countries in 1960s. After more than 10 years of empirical research, the theoretical framework of the replacement of CEO was just in shape until 70s. The foreign related CEO is more important. The research is under the mature market economy, but China is now in the transition stage of the economic system. Since the 90s of last century, the state-owned enterprises carried out a large-scale corporate system reform, initially established a modern enterprise system to form a corporate governance structure with definite power and responsibility and mutual restriction, and the capital market is imperfect. And studying the relative insufficiency of the CEO replacement, the research results abroad can not explain the deep reasons for the CEO replacement of the listed companies in China. On the other hand, most of the listed companies in China are converted from state-owned enterprises, and these enterprises with strong government background are relatively complex in their CEO replacement and are mostly administrative and free. Try to avoid the influence of the subjective component (administrative appointment) on the replacement of the CEO. This article will select a sample of the initial establishment of a modern corporate governance structure and a larger scale of the GEM listed companies, and make an in-depth study of the motivation of the CEO replacement of the GEM listed companies.
Since the GEM market is not mature enough, the entrepreneurial mechanism of the society is not perfect and the risk and income of the gem are asymmetrical, since the opening of the Chinese gem market in October 30, 2009, the gem has ushered in the high tide of executive turnover. As the core figure of the executive team, CEO has an immeasurable effect on the survival and development of the enterprise. In this major, it is very meaningful to systematically study the CEO replacement of such enterprises. This paper puts forward the main research object, that is, the influence mechanism of the CEO replacement of the Chinese GEM listed companies. Compared with the more mature gem market in foreign countries, the Chinese gem market is still in its infancy at present, and there are still many imperfect and necessary. The improved place, but its growth rate is amazing, in December 31, 2013, in a few short years, a total of 355 independent innovation and entrepreneurial enterprises have been successfully listed in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. In order to have more comprehensive and systematic analysis of the influence mechanism of the CEO replacement of the GEM listed companies, I think it should be from the result and replacement of the replacement. Two aspects of the process are studied. Based on the previous research results and the above analysis, the research of this paper is divided into two main parts: one is to discuss the influence factors of the CEO replacement of all listed companies on the gem; the two is to take the listed companies with CEO replacement as samples to study the influence factors of its CEO replacement process, of which the CEO replacement process is divided into the separation process. The type of appointment and the source of the successor, the outgoing type includes forced resigning and voluntary resigning, and the successor sources include internal succession and external succession.
The overall study of this paper is based on the principal-agent theory, human capital theory and resource dependence theory, summing up and summarizing the previous research results, taking the GEM listed companies in the rapid development period as samples, and putting forward the corresponding hypotheses and Jian Limo from the four aspects of enterprise performance, corporate characteristics, characteristics, and control market. In order to improve the corporate governance structure of the Chinese private enterprises, the improvement of the relevant regulations of the securities market supervision department and the improvement of the market environment, it is hoped that the motivation of the CEO replacement of this kind of enterprise will be thoroughly and deeply studied. Provide reference basis.
The logical framework of this study is as follows: (1) Introduction: introduction of the research background, combined with the research on CEO replacement at home and abroad, then put forward the research problems in this paper; secondly, discuss the theoretical and practical significance of this study; on this basis, we summarize the research ideas, research methods, research content and research framework; finally summarize this article Innovation points. (2) literature review: the research results of CEO replacement in China and abroad are collected from four aspects of enterprise performance, company characteristics, CEO characteristics and corporate control market. (3) theoretical framework and hypothesis: this chapter details the three theoretical basis of this study - principal-agent theory, human capital theory On the basis of the three theories, a brief analysis of the CEO replacement is made with these theories. Based on the theory and the research results of the literature, the research hypothesis is put forward. This chapter, first of all, combined with the specific situation in China, from the reality of China, the CEO, the CEO, the CEO departure (forced departure, voluntary departure), and the CEO succession source ( The concepts of internal succession and external successor are clearly defined. Secondly, the three theoretical foundations of this study are discussed in detail: principal-agent theory, human capital theory, and resource dependence theory, and the CEO replacement is analyzed in detail with these three theories. (4) empirical research and Design: first of all, the sample and data are arranged and screened. And then select the corresponding explanatory variables and the explanatory variables according to the research hypothesis, and define the related concepts and variables of CEO. Finally, the model and model design of this paper are selected according to the category of variables. (5) empirical study: first, we collect the GEM listed companies from the CSMAR database and the official website of Shenzhen securities exchange. Financial data and corporate governance data, and make a summary and collation, carry out a statistical description of the sample of the study; secondly, make a hypothesis test of the established Logit model. After getting the results of the regression, we can get the empirical conclusion through further analysis. (6) conclusion and Prospect: Summarize the research results of this article, and point out the limitations and the lack of the research. Foot, and look at the direction of future research.
In this paper, the hypothesis of the theoretical model has been verified by means of regression analysis and statistical software SPSS20.0.
(1) there is a significant negative correlation between company performance and CEO turnover
(2) there is a significant negative correlation between corporate performance and CEO forced departure
(3) there is a significant negative correlation between company performance and CEO's external successor
(4) there is a significant positive correlation between industry and CEO replacement
(5) there is a significant positive correlation between the size of the company and the internal successor of CEO
(6) the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder is positively related to the external succession.
(7) a significant positive correlation between the size of the Tung's board and the replacement of the CEO
(8) there is a significant negative correlation between the CEO age and the forced departure of CEO
(9) the level of CEO education was negatively correlated with the replacement of CEO
(10) CEO education level is significantly negatively correlated with CEO forced resigning.
(11) the length of service of CEO is significantly negatively correlated with CEO's forced departure.
(12) a significant positive correlation between M & A and CEO replacement
【学位授予单位】:西南财经大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F832.51;F272.91

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