高管激励对非效率投资的影响研究

发布时间：2018-06-04 21:07

本文选题：股权激励 + 货币薪酬激励　；参考：《内蒙古财经大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：在现代企业管理制度中,由于企业所有权和经营权的分离,从而形成委托代理关系。根据委托代理理论和信息不对称理论,管理者和所有者之间会产生利益冲突。所有者拥有对企业的控制权和利润的剩余索取权,而管理者拥有投资决策权。管理者在投资决策过程中,为了增加个人收益、加强对企业资本的控制,可能会选择净现值为负的投资项目,从而导致过度投资问题;也可能为了降低私人成本、回避风险而放弃净现值为正的投资项目而导致投资不足。这两种非正常投资问题都属于非效率投资行为。学者普遍认为可以通过将管理者与所有者之间的利益一致化,来解决所有者和管理者之间的委托代理矛盾,抑制非效率投资行为。具体来说,我们首先需要了解高管人员的工作态度、工作能力等,进而制定有效的激励措施来影响高管人员的投资行为,从而提高他们的投资效率。近期国外学术界对抑制非效率投资行为的研究,主要集中在高管激励对非效率投资的影响上,比如利用货币薪酬激励或者股权激励等单一激励模式对非效率投资的影响,缺乏综合性研究。与国外相比,我国高管薪酬在1998年才开始披露,股权激励制度也是在2006年才正式开始实施,因而我国对非效率投资的研究起步晚,理论体系尚不成熟。此外,有关高管激励模式对非效率投资的影响程度的比较研究甚少。为此,本文以我国上市公司作为研究对象,通过实证分析法考察我国企业实施的高管激励制度对非效率投资的影响,并比较货币薪酬激励和股权激励这两种激励模式对非效率投资的影响程度,进而得出本文的研究结论。本文沿着“文献综述——理论分析——实证分析——提出建议”的路线进行相关研究。首先对国内外相关文献进行梳理;接着运用规范分析方法具体阐释委托代理理论、信息不对称理论、风险承担理论、不完全契约理论、激励理论等相关理论;然后在我国的高管激励制度背景下,根据以往的研究和理论基础提出研究假设并建立模型;再通过样本筛选(以2012年至2015年的沪深A股上市公司的4048个有效观测值为研究样本)运用SPSS统计软件进行多元线性回归,获得实证结果。最后,根据实证结果进行分析得出研究结论。研究结果显示高管货币薪酬激励和股权激励都可以抑制非效率投资行为的产生,但通过比较二者对非效率投资的影响程度发现,我国的上市公司中采用货币薪酬激励要比采用股权激励的作用更大。最后针对我国上市公司目前存在的问题,从激励机制的完善以及监督政策的构建等方面提出相应的政策性建议。
[Abstract]:In modern enterprise management system, due to the separation of ownership and management right, principal-agent relationship is formed. According to principal-agent theory and information asymmetry theory, conflicts of interest will occur between managers and owners. The owner has the residual claim on the control and profit of the enterprise, while the manager has the right of investment decision. In the process of making investment decisions, managers may choose investment projects with negative net present value in order to increase personal income and control the capital of enterprises, which may lead to overinvestment problems, or to reduce private costs. Risk avoidance and abandonment of positive NPV investments lead to underinvestment. These two kinds of abnormal investment problem belong to the non-efficient investment behavior. Scholars generally think that we can solve the principal-agent contradiction between the owner and the manager by unifying the interests between the manager and the owner, and restrain the inefficient investment behavior. Specifically, we first need to understand the work attitude, work ability and so on, and then formulate effective incentives to affect the investment behavior of senior managers, thereby improving their investment efficiency. Recent studies on restraining inefficient investment behavior in foreign academic circles mainly focus on the influence of executive incentive on inefficient investment, such as the impact of single incentive mode such as monetary compensation incentive or equity incentive on inefficient investment. Lack of comprehensive research. Compared with foreign countries, the executive compensation in our country only began to disclose in 1998, and the equity incentive system began to be implemented in 2006. Therefore, the research on inefficient investment in our country started late, and the theoretical system is not yet mature. In addition, there are few comparative studies on the impact of executive incentive model on inefficient investment. Therefore, this paper takes the listed companies of our country as the research object, through the empirical analysis to investigate the influence of the executive incentive system on the inefficient investment. The paper also compares the influence of monetary compensation incentive and equity incentive on inefficient investment, and draws the conclusion of this paper. This paper follows the route of literature review-theoretical analysis-empirical analysis-making recommendations. At first, it combs the relevant literature at home and abroad, then explains the principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory, risk-bearing theory, incomplete contract theory, incentive theory and other related theories by normative analysis method. Then under the background of the executive incentive system in our country, according to the previous research and theoretical basis, put forward the research hypothesis and establish the model; Through sample screening (from 2012 to 2015, 4048 effective observations of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as the research samples), the SPSS statistical software is used to carry out multivariate linear regression, and the empirical results are obtained. Finally, according to the empirical results of the analysis of the conclusions of the study. The results show that both monetary incentive and equity incentive can inhibit the emergence of inefficient investment behavior. Monetary compensation incentive is more important than equity incentive in Chinese listed companies. Finally, in view of the existing problems of listed companies in our country, this paper puts forward the corresponding policy suggestions from the aspects of the improvement of incentive mechanism and the construction of supervision policy.
【学位授予单位】：内蒙古财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F272.92

【参考文献】