内部控制、外部审计与股价崩盘风险

发布时间：2018-06-13 23:37

本文选题：股价崩盘风险 + 内部控制　；参考：《浙江财经大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：在中国当前新一轮股市动荡以及历次世界金融危机的现实背景下,股价崩盘风险成为学术界研究的热点话题。股价崩盘风险是股价暴跌的表现,源于管理层出于自利目的对上市公司重大风险和坏消息进行隐瞒的信息管理行为;同时,公司与市场投资者之间存在信息不对称,投资者对公司所隐瞒的信息无从知晓。当窖藏信息积累到阈值瞬间释放时,必然会引起股价的无预兆暴跌。股价崩盘风险会对投资者利益、公司发展甚至资本市场稳定产生极大危害。在中国,资本市场起步较晚、发展不完善,股价暴跌现象更为频繁,寻求抑制股价崩盘风险的有效方法显得亟不可待。作为公司内部的一项监督制约机制,高质量的内部控制一方面能提高财务报告的可靠性和上市公司信息透明度,缓解管理层与投资者之间的信息不对称程度;另一方面,内部控制有效实施可以对公司管理层进行监督,抑制管理层自利行为。总结而言,高质量的内部控制对股价崩盘风险有显著的负向抑制作用。同样作为公司治理的重要部分,外部审计已被证实可以提高会计信息质量,降低信息不对称程度,监督管理层行为。当上市公司聘任高质量、高声誉的会计事务所进行审计,能够充分发挥审计监督作用以实现降低股价崩盘风险的可能性。近年来,《企业内部控制基本规范》、《企业内部控制评价指引》、《企业内部控制审计指引》,《会计师事务所服务收费管理办法》、《关于坚决打击和治理注册会计师行业不正当低价竞争行为的通知》等法律法规相继颁布,我国在内部控制建设、外部审计服务方面进入了有法可依的新时期,对内部控制和外部审计的治理效应进行检验显得十分必要。本文以股价崩盘风险为切入点,研究现阶段内部控制及外部审计在稳定市场方面所发挥的作用。首先,对股价崩盘风险、内部控制、外部审计等相关研究成果进行文献综述,发现对三者关系的研究鲜少涉及。其次,结合股价暴跌风险成因理论、委托代理理论、信息不对称理论,对内部控制、外部审计如何影响股价崩盘风险进行理论分析,进而提出本文的研究假设。然后,选取2011年至2015年深、沪两市主板A股上市公司为研究对象,实证检验内部控制、外部审计与股价崩盘风险三者之间的关系。研究结果显示:(1)内部控制质量越高,股价崩盘风险越低;(2)外部审计质量越高,股价崩盘风险越低;(3)内部控制和外部审计共同作用于股价崩盘风险时,两者存在互补关系;公司的内部控制越好,越有助于审计发挥其外部治理效应,对股价崩盘风险产生抑制作用。文章最后,对本文的研究结论进行总结。并据此对企业内部管理层、外部会计师事务所以及监管机构在如何进一步改善企业内部控制质量和外部审计质量、以及稳定资本市场方面提出了一些切实可行的建议。同时,指出研究过程中存在的局限,提出后续研究可能的方向。
[Abstract]:Under the background of China's current stock market turbulence and previous world financial crises, the risk of stock price collapse has become a hot topic in academic circles. The risk of stock price collapse is the manifestation of the stock price collapse. It stems from the information management behavior of management to conceal the major risks and bad news of listed companies for self-interest purposes. At the same time, there is information asymmetry between companies and market investors. Investors have no idea what information they are hiding from the company. When the cellar information accumulates to the threshold moment release, will inevitably cause the stock price unpredictably to plummet. The risk of stock price collapse will do great harm to the interests of investors, the development of the company and even the stability of the capital market. In China, where capital markets start late, develop imperfectly, and share prices plummet more frequently, it is urgent to seek effective ways to curb the risk of share price crashes. As a supervision and restriction mechanism within the company, high quality internal control can improve the reliability of financial report and information transparency of listed companies, alleviate the information asymmetry between management and investors, on the other hand, The effective implementation of internal control can supervise the management and restrain the self-interest of the management. In conclusion, high-quality internal controls have a significant negative effect on the risk of stock price collapse. As an important part of corporate governance, external audit has been proved to improve the quality of accounting information, reduce the degree of information asymmetry, and supervise the behavior of management. When a listed company employs a high quality and reputable accounting firm to audit, it can give full play to the role of audit supervision in order to realize the possibility of reducing the risk of stock price collapse. In recent years, the basic Standards of Internal Control in Enterprises, the Evaluation guidelines on Internal Control in Enterprises, the Audit guidelines on Internal Control in Enterprises, the measures for the Management of fees and charges for the Service of Accounting firms, the rules on resolutely cracking down on and Managing the irregularities in the profession of Certified Public Accountants When the low price competition behavior notice > and other laws and regulations have been promulgated, In China, the construction of internal control and the external audit service have entered a new period with laws to be followed, so it is necessary to test the governance effect of internal control and external audit. This paper studies the role of internal control and external audit in stabilizing the market. Firstly, literature review on the risk of stock price collapse, internal control, external audit and other related research results, found that the relationship between the three rarely involved. Secondly, based on the theory of the cause of stock price collapse, principal-agent theory and information asymmetry theory, this paper makes a theoretical analysis of how internal control and external audit affect the risk of stock price collapse, and then puts forward the research hypothesis of this paper. Then, from 2011 to 2015, Shanghai and Shanghai main Board A-share listed companies as the research object, empirical test of the relationship between internal control, external audit and the risk of stock price collapse. The results show that the higher the quality of internal control is, the lower the risk of stock price collapse is. The higher the quality of external audit is, the lower the risk of stock price collapse is. (3) when internal control and external audit act on the risk of stock price collapse, there is a complementary relationship between the two. The better the internal control of the company is, the better the external governance effect of audit is, and the restraining effect on the risk of stock price collapse. Finally, the conclusion of this paper is summarized. Based on this, some practical suggestions on how to further improve the quality of internal control and external audit, as well as to stabilize the capital market, are put forward for the internal management, external accounting firms and regulators. At the same time, the limitations of the research process are pointed out, and the possible direction of follow-up research is proposed.
【学位授予单位】：浙江财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F239.4

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