机构持股、债务融资与公司盈余管理
本文选题:机构持股 + 债务融资 ; 参考:《江苏师范大学》2017年硕士论文
【摘要】:随着我国资本市场不断发展,公司盈余管理受到国内外研究学者的亲睐,经典的债务契约等理论认为,债务融资能够诱发管理层进行盈余管理。由于债务人是否能够获取融资,很多大程度上取决于债务人提供的财务报告中盈利指标。因此,将债务融资与公司盈余管理联系在一起。同时,随着机构投资者迅速发展,其在公司治理中扮演越来越重要的角色。机构投资者可通过积极参与公司治理影响管理层融资决策,进而对公司盈余管理产生影响。本文希望通过对机构持股进行分析,探讨机构持股对债务融资与盈余管理的调节作用,为提高公司盈余信息质量提供政策性建议。通过对国内外相关文献进行回顾和分析,并对研究结论进行归纳,发现以往对机构持股、债务融资与公司盈余管理关系研究中,侧重研究两两关系,没有涉及机构持股对债务融资与盈余管理调节作用的研究,且以往研究主要涉及到债务融资特征中的债务规模。本文从债务融资规模、债务融资来源和债务融资期限三大角度出发,着重研究机构投资者是否持股对债务融资与公司盈余管理的调节作用;为了进一步探索上述三者之间的关系,本文按照机构持股中位数进行划分,分别研究机构持股高/低对债务融资与盈余管理的调节作用。本文选取2010-2015年间我国沪深两市A股上市公司作为研究样本,采用修正的琼斯模型进行度量公司的盈余管理,通过描述性统计、多元线性回归方法,研究债务融资与盈余管理的关系。在此基础上,引入机构持股作为调节变量,分析了机构持股对债务融资与公司盈余管理关系的调节作用。研究发现:(1)就债务融资规模而言,公司债务水平较高时,能够诱发管理层盈余管理动机;就债务融资来源而言,银行借款的间接融资模式能够诱发盈余管理;就债务融资期限而言,长期债务融资能诱发管理层进行盈余管理,但短期债务融资能够抑制盈余管理。(2)机构持股和机构持股比例高的上市公司均能对债务规模、银行借款、长期债务融资与盈余管理关系起到反向调节的作用。最后,根据研究提出以下合理性建议:(1)规范机构投资者制度的建设;(2)加强债券市场的发展,拓宽融资渠道;(3)提高盈余信息质量,实现公司价值最大化。
[Abstract]:With the development of capital market in our country, earnings management is favored by domestic and foreign scholars. The classical debt contract theory holds that debt financing can induce management to carry out earnings management. Much depends on the profitability of the financial statements provided by the debtor because of the availability of financing for the debtor. Therefore, debt financing and corporate earnings management are linked. At the same time, with the rapid development of institutional investors, it plays an increasingly important role in corporate governance. Institutional investors can actively participate in corporate governance to influence management financing decisions, and then affect corporate earnings management. Through the analysis of institutional shareholding, this paper discusses the adjustment effect of institutional shareholding on debt financing and earnings management, and provides policy suggestions for improving the quality of earnings information. Based on the review and analysis of domestic and foreign literature, and the conclusion of the study, it is found that in the past research on the relationship between institutional shareholding, debt financing and corporate earnings management, the research focuses on the relationship between two and the other. There is no research on the regulatory effect of institutional shareholding on debt financing and earnings management, and previous studies mainly concern the debt size in the characteristics of debt financing. From the perspective of debt financing scale, debt financing source and debt financing period, this paper focuses on the adjustment effect of institutional investors' shareholding on debt financing and corporate earnings management. In order to further explore the relationship between the above three, this paper classifies the relationship between institutional ownership and earnings management according to the median of institutional shareholdings, and studies the regulatory effects of high and low institutional shareholdings on debt financing and earnings management. In this paper, A share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in China from 2010 to 2015 are selected as the research samples, and the modified Jones model is used to measure the earnings management of the companies. Through descriptive statistics, the multivariate linear regression method is used to measure the earnings of the companies. The relationship between debt financing and earnings management is studied. On this basis, institutional shareholding is introduced as a regulating variable to analyze the regulatory effect of institutional shareholding on the relationship between debt financing and corporate earnings management. The results show that: (1) when the debt level is high, the management earnings management motivation can be induced, and the indirect financing mode of bank loan can induce earnings management. As far as the term of debt financing is concerned, long-term debt financing can induce management of earnings, but short-term debt financing can restrain earnings management. The relationship between long-term debt financing and earnings management plays a reverse role. Finally, the following reasonable suggestions are put forward according to the research: (1) standardizing the construction of institutional investor system; (2) strengthening the development of the bond market and widening the financing channels; (3) improving the quality of earnings information to maximize the value of the company.
【学位授予单位】:江苏师范大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:F275;F832.51
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