农户联保贷款集体违约风险防控研究

发布时间：2018-07-01 12:08

本文选题：农户联保贷款 + 集体违约风险　；参考：《武汉理工大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：近年来，联保贷款凭借其独特的制度优势迅速发展成为我国第二大农户贷款模式，在缓解农户融资困境、解决“三农”问题上发挥了重要作用。然而，当联保农户选择集体违约时，该贷款模式不仅未能够发挥其社会担保的制度优势，，反而会给放贷机构造成更大损失。因此，有必要加强对联保农户集体违约风险的管理与控制，以使农户联保贷款模式有效发挥其支农惠农的扶贫效应。本文以农户联保贷款集体违约风险为研究对象，综合运用博弈论、概率论、实证案例以及新制度经济学等相关分析方法，对其生成与防控机制展开深入研究，并基于分析结论提出改进与创新该贷款模式的制度安排。论文主要内容如下：本文在介绍农户联保贷款模式概况的基础上，首先借助相关案例对农户联保贷款集体违约风险的表现形式与成因进行了梳理与总结，接着通过构建联保小组内部成员之间、以及联保小组与放贷机构之间的博弈模型，借助概率论等相关数理工具探析了不同情形下农户联保贷款集体违约风险的生成机制；然后，本文拟通过引入抵押品对农户联保贷款模式进行改进，并对其现实可行性以及对集体违约风险的防控机制展开了分析；最后，论文基于前文分析结论，从多个角度探讨了农户联保贷款集体违约风险的有效防控措施。本文通过分析指出，农户联保贷款集体违约风险主要有组员跟风拖欠、组员合谋以及经营环境恶化三种表现形式，由借款农户法律与诚信意识薄弱、放贷机构信贷管理执行不力以及同地域农业产业结构单一等原因造成。从博弈角度来看，联保农户集体违约现象发生与否，主要取决于信贷市场完全程度、未来再贷款价值以及社会约束大小。另外，随着近年来我国农村居民抵押担保能力的不断提升，农户联保抵押创新贷款模式具有一定的现实可行性，并且可借助物质担保手段有效解决联保组员集体违约下的社会担保失效问题。最后，为有效防控农户联保贷款集体违约风险，论文针对农村金融机构和相关政府部门不同的参与程度与角色扮演，分别对二者提出一系列可操作性建议以及政策安排。从理论意义来讲，本文将借助博弈与数理工具从多个角度对联保农户集体违约风险的生成与防控机制展开分析，这是对当前关于农户联保贷款模式研究领域的一个重要补充；而从现实意义来看，论文将根据集体违约风险生成与防控机制的分析结果提出相关政策建议，可对农村金融机构今后顺利开展农户联保贷款业务提供一定借鉴。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with its unique institutional advantages, the UNPROFOR loan has developed rapidly into the second largest peasant household loan mode in China, which has played an important role in alleviating the farmers' financing difficulties and solving the "three rural" problems. However, when UNPROFOR farmers choose to default collectively, the loan model will not only fail to give play to the institutional advantages of social guarantees, but will cause more losses to lenders. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen the management and control of the risk of collective default of the rural households in order to make the mode of rural households' UNPROFOR loan give full play to the effect of helping agriculture and benefiting farmers effectively. This paper takes the collective default risk of peasant household's UNPROFOR loan as the research object, synthetically uses the game theory, the probability theory, the empirical case and the new institutional economics and so on correlation analysis method, carries on the thorough research to its generation and the prevention and control mechanism. Based on the conclusion of the analysis, the paper puts forward the institutional arrangements for improving and innovating the loan model. The main contents of this paper are as follows: on the basis of introducing the general situation of peasant household's UNPROFOR loan mode, this paper firstly combs and summarizes the manifestation and cause of collective default risk of peasant household's UNPROFOR loan with the help of relevant cases. Then, by constructing the game model between the members of the group and between the group and the lending institution, and with the help of the probability theory and other relevant mathematical tools, this paper analyzes the generation mechanism of collective default risk of the farmers' UNPROFOR loan under different circumstances. This paper intends to improve the model of farmers' UNPROFOR loan by introducing collateral, and analyzes its practical feasibility and prevention and control mechanism of collective default risk. Finally, the paper is based on the conclusions of the above analysis. This paper discusses the effective prevention and control measures of collective default risk of farmers'UNPROFOR loan from several angles. Through analysis, this paper points out that the collective default risk of peasant households' UNPROFOR loan mainly includes three forms: group members' default, collusion of the members and deterioration of the operating environment, and the sense of law and good faith of the borrowing farmers is weak. The credit management of lending institutions is weak and the structure of agricultural industry in the same region is single. From the point of view of game theory, whether the collective default occurs or not mainly depends on the complete degree of the credit market, the value of the future reloan and the size of the social constraints. In addition, with the continuous improvement of the mortgage guarantee ability of rural residents in China in recent years, the innovative loan mode of rural household protection mortgage has certain practical feasibility. And it can effectively solve the problem of social guarantee invalidation under collective breach of contract by means of material guarantee. Finally, in order to effectively prevent and control the collective default risk of farmers' UNPROFOR loans, the paper puts forward a series of operational suggestions and policy arrangements for rural financial institutions and related government departments. From the theoretical point of view, this paper will use game and mathematical tools to analyze the generation and prevention and control mechanism of the collective default risk of UNPROFOR farmers from many angles, which is an important supplement to the field of research on the mode of peasant households' UNPROFOR loan at present; According to the analysis results of collective default risk generation and prevention and control mechanism, the paper will put forward relevant policy recommendations, which can be used as a reference for rural financial institutions to carry out rural household UNPROFOR loan business smoothly in the future.
【学位授予单位】：武汉理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.43;F224.32

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