机构投资者持股对我国上市公司并购交易的影响研究

发布时间：2018-07-05 16:57

本文选题：机构投资者持股 + 公司治理　；参考：《南京大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：本文首先回顾了公司治理的内涵、利益相关者理论和委托代理理论等机构投资者参与公司治理的理论基础并总结归纳了机构投资者参与公司治理的现有文献,其中特别回顾了在机构投资者持股对我国上市公司利益输送行为影响的研究。在理论基础和文献回顾的基础上,本文通过全面分析机构投资者与企业各利益相关者的关系及可能的影响途径与方法,将机构投资者参与公司治理的机制归为内部和外部两方面。结合对上市公司并购流程和相应信息披露时点的分析,本文指出了机构投资者对上市公司并购交易可能的介入时机、方式和途径。基于上述分析,提出了有关机构投资者持股对上市公司并购交易的六个假设并构建了相应的逻辑回归模型和多元线性回归模型。模型以机构投资者持股比例作为解释变量,以上市公司并购交易的产生、规模和绩效作为被解释变量,通过实证的方法对文章的假设进行检验。本文以2009年至2011年我国沪深两市A股市场发生的790个并购事件为样本,识别了以利益输送为目的的掏空型并购和支持型并购。通过实证分析和对结果的讨论之后,得出以下结论：(1)机构投资者持股没有能够有效遏制上市公司掏空型并购的产生,其主要可能的原因是机构投资者在上市公司内部治理机制中的缺位。(2)机构投资者持股能够有效减小上市公司掏空型并购的规模,说明其在外部治理机制中的作用影响了上市公司的并购决策。(3)机构投资者持股能够有效识掏空型并购并对其市场绩效产生负向影响。(4)证券投资资金和合格境外投资者持股与上市公司掏空型并购的财务绩效显著正相关。
[Abstract]:This paper reviews the connotation of corporate governance, stakeholder theory, principal-agent theory and other institutional investors involved in corporate governance, and summarizes the existing literature on institutional investor participation in corporate governance. In particular, it reviews the impact of institutional investor holding on the interest transmission behavior of listed companies in China. On the basis of theoretical basis and literature review, this paper analyzes the relationship between institutional investors and various stakeholders of the enterprise, as well as the possible ways and methods of influence. The mechanism of institutional investors participating in corporate governance is classified as internal and external. Based on the analysis of the process of M & A of listed companies and the corresponding information disclosure, this paper points out the possible timing, ways and means for institutional investors to intervene in M & A transactions of listed companies. Based on the above analysis, this paper puts forward six hypotheses about institutional investor holding on M & A transactions of listed companies, and constructs corresponding logical regression model and multivariate linear regression model. The model takes institutional investor's shareholding ratio as the explanatory variable, and takes the emergence, scale and performance of M & A transaction of listed companies as the explanatory variables, and tests the hypothesis of the article by empirical method. Based on 790 M & A events in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share markets from 2009 to 2011, this paper identifies tunneling M & A and supporting M & A. After empirical analysis and discussion of the results, the following conclusions are drawn: (1) Institutional investors' shareholding can not effectively curb the emergence of tunneling mergers and acquisitions of listed companies. The main possible reason is the absence of institutional investors in the internal governance mechanism of listed companies. (2) Institutional investors holding shares can effectively reduce the scale of tunneling mergers and acquisitions of listed companies. It shows that its role in the external governance mechanism affects the M & A decision of listed companies. (3) Institutional investor holding can effectively identify tunneling M & A and have a negative impact on its market performance. (4) Securities investment funds and qualified overseas investment. There is a significant positive correlation between shareholder shareholding and financial performance of tunneling mergers and acquisitions of listed companies.
【学位授予单位】：南京大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51;F271

【参考文献】