证券民事诉讼制度的实证研究

发布时间：2018-07-09 13:50

本文选题：证券民事诉讼 + 投资者保护　；参考：《中国政法大学学报》2017年02期

【摘要】：证券民事诉讼制度是公司治理的重要组成部分,在事后保护投资者的合法权益。由于高昂的参与成本,因欺诈行为而遭受损失的投资者缺乏提起证券民事诉讼的激励。对证券虚假陈述责任纠纷判决文书的实证分析显示,投资者和证券律师之间存在显著的代理成本,证券律师为了鼓励投资者参与诉讼,倾向于高估损害赔偿。由于案件受理费是按照诉讼请求的金额计算,而不是法院判决的金额计算,投资者承担了高估损害赔偿的成本。笔者认为,可以通过改革证券民事诉讼案件受理费用的计算规则,即以判决损害赔偿的数额按比例分段累计计算受理费用,或者按照请求损害赔偿的金额累计计算,但设定受理费占判决赔偿金额的比例上限降低代理成本、提高投资者的预期收益。
[Abstract]:Securities civil litigation system is an important part of corporate governance, protecting the legitimate rights and interests of investors after the event. Because of the high cost of participation, investors who suffer losses due to fraud lack the incentive to initiate civil action on securities. The empirical analysis on the judgment documents of securities misrepresentation liability disputes shows that there are significant agency costs between investors and securities lawyers, and securities lawyers tend to overestimate damages in order to encourage investors to participate in litigation. Since the case acceptance fee is calculated on the basis of the amount of the claim, not the amount of the court ruling, the investor bears the cost of overestimating the damages. The author believes that the rules for calculating the costs of accepting securities civil litigation cases can be reformed, that is, the cumulative amount of damages awarded shall be calculated in proportion to the cumulative amount of damages, or according to the cumulative amount of damages requested. But setting a cap on the proportion of acceptance fees to the amount of compensation awarded reduces agency costs and raises investors' expected returns.
【作者单位】：中国政法大学法与经济学研究院;
【基金】：中国政法大学校级科学研究青年项目——“我国证券法执行机制的实证分析”(项目编号:10816332)的资助
【分类号】：D922.287;D925.1

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