子公司自主权与母公司高管激励有效性关系研究

发布时间：2018-08-25 08:18

【摘要】：股东基于公司业绩对高管进行激励,以缓解股东与管理层之间的委托代理问题。而我国上市公司母子公司股权投资程度日益增加,母公司强化资源配置职能、弱化生产经营活动,整体业绩越来越依赖于子公司的经营状况。由于子公司独立法人的地位以及业务、地域的差异,母公司高管难以直接决定下层子公司经营状况。因此,在以企业整体业绩作为评价基础的激励机制下,母子公司长期股权投资程度增加的业务结构和子公司自主权增加的权力结构,将导致上市公司高管身处总部,其激励的决定与效果愈来愈受非其行为直接决定的下层子公司经营状况的影响。故有的高管激励机制对于同时具有高股权投资程度和大子公司自主权的企业的适用性值得探讨。现有高管激励研究大多从母子公司的合并整体出发,研究公司规模、治理结构及管理层任期等因素对高管激励的影响,对于公司内部业务及权力分布如何影响高管激励尚缺乏探讨。公司业务逐渐下沉到子公司后,公司生产经营决策的部分自主权也由母公司高管逐渐转移到子公司高管手中。因此,本文以识别的公司业务结构调整背景下经营决策权分配特征为切入点,从委托代理视角,就长期股权投资程度增加的趋势下,子公司自主权大小是否会影响高管激励的有效性的问题展开研究。根据激励契约理论,有效的高管激励应与高管可控制的结果挂钩。业务下沉后,母公司高管对企业业绩的影响力受子公司高管自主权大小的影响,相应的,以合并业绩评价此类企业母公司高管表现的准确度也依赖于企业的经营决策权的集中度。而业绩基础的信息有效性直接左右了激励制度对高管行为的激励效果。另一方面,业务下沉后,母公司高管主要从事企业资本的配置,而配置效率较经营决策的好坏需要更长时间得以显现,致使针对母公司高管的长、短期激励的有效性发生变化。激励机制的(长短期)结构安排需要重新考虑。基于以上分析,研究将从盈余持续性角度,分别研究子公司自主权对母公司高管薪酬激励、股权激励有效性的影响。本文使用2008-2011年沪深两市A股非金融类上市公司样本,考察企业自主权分配特征对母公司高管激励有效性的影响。研究发现：(1)在母子公司长期股权投资程度较高的情形下,相对于子公司自主权小的公司,子公司自主权大的公司高管薪酬激励有效性较差；(2)当上市公司对子公司股权投资程度较高时,对于子公司自主权小与自主权大的公司,股权激励均是有效性的,且子公司自主权小的公司与子公司自主权大的公司的股权激励有效性没有显著差异。(3)在长期股权投资程度低的情形下,子公司自主权的大小对于高管薪酬激励与股权激励的有效性没有显著影响。研究揭示了下层子公司业绩影响力对上市公司高管长短期激励机制有效性的不同作用。与前人研究不同：①现有的高管激励决定因素研究大多从企业整体出发,研究财务及治理状况对高管激励的影响；没有考虑到内部不同业务分布特征的公司高管激励效用的异质性。本文深入企业内部,以激励业绩基础选择的基本原则为分析的切入点,研究业务结构变化背景下决策权的分配对高管激励有效性产生的内生性影响,探究母子公司股权控制趋势下企业高管激励的特点。②由于分部数据的缺乏,国内已有的集团化研究多以上市公司为集团分部,研究集团内部资本市场的存在性与效率。以上市公司为总部、研究高管激励对多元化投资企业内部资本市场效率影响的文献停留于理论模型推导层面,缺乏大样本的经验证据。本文通过比较合并、母公司经营业绩的盈余持续性差异的方式,间接衡量高管激励对多元化股权投资企业价值的促进作用,拓展了集团企业的财务研究。本文研究的意义在于,从业务在母子公司间的分布及权力分配特征视角丰富了高管激励有效性研究,并对高管激励的制定提供了参考：在母子公司股权投资程度增加的趋势下,子公司自主权大的公司简单沿用基于合并业绩的薪酬激励方式不能对母公司高管的产生激励作用。股权投资程度高且子公司自主权大的公司应当增加母公司高管激励机制中股权激励的比重,减少薪酬激励的比重。
[Abstract]:Shareholders motivate executives on the basis of corporate performance to alleviate the principal-agent problem between shareholders and managers. However, the degree of equity investment between parent and subsidiary companies of Listed Companies in China is increasing day by day. The parent company strengthens the function of resource allocation, weakens production and operation activities, and the overall performance is increasingly dependent on the operating conditions of subsidiaries. Therefore, under the incentive mechanism based on the overall performance of the enterprise, the business structure and the power structure of the increase of the degree of long-term equity investment of the parent-subsidiary company and the autonomy of the subsidiary company will lead to the listed company. The decision and effect of executive incentive in headquarters are more and more influenced by the operating conditions of the lower subsidiaries which are not directly determined by their actions.
Existing researches on executive incentives mostly focus on the merger of parent-subsidiary companies, the impact of company size, governance structure and management tenure on executive incentives, and the impact of internal business and power distribution on executive incentives. Therefore, this paper takes the characteristics of management decision-making power distribution under the background of corporate business restructuring as the breakthrough point, from the perspective of principal-agent, as to whether the size of subsidiary autonomy will affect the effectiveness of executive incentives under the trend of increasing long-term equity investment. The problem is studied.
According to the incentive contract theory, effective executive incentives should be linked to the results of managerial control. After business sinks, the influence of parent executives on firm performance is affected by the size of autonomy of subsidiary executives. Correspondingly, the accuracy of evaluating parent Executives'performance by combining performance also depends on the decision-making power of the firm. On the other hand, after the business sinks, the parent company executives are mainly engaged in the allocation of corporate capital, and the allocation efficiency needs longer time than the quality of business decisions, resulting in long-term and short-term incentives for the parent company executives. The structure of incentive mechanism needs to be reconsidered. Based on the above analysis, we will study the influence of subsidiary autonomy on parent company executive compensation incentive and equity incentive effectiveness from the persistence of earnings.
Using the sample of A-share non-financial listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2008 to 2011, this paper investigates the effect of corporate autonomy distribution on the incentive effectiveness of parent-subsidiary executives. The effectiveness of incentive incentives is poor; (2) When the listed companies invest more in subsidiary equity, equity incentives are effective for companies with small autonomy and large autonomy, and there is no significant difference in the effectiveness of equity incentives between companies with small autonomy and those with large autonomy. (3) There is no significant difference in long-term equity incentives between companies with small autonomy and those with large autonomy. In the case of low investment level, the size of subsidiary autonomy has no significant effect on the effectiveness of executive compensation incentive and equity incentive.
Different from the previous studies: 1) Most of the existing research on the determinants of executive incentives is based on the whole enterprise, which studies the impact of financial and governance conditions on executive incentives; the heterogeneity of the incentive effectiveness of corporate executives does not take into account the different internal business distribution characteristics. Then, the paper studies the endogenous influence of the distribution of decision-making power on the effectiveness of executive incentives under the background of business structure changes, and explores the characteristics of executive incentives under the trend of parent-subsidiary equity control. 2. Due to the lack of branch data, most of the existing collectivization studies in China are listed companies as group branches, and research groups. The literature on the influence of executive incentives on the efficiency of the internal capital market of diversified investment firms based on the headquarters of listed companies remains at the theoretical model deduction level, lacking empirical evidence from large samples. Measuring the role of executive incentives in promoting the value of diversified equity investment enterprises has expanded the financial research of group enterprises.
The significance of this study lies in that it enriches the research on the effectiveness of executive incentives from the perspective of the distribution of business between parent and subsidiary companies and power distribution characteristics, and provides a reference for the formulation of executive incentives: under the trend of increasing equity investment in parent and subsidiary companies, companies with large autonomy of subsidiary companies simply follow the salary incentive based on Merger Performance Incentives can not motivate the parent executives. Companies with high equity investment and large subsidiary autonomy should increase the proportion of equity incentives in parent Executives'incentive mechanism and reduce the proportion of incentive incentives.
【学位授予单位】：北京交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51;F272.92;F275

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