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上市公司独立董事非正常辞职行为的市场反应研究

发布时间:2018-10-30 10:23
【摘要】:我国上市公司普遍存在“一股独大”、股权高度集中的问题,大股东往往具有侵占中小股东利益的动机,为了使中小投资者的利益得到更好的维护,独立董事制度被引入。然而现实中,独立董事的独立性备受争议。鉴于投资者很难观察到董事会内部的决策过程,只能通过独立董事行为来判断公司状况,特别是近年来独立董事辞职潮的出现,成为投资者决策的重要依据。在搜集及查阅相关文献的基础上发现,现有研究主要从独立董事辞职的市场反应以及个人特征对市场反应影响两方面来进行研究,缺少将辞职原因进一步划分,以及从独立董事功能角度进行影响因素的探讨,从而形成了本文的研究思路。本文首先对独立董事辞职非正常辞职行为进行界定,在此基础上,基于信号传递理论分析独立董事非正常辞职行为带来的市场反应,并从独立董事监督大股东行为角度,根据委托代理理论,研究资金占用、关联担保、关联交易三个因素对市场反应程度的影响,提出研究假设。用Wind金融数据库中2010年到2014年536个存在独立董事非正常辞职的A股上市公司样本,采用事件研究法进行研究,在此基础上建立多元回归模型进行市场反应影响因素的实证检验。通过理论分析和数据验证,结果表明:外部投资者对独立董事非正常辞职行为反应消极信号,平均异常收益率和平均累计异常收益率均为负值,且持续较长时间;进一步划分不同辞职原因发现,投资者对因个人原因造成的独立董事辞职事件最为敏感;存在资金占用、关联交易、关联担保这三类大股东代理行为的公司,投资者对独立董事非正常辞职行为的市场反应更为强烈。另外,为了结果的准确性,还进行了稳健性检验,所得结果与市场模型一致,说明结论是可信的。本文的结论为公司改善治理水平提供借鉴意义,同时为监管部门完善独立董事制度以及实行有效监督提供证据支持。
[Abstract]:In order to protect the interests of small and medium-sized investors, the independent director system is introduced in order to protect the interests of small and medium-sized investors, because of the problem of "one share is dominant" and the stock rights are highly concentrated in the listed companies of our country, and the major shareholders often have the motive of encroaching on the interests of small and medium shareholders. However, in reality, the independence of independent directors is controversial. Since it is difficult for investors to observe the decision-making process within the board of directors, it is only through the behavior of independent directors that they can judge the situation of the company, especially the emergence of the tide of resignation of independent directors in recent years, which has become an important basis for investors to make decisions. On the basis of collecting and consulting relevant literature, it is found that the existing studies mainly focus on the market reaction of the resignation of independent directors and the influence of individual characteristics on the market reaction, and the lack of further division of the reasons for resignation. And from the independent director's function angle carries on the influence factor discussion, thus formed this research thought. This paper first defines the abnormal resignation behavior of independent directors, and based on this, analyzes the market reaction caused by the abnormal resignation of independent directors based on signal transmission theory, and from the angle of independent directors' supervision of the behavior of large shareholders, it analyzes the market reaction caused by the abnormal resignation of independent directors based on the theory of signal transmission. According to the principal-agent theory, this paper studies the influence of three factors on the market reaction degree, such as capital occupation, affiliated guarantee and related party transaction, and puts forward the research hypothesis. From 2010 to 2014, 536 samples of A-share listed companies with abnormal resignation of independent directors in Wind financial database were used to study them. On the basis of this, a multivariate regression model was established to test the influencing factors of market reaction. Through theoretical analysis and data verification, the results show that: external investors react to the abnormal resignation of independent directors, the average abnormal rate of return and the average cumulative abnormal rate of return are both negative, and continue for a long time; Further divided into different resignation reasons found that investors are most sensitive to the resignation of independent directors caused by personal reasons; There are three kinds of agency behavior of large shareholders, such as capital occupation, related party transaction and related party guarantee, and investors react more strongly to the abnormal resignation of independent directors in the market. In addition, for the accuracy of the results, the robustness test is carried out, and the results are consistent with the market model, which shows that the conclusions are credible. The conclusion of this paper provides reference significance for the improvement of corporate governance, and provides evidence support for the supervision department to perfect the independent director system and to carry out effective supervision.
【学位授予单位】:哈尔滨工业大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2016
【分类号】:F271;F832.51


本文编号:2299734

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