国资控股公司在职消费与股权激励替代效应研究

发布时间：2017-12-27 18:08

本文关键词：国资控股公司在职消费与股权激励替代效应研究　出处：《湖南大学》2016年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：股权激励与在职消费同属于高管激励契约的一部分,两种的激励契约拥有不同的契约成本,一种激励方式的可获得性与否与收益的高低会影响高管对另一种激励方式的选择,因此在职消费与股权激励之间可能会存在着替代效应。然而,现有成果中分别对这两者进行研究的文章虽多,深入研究在职消费与股权激励之间替代效应的却很少。因此,本文从股权激励方案的制定环节出发,以国资控股公司为样本,结合国企激励制度的特殊性,重点探讨国资控股公司的在职消费水平与股权激励方案的福利性程度之间的相关性关系。具体本文以2008年1月1日至2014年12月31日期间所有公布股权激励方案的国资控股公司为研究对象,对在职消费如何影响国资控股公司股权激励方案类型的选择,以及公司的内部股权结构和管理层权力在该影响过程中扮演了怎样的角色进行了理论探讨和实证检验,研究发现：在职消费水平对股权激励方案类型存在显著的替代效应；股权制衡度的提高,会弱化在职消费对股权激励方案类型的替代效应影响；管理层权力的提高也会弱化国资控股公司在职消费与股权激励方案选择之间的替代效应。这意味着,改善一股独大的股权结构,实现股权制衡,可以有效抑制高管的道德风险,并将促成最有利于公司发展的激励契约的达成；同时在国资控股公司股权激励方案的制定过程中,要密切关注行权业绩条件等条款的设定,避免股权激励沦为管理层弥补在职消费方面福利损失的工具。
[Abstract]:A portion of the equity incentive and perquisite consumption belong to executive incentive contract, two kinds of incentive contracts with different contract costs, an incentive mechanism can be obtained or not and the income will affect the level of executives on another incentive options, so between on-the-job consumption and equity incentive may exist substitution effect. However, although there are many articles on the two, there are few alternative effects between on-the-job consumption and equity incentive. Therefore, starting from the formulation of equity incentive program and taking the state owned holding company as a sample, combined with the particularity of the incentive system of state-owned enterprises, this paper focuses on the correlation between the incumbency level of state owned holding companies and the welfare degree of equity incentive programs. This paper from January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2014 all announced equity incentive plan of state-owned holding company as the research object, how to influence the state owned holding company equity incentive plan to choose the type of service consumption, and the company's internal ownership structure and management power in the process of how to play the role of theoretical discussion and empirical test. The study found: scheme types have a significant substitution effect on the consumption level of the equity incentive; equity balance degree of substitution effect will weaken the influence of consumption equity incentive plan types; management of power will improve the substitution effect between consumption and equity weakening of state owned holding company incentive scheme selection. This means that the improvement of shareholder ownership structure, to achieve the balance of ownership, moral hazard can effectively restrain executive, and to reach the most conducive to the development of the company's equity incentive contract; at the same time in the state owned holding company scheme, should pay close attention to exercise performance conditions in terms of the set. To avoid becoming the management equity incentive for on-the-job consumption welfare loss tool.
【学位授予单位】：湖南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F272.92

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