中国家族上市企业控制权与现金流权分离对非效率投资行为的影响

发布时间：2017-12-27 21:31

本文关键词：中国家族上市企业控制权与现金流权分离对非效率投资行为的影响　出处：《南京大学》2016年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：随着我国市场经济改革的不断深化,中国家族企业发展极为迅速,逐渐成长为国民经济中不可或缺的重要组成部分。得益于中国资本市场的的不断壮大,越来越多的中国家族企业选择登陆中国沪深A股市场,包括了中小板与创业板,资本市场出现了越来越多优秀的家族企业。学术界针对家族企业也进行了越来越多的研究。家族企业的一个主要特征是控制权与现金流权的分离,这是学者们关注的重点所在,因此学术界对家族企业的研究也主要集中在公司股权结构与公司治理问题上,如：控制权与现金流权分离对公司价值的影响,控制权与现金流权分离对公司绩效的影响。投资行为作为企业发展的原动力,会对公司融资政策、分配政策产生重大影响,继而影响到公司未来业绩和发展前景。但是学者们对控制权与现金流权分离对投资效率的影响关系却鲜少探讨,因此,我们研究控制权与现金流权分离对企业投资效率的影响是非常必要且有意义的。本文以公司终极控制人为家族或个人作为界定家族上市公司的标准,从沪深A股中筛选出471家符合要求的中国家族上市企业。选取2012-2013两年的数据,研究控制权与现金流权分离对非效率投资行为的影响。文章首先阐述了家族企业的定义和本文的两个理论基础——委托代理理论和控制权理论,分析了控制权与现金流权分离的实现方式和测量方法,以及控制权与现金流权分离对投资行为会产生何种影响。其次,基于2012-2013年中国471家家族上市企业已披露的年报中股权与控制关系确认上市公司终极控制股东,计算终极控制股东的控制权与现金流权以及控制权与现金流权的分离度。再次,采用Richardson模型,对样本企业进行多元回归分析,以回归方程的残差项代表非效率投资的类型及程度。最后以控制权与现金流权的分离度作为解释变量,非效率投资作为被解释变量,进行多元回归分析,探讨两者的影响关系。在此基础上,以471家样本企业终极控制人的现金流权中位数为界,分为高现金流权组和低现金流组,分别进行多元线性回归分析。并且探讨现金持有水平是否会对控制权与现金流权分离对投资效率的影响产生调节作用。实证结果表明,第一,中国家族上市企业普遍存在非效率投资行为,投资不足的样本数多于投资过度的样本数。第二,控制权与现金流权的分离度越大,投资不足越严重,但控制权与现金流权的分离对投资过度则没有显著影响。第三,基于利益协同效应,高现金流权组中,控制权与现金流权的分离对非效率投资行为没有显著影响,但在低现金流权组,控制权与现金流权的分离与投资不足显著正相关。第四,现金持有水平的调节效应不显著。为了防范由于家族企业终极控制人追逐私利掏空上市公司带来的对中小股东利益侵害的风险,本文提出三点建议。其一,完善股权结构和监督机制；其二,减少控制链层级,降低控制权与现金流权的分离程度；其三,引入职业经理人制度,提高家族控股股东的持股比例。
[Abstract]:With the deepening of the reform of the market economy in China, the development of family enterprises in China is very rapid and has gradually grown into an indispensable part of the national economy. Thanks to the continuous growth of China's capital market, more and more Chinese family businesses choose to go to China's Shanghai and Shenzhen A share market, including small and medium-sized board and gem, and there are more and more excellent family businesses in capital market. More and more studies have been carried out on family businesses in the academic world. One of the main characteristics of family enterprises is the separation of control right and cash flow right, this is the focus of scholars, so the family business academic research also focused on the ownership structure and corporate governance company, such as: control rights and cash flow rights separation effect on the value of the company, control rights and cash flow rights separation effect on corporate performance. As the driving force of the development of enterprises, investment behavior will have a significant impact on the company's financing policy and distribution policy, and then affect the company's future performance and development prospects. But scholars have seldom discussed the relationship between control right and cash flow right separation to investment efficiency. Therefore, it is very necessary and meaningful for us to study the influence of separation of control rights and cash flow rights on the investment efficiency of enterprises. In this paper, we take the ultimate control family or family as the standard to define family listed companies. We select 471 eligible Chinese family listed companies from Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares. The data of 2012-2013 years are selected to study the influence of the separation of control and cash flow on the inefficiency investment behavior. This article firstly expounds the definition of family business and the two theoretical basis of principal-agent theory and control theory, analyzes the way and method to realize the control rights and cash flow rights separation, and the separation of control rights and cash flow rights will affect investment behavior. Secondly, based on the relationship between ownership and control in the annual reports published by 471 Chinese Family Listed Companies in the past 2012-2013 years, we confirm the ultimate controlling shareholders of listed companies, and calculate the separation of control and cash flow rights of the ultimate controlling shareholders and the separation of control rights and cash flow rights. Thirdly, the Richardson model is used to analyze the sample enterprise by multiple regression analysis, and the residual term of the regression equation represents the type and degree of the inefficiency investment. Finally, taking the separation degree of control rights and cash flow rights as explanatory variables, inefficient investment is used as explanatory variable, and multiple regression analysis is conducted to explore the relationship between them. On this basis, the median of the cash flow rights of the ultimate controller of 471 sample enterprises is bounded, and they are divided into high cash flow group and low cash flow group, and multiple linear regression analysis is conducted respectively. It also discusses whether the level of cash holding will regulate the impact of the separation of control and cash flow on the efficiency of investment. The empirical results show that, first, the non efficient investment behavior is common in Chinese listed companies, and the number of underinvested samples is more than the number of overinvestment samples. Second, the greater the separation of the right of control and cash flow, the more serious the investment is, but the separation of the right of control and cash flow has no significant influence on the overinvestment. Third, based on the synergistic effect of interest, the separation of control rights and cash flow rights has no significant impact on inefficient investment behavior in high cash flow group, but in the low cash flow group, the separation of control rights and cash flow rights is significantly positively related to underinvestment. Fourth, the adjustment effect of cash holding level is not significant. In order to prevent the risk that the ultimate controller of the family enterprise is pursuing private profits to empty the listed companies, this paper puts forward three suggestions. First, improve the ownership structure and supervision mechanism; secondly, reduce the control chain level, reduce the separation of control rights and cash flow rights; thirdly, introduce the professional manager system to improve the shareholding ratio of family controlled shareholders.
【学位授予单位】：南京大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F275;F276.5

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