管理层权力及企业规模与交叉持股的交互影响——基于中国资本市场的实证研究

发布时间：2018-02-12 19:37

本文关键词： 交叉持股公司规模国企改革管理层权力　出处：《证券市场导报》2017年01期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：交叉持股是短期做大规模和业绩改善的利器,特别是在牛市行情中,由于股票价格上涨带来持股账面收益剧增,这种效应更加显著。企业交叉持股的动因很多,包括阻止恶意收购、战略联盟协同、防止管理层短视行为等,本文则从管理层特征出发考虑其对交叉持股的影响,具体而言,考虑管理层权力对交叉持股的影响,加深我们对交叉持股动因的理解,弥补交叉持股动因理论空白。借鉴李青原和刘志成(2010)[13]的实证研究模型,本文以中国A股市场2004~2015年上市公司交叉持股为样本实证检验管理层权力对交叉持股的影响,并考虑企业规模对其的调节作用。研究结果发现:管理层权力越大,交叉持股越多;企业规模越大,交叉持股的可能性越大;最后,企业规模对管理层权力与交叉持股关系没有显著影响。
[Abstract]:Cross-shareholding is a powerful tool to do large-scale and improve performance in the short term, especially in the bull market, because of the sharp increase in book income caused by the rise of stock price, this effect is even more significant. There are many motivations for cross-shareholding. Including preventing hostile takeover, strategic alliance cooperation, preventing management short-sighted behavior and so on. This paper considers the influence of management power on cross-shareholding from the perspective of management characteristics, specifically, considering the influence of management power on cross-shareholding. To deepen our understanding of cross-shareholding motivation, to make up for the gaps in cross-shareholding motivation theory. [13] [13] empirical research model, which is based on Li Qingyuan and Liu Zhicheng 2010. In this paper, the cross-shareholding of listed companies in China A-share market from 2004 to 2015 is taken as a sample to test the influence of management power on cross-shareholding, and the regulatory effect of enterprise size on cross-shareholding is considered. The results show that: the greater the power of management, the more cross-shareholding; The larger the enterprise scale, the greater the possibility of cross-shareholding. Finally, the size of the enterprise has no significant effect on the relationship between management power and cross-shareholding.
【作者单位】：对外经济贸易大学金融学院;西南证券股份有限公司;
【分类号】：F275;F272.91;F272.92

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