财政透明度对企业产能过剩的影响研究——基于“主观”与“被动”投资偏误的视角

发布时间：2018-02-14 21:29

  本文关键词： 财政透明度 土地资源获取 产能过剩　出处：《财经研究》2017年05期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：文章把地方政府的财政透明度纳入企业微观行为的分析体系,根据《2012年中国市级政府财政透明度研究报告》和《2012年世界银行中国企业调查数据》等统计资料,实证检验了财政透明度对企业产能过剩的两种影响机制——企业"主观"投资偏误形成机理和"被动"投资偏误形成机理。研究发现:(1)财政透明度的提高会增加企业对政府行为的理性预期,减少其对外部经营环境的不确定性判断,抑制了企业由于"主观"投资偏误而导致的产能利用率低下、产能过剩现象;(2)财政透明度的提高增加了政府干预土地要素市场的成本,继而减少了企业因政府干预土地要素市场而产生的"被动"投资偏误,产能利用率提高。
[Abstract]:In this paper, the financial transparency of local governments is incorporated into the microcosmic behavior analysis system of enterprises. According to the statistical data such as the 2012 Research report on the Fiscal Transparency of Chinese Municipal governments and the 2012 World Bank Survey data on Chinese Enterprises, etc. This paper empirically tests two kinds of influence mechanisms of fiscal transparency on overcapacity of enterprises, that is, the formation mechanism of "subjective" investment bias and "passive" investment bias of enterprises. It is found that the improvement of fiscal transparency will increase enterprises. Industry's rational expectation of government behavior, Reducing the uncertainty judgment of external operating environment, restraining the low utilization rate of production capacity caused by "subjective" investment bias, and increasing the fiscal transparency of excess capacity increase the cost of government intervention in the land factor market. Then it reduces the "passive" investment bias caused by government intervention in the land factor market, and improves the utilization rate of production capacity.
【作者单位】： 上海财经大学公共经济与管理学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金项目(11BZZ061) 上海财经大学研究生创新基金项目(CXJJ-2016-39)
【分类号】：F279.2;F812.2
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本文编号：1511657